



Steffen Werner

The Second Babylonian Captivity

**The Fate
of the Jews
in Eastern Europe
since 1941**

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by Steffen Werner



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The Fate of the Jews in Eastern Europe since 1941.

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Foreword

According to orthodox historiography, which is prescribed by penal law in many European countries, about three million European Jews were murdered in homicidal gas chambers between December 1941 and the autumn of 1944. These chambers are said to have been erected in six camps in Poland, in the combined “concentration and extermination camps” Auschwitz-Birkenau and Majdanek (Lublin) and in the “pure extermination camps” in Bełżec, Chełmno (Kulmhof), Sobibór and Treblinka.

Revisionist historians contest this, however. They insist that there is no documentary or material evidence for this assertion. In a series of studies, they have provided evidence based on documentation as well as archaeological-forensic and technical evidence,

- that the alleged homicidal gas chambers never existed in these camps,
- that it would have been technically impossible to burn the alleged quantities of corpses as claimed in crematoria or on pyres,
- that there are no traces of mass graves of the necessary size,
- that the alleged casualties of these camps were, and still are, greatly exaggerated, and
- that the existence of a National Socialist plan for the systematic murder of European Jews cannot be proved.¹

In essence, there is no dispute as to the fact that well over two million Jews have been deported to the aforementioned camps. If one assumes, as a working hypothesis, that the deportees in these camps were *not* murdered, the question arises: what else happened to them?

Revisionists posit that the six camps mentioned functioned partially (Auschwitz, Majdanek) or exclusively as transit camps, where the mass of deported Jews stayed only very briefly and then was deported further to the east. This is also Werner’s first hypothesis, as he explains at the very beginning. Over the years, several revisionists have tried to substantiate this thesis.² They have shown that this transit-camp hypothesis is fully in line with the documented policies of the Third Reich toward the Jews, as re-

¹ The first, cautious step in that direction was Rassinier’s book *Drama of the European Jews*, which is only of historical interest today. For recent research efforts see the many volumes of the series *Holocaust Handbooks* as listed at the end of this book.

² Cf. Aynat, Boisdefeu 1996, Mattogno/Graf, Mattogno/Kues/Graf.

flected in official and internal reports, documents on Jewish transports, and even in classified exchanges among leading SS members.

However, orthodox historians insist that the terms dominating in these documents, such as transit camps, eastward migration, resettlement, and evacuation, were merely part of a code language used by those in charge of the Third Reich to avoid documenting the ugly, if not highly criminal, reality of mass murders, in order not to create evidence against themselves. Although such tactics are likely to be used by hypothetical mass murderers, the *absence* of documentary evidence for the mass murder is certainly no proof *for* it, but rather *against* it.

While orthodox historians struggle to explain where the corpses or their remnants are that resulted from the mass murder they postulate, the revisionists face the challenge of proving where the Jews went.

There can be no doubt that the deportation of millions of people would have left distinct traces. Even if one assumes that the archives, especially in the former Soviet Union, have been cleansed of all sorts of “inconvenient” documents, it is to be expected that other documentary traces have been preserved. In addition, there should be a multitude of testimonies attesting to the arrival and presence of deported Jews in the occupied eastern territories. It is also to be expected that these settlement activities left material traces as well.

In three lengthy papers published in 2010/2011, Swedish revisionist Thomas Kues put together all the evidence that had been found in support of the revisionist thesis, adding a long list of new evidence to this already substantial list (Kues 2010a&b, 2011).

For many orthodox historians, the revisionist transit-camp hypothesis is a tremendous provocation that they usually ignore studiously. In December 2011, however, five orthodox researchers published a 570-page response to the revisionist thesis (Harrison *et al.*). This, in turn, triggered a massive response from the criticized revisionist researchers, which was published just two years later, in October 2013, in a two-volume work of nearly 1,400 pages (Mattogno/Kues/Graf).

In the present context, it is of particular interest that on this occasion Thomas Kues and Carlo Mattogno refined their arguments as first laid out in the above-mentioned books and articles, and substantiated them in 140 pages with further arguments and evidence (*ibid.*, Chapter 7: “Where They Went: The Reality of Resettlement”, Vol. 1, pp. 561-703).

Reading these revisionist works on the subject makes one realize that the fate of those deportees who were deported to the East was not very

rosy. Although they may not have been killed (“gassed”) in Bełżec, Chełmno, Sobibór or Treblinka, their lot in Byelorussia and other destinations was not necessarily much better, since accommodating these masses under humane conditions in these areas in such a short period of time and under wartime conditions was logistically impossible. The number of casualties must therefore have been terribly high for this scenario as well.

In spite of all this, orthodox historians still reject the revisionist hypothesis of transit camps. Some of them challenge the revisionists to show them one Jew, one single Jew, who was deported to one of the “extermination camps,” survived and then appeared further east. I responded to this challenge with an article that, in my view, meets this criterion: one single Jew. No, actually two (Rudolf 2017). Both cases were not discovered by me, but by Carlo Mattogno and Jean-Marie Boisdefeu. Here are the two cases:

Case No. 1, Discovered by Carlo Mattogno

A certain Minna Grossova, who was born on September 20, 1874, was deported to Treblinka on October 19, 1942 at age 68, at a time when on average about 5,000 Jews were allegedly killed and buried there every day. But instead of being killed there, she simply passed through Treblinka and from there was sent on to Auschwitz, of all places. At her age, she was certainly classified as “unfit for labor” by the usual selection on arrival and would therefore have been sent to the gas chambers, if the orthodox thesis were correct. But that is not what happened, because she was properly registered in the camp and died there only 14 months later, on 30 December 1943 (Mattogno 2016, p. 165).

If Mrs. Grossova was spared the gas chambers at Treblinka *and* Auschwitz at the age of 68 years, then why should many other not have shared the same fate? This fate also underlines that Treblinka was actually used as a transit camp in which not even old, infirm Jews were murdered. In any case, it is unlikely that Mrs. Grossova was the only deportee transferred from Treblinka to Auschwitz. Single transports for Jews in passenger cars did not exist at that time.

Case No. 2, Discovered by Jean-Marie Boisdefeu

This case is based on a memorial book published by a German government agency. It is about the Berlin Jew Siegmund Rothstein, born in 1857, who was deported to the Theresienstadt Ghetto in August 1942. However, just over a month later, on 26 September, he was deported to Treblinka at the age of 75. But this was still not his end, because the German authorities

recorded another sign of life from him even further east: they determined that Rothstein had died in Minsk, the capital of Belarus. This city is located 286 kilometers east of Treblinka (Boisdefeu 2009, pp. 133-136).

I doubt that the 75-year-old Mr. Rothstein jumped off the train before arriving in Treblinka and drove to the German-occupied Minsk by himself. Therefore, he must have arrived there by train. I also doubt that the German authorities reserved a train just for him or simply took him to Minsk in a military train. He must have made this journey with hundreds or thousands of deportees from Theresienstadt on a deportation train.

This is by no means an isolated incident, for Boisdefeu states that none of the thousands of Jews deported from Theresienstadt are listed in the German memorial book as killed in Treblinka, but that they are all listed as having died or given their last sign of life at different places before any trace of them disappeared. This case also indicates that thousands of Jews were deported through Treblinka as a transit camp to the “East.”

But there were also deportations to the west that ran through Treblinka. On this, several eyewitness accounts of survivors exist which were recorded by orthodox organizations (Hunt, 6 min. 18 sec.). These witnesses confirm that they, along with hundreds of other deportees, were actually transited through the Treblinka Camp. Although these survivors were sent to the Majdanek Labor Camp rather than to the East, they confirm that Treblinka, at least in these cases, served as a transit camp for thousands of Jews.

It follows that Treblinka must in fact have had the logistics enabling it to temporarily – for a few hours or days – house, feed and clean hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals.

Research Desiderata

“These are just isolated cases,” claim our opponents. Sure, but so far nobody has systematically explored this issue. These isolated cases are all it takes, however, to undermine the dogma of the *pure* extermination camps irreparably. Apparently, Treblinka and thus probably also Bełżec, Chełmno and Sobibór were more than just extermination camps. What remains to be done?

- The thousands of survivor statements taken by various institutions should be systematically scanned for brief references to stays in the “pure extermination camps.”
- Government archives, media archives, museums and other historical collections in cities and towns in the areas considered to be destinations for deportations should be combed for documentary evidence of prepa-

rations for expected deportations or for deportees' arrival and accommodation or any different treatment.

A few years ago, Thomas Kues decided to undertake a longer research trip to the deportation area in order to tackle the second desideratum listed above. However, he met with unexpected resistance, so that he not only had to give up this endeavor, but was also forced to withdraw completely from historical research at least temporarily. To this date, he has not sent us more detailed information.

In the present book, Steffen Werner took a different approach to at least partially unravel the mystery of the fate of Jews deported to the East. He wrote this book when the Soviet Union was in free fall. Werner expressed his hope that the policy of Glasnost and Perestroika initiated by Gorbachev would result in many files and archives that had previously been inaccessible would now be made freely accessible. This, he hoped, would make it possible to further substantiate his thesis that the Jews deported to the East were actually sent "into the morass" of Byelorussia, as Hitler put it.

Unfortunately, the archival spring of free Russia lasted only a few years. Due in part to pressure from the German government, the Russians and other Eastern European countries closed their archives again toward the late 1990s. Since then, independent researchers are no longer able to access these archives. Since 2014, it is moreover potentially punishable with up to five years' imprisonment in Russia, as it is in Germany, to publicly disseminate theses as they are presented and substantiated here.

Werner's second thesis is that the Jews deported during the war to the east "into the morass" should still be there today (meaning in 1990). I think that this thesis is somewhat naïve, for several reasons:

1. The *Einsatzgruppen*

As Werner mentioned several times, the German troops in the East were involved in a brutal partisan war. What Werner does not mention are the German counter-measures, especially the operations of the *Einsatzgruppen* and associated German units. Werner has an amazing blind spot here, because he does not mention the term *Einsatzgruppen* even once in his entire text.

According to the orthodox narrative, the *Einsatzgruppen* committed massacres in the East among the Baltic, Ukrainian, Belorussian and Russian Jews since the very beginning of the Russian campaign, and at least about one million Jews fell victim to them. Jews from other parts of Eu-

rope deported to the East are said to have gotten caught up in this maelstrom as well.

Revisionist texts on this complex see the activities of the *Einsatzgruppen* in a somewhat differentiated light, but even from their perspective it also becomes clear that the Jews in the East had to endure being scapegoated for the escalation of the war (see Rudolf's "Concluding Remarks" to Siegert, pp. 550-555, as well as Mattogno 2018).

Under these circumstances, it is to be expected that some of the Jews deported to the East sooner or later ended up in mass graves, either because they joined the partisans and were executed as such by the Germans, because they were executed during reprisal killings for crimes perpetrated by – even that would have been legal under martial law, if it did not take on excessive forms (see Siegert) – or because they were "preventively" murdered with kith and kin as alleged bearers of Bolshevism and potential contributors to the partisans warfare. Irrespective of the legal evaluation of the individual actions, the fact remains that Jews deported to the East were by no means safe there, to say the least.

2. Stalin's Policies Toward Deportees

After these areas had been recaptured by the Red Army, the Jews possibly deported to the East were still not out of danger, however. First of all, one has to keep in mind that no one was liberated who was conquered by the Red Army. The change of the ruling armies brought only a change of the oppressive system, but no liberation. In fact, large parts of the populations temporarily occupied by the German made it very clear by their voting with their feet what they thought about the Red-Army liberation propaganda: When the German units began to retreat, large swaths of the locals wanted to tag along with the Germans to the west but had to be prevented from doing so, because a trek of millions of westward migrants or refugees would have made German military operations impossible.

Although the Jews, as scapegoats of the National Socialists, were most likely to have felt liberated by the Red Army, Stalin was by no means a friend of the Jews as such. His mistrust of all sections of the population that had once been under German influence was so great (and mostly justified) that witch hunts set in on former collaborators in all the reconquered areas. Significant sections of ethnic groups that had collaborated particularly strongly with the Germans disappeared into Siberia. Inmates of liberated camps were not exempt from this, whether they were prisoners of war, la-

bor or concentration camps or even ghettos. In particular, foreign elements with a Western-liberal background were considered suspicious at the time.

After the withdrawal of the Germans, the people who survived not only the deportation itself but also the actions of the *Einsatzgruppen* and the certainly poor living conditions “into the morass” saw themselves once more as targets of persecution and oppression. It may therefore be assumed that the number of surviving deportees who were still living in “the morass” when the Soviet Union collapsed was not high.

But even those who were allowed to stay in the deportation areas and later did not follow the general trend of moving to the West or to Israel in order to emigrate, eventually will have become a prisoner of the USSR, just like all other people in this totalitarian empire. Whether Jewish or not, whether deportee, displaced or local, the pressure of assimilation in the USSR at that time was great, and there was virtually no possibility for certain groups – here the former deportees – to organize themselves outside state supervision.

Under these circumstances, it would be almost impossible without help from the authorities or at least their acquiescence to track down survivors of that time or their descendants today. And with every year passing, this gets even more difficult.

In fact, not only is there no help or toleration from the authorities for such hypothetical research projects, but at best a visit from the public prosecutor, see above.

It is therefore not surprising that the earlier editions of this book were confiscated in 1993 by ordered of the Tübingen District Court and subsequently burned in waste incineration plants.³ When facing such dictatorial conditions, historical scholarship can produce reliable results in this field of study only with the utmost exertion *and with sacrifices*.

Our thoughts are free, our thinkers are in prison or in exile.

Germar Rudolf
Red Lion, PA, March 10, 2019

³ Verdict of the Tübingen County Court, Ref. 15 Js 1608/93, with regard to Werner 1990/1991.

I. The Thesis

As this book propounds a most unusual thesis, it requires an unusual introduction. I hesitated to put the thesis to paper because it sounds unbelievable, even outrageous. It seems utterly absurd, but it is – in my honest opinion – true and even can be proven!

This thesis deals with one of the most terrible events of contemporary history, with the so-called Final Solution of the Jewish Question. I maintain that:

1. the Final Solution consisted of the re-settlement of the Jews in the eastern part of Byelorussia and that
2. they are still being kept there as prisoners of the USSR today [1990].

I know that this sounds preposterous, and I don't expect anybody to simply believe this theory. But I do expect that everyone – or rather those interested in historical truth – scrutinize my theory, at least to that extent that they read this and the next chapter – which are both short – and decide only then whether the thesis is as absurd as it seems initially. I hope that maybe I can captivate the reader to such an extent that he continues reading the ensuing, longer chapters. I am sure that I can convince the conscientious reader who makes an effort to read my study carefully that my theory is correct. I am also sure that all arguments that initially speak against this theory will even be beneficial, once the reader will have become familiar with certain facts which are mostly known to experts in the field, but which are usually considered in isolation. I must also point out, however, that all my evidence is circumstantial in nature, with all the weaknesses and strengths of such evidence.

Before I come to my point, I think it necessary to describe how I came to adopt such a heterodox theory, as I feel that this is helpful for the reader. I am a mathematician, and I work freelance in data processing. During my

spare time I tackle scholarly challenges of contemporary history. Due to personal circumstances – I come from Dresden – my focus was on issues of the so-called “*DDR Forschung*” (Research of the communist German Democratic Republic), and I have published various essays on this subject (e.g. Werner 1977). The “Third Reich” as such did not interest me at all initially. Regarding the Final Solution, I shared the standard opinion of most people interested in politics, meaning that the Jews were killed at Auschwitz and elsewhere. This opinion was based more on general impressions and less on detailed facts.

In 1978 I began studying theories of totalitarianism, as my opinions deviated from the generally accepted theory. In this context, I wanted to use the Final Solution as proof for a certain theory. To me, the National-Socialist worldview seemed responsible for the murder of millions of Jews.

Eichmann, the organizer of this extermination, must have justified himself somehow when he was on trial in Jerusalem. I expected that Eichmann justified his murderous activities with the National-Socialist worldview. I searched for material in a public library, and I found what I was looking for, or so I thought. I quickly found a book with documents on crimes of National Socialism, along with a chapter headlined with something to the effect of “Eichmann and the Final Solution.”⁴ At home I began to skim the pertinent chapter, as I wanted to get to the core of the issue, but I was surprised. The text was shocking in its “irrelevance”! Terrible things were addressed for sure, but nothing about Auschwitz, nothing about the mass murder. Only upon reading the text again more-thoroughly, I found a phrasing stating something like “...that was in the east, that’s where the murder took place.”⁵ Yet no outcry, no energetic inquiry; the discussion continued as though nothing of significance had been said. At first, I was perplexed, then annoyed because I could not make any progress with my project; after all, I was merely looking for an appropriate quote.

How was I to continue? I pondered and remembered a supplement to the weekly German newspaper *Das Parlament*. Although this issue dealt with the “*ewig Gestrige*”⁶ who denied the mass murders of the Jews, I still hoped to make some headway with the literature quoted. Then I discovered a paper by Georges Wellers “*Die Zahl der Opfer der Endlösung und der*

⁴ Unfortunately, I cannot name the book as it cannot be found in the Reutlingen library any more. The title is not necessary for my work. The quoted subtitle was drawn from memory.

⁵ The same as in the previous footnote applies here, too.

⁶ A German pejorative for revisionists: roughly, “[persons who are] eternally stuck in the past”

Korherr-Bericht” (“The Number of Victims of the ‘Final Solution’ and the Korherr Report”). Wellers was critiquing a book by Paul Rassinier, *Was ist Wahrheit?*. On the one hand, his paper impressed with its clear, logical statements, but on the other hand I was amazed that the core of the paper mentioned neither Adolf Eichmann nor Rudolf Höss nor anybody else, but in its main part rested its statistics upon the results of Soviet censuses before and after the war. Wellers compared the results of the census before and after the war and came to the following conclusion: millions of Soviet Jews had disappeared. He then addressed to Paul Rassinier the rhetorical question: “Where were they hidden so that they cannot be found anywhere?” (Wellers, p. 36). I found this question just and reasonable, but why was it postulated in the first place? Was the mass murder not an irrefutably proven fact? The matter seemed more complicated and different than I had thought. Hence, the logical chain of arguments involving the Final Solution – as I had seen it – seemed to unravel. And I became curious of what those dubious revisionist books had to say.

Per chance I acquired two such books. One was the already-mentioned *Was ist Wahrheit*, the other by Arthur R. Butz, *The Hoax of the Twentieth Century*. Rassinier’s book was not that spectacular, but I was surprised to learn that Rassinier had been an inmate at the Buchenwald Concentration Camp and that he was French. He wrote his book after he had read testimonies of fellow inmates minutely describing the existence of gas chambers at Buchenwald, gas chambers he had never heard of nor seen when he was at Buchenwald. Butz’s book was more substantial. He analyzed numerous documents on the mass murder of Jews, and raised objections. This seemed quite plausible to me. As Butz always gives sources, his claims could be verified, which is quite unusual for the peculiar type of literature it was categorized in.

Even to the question “where have they been hidden,” Butz had an answer. Simplified: The Jews have all survived and, in an act of mass conspiracy, decided to be untraceable so that financial reparations could be claimed from Germany. This seemed quite nonsensical, but I will raise logical objections, since many of my readers may find my postulations just as nonsensical.

If, as the theory implies, all Jews remained in the east, then they were liberated by the Red Army in 1944/45. Furthermore, since the Federal Republic of Germany pays financial compensation mostly to the state of Israel, the implications are that all these people would have to postpone their own claims, so that a not-yet-existing state (Israel) would benefit from a

prostrate Germany, which in 1945 needed more help than it could ever be expected to give. From the day-laborer to the professor, from the child to the aged, all would have had to foresee the founding of the state of Israel and the German “*Wirtschaftswunder*” (economic miracle; note the word miracle!) – a truly incredible feat. In other words: why would a Jewish owner of a department store relinquish his claim for the sake of a non-existing state of Israel? Or why would a mother – and not just one – choose to be untraceable for her child? There were plenty of Jewish children looking for their mothers.

Having had these thoughts, I decided to scrutinize this theory at a later date and to compare Butz’s text with his source material, so that, should Butz’s objections prevail, I could find an answer to the question: What happened to the Jews? I postponed this quest because this is a typical topic with which one can easily get obsessed. The central question, however, what happened to the people, kept me in its thrall. After all, doesn’t this question imply that all governments, including the Third Reich, tried to conceal the answer? How could this be overcome? How could one even find an approach, where could I search for an answer? Was this not hopeless, even foolhardy? At first it seemed impossible.

How I did find an approach and made a discovery is the subject of the next chapter. Starting from this, I have made specific investigations, the results of which are introduced in the chapters Facts I and II.

II. The Discovery

Starting point of my reflections: the undisputable result of the Final Solution was that millions of Jews under German control during World War II seem to have disappeared after the war. The path of many of these Jews, especially those living in Western Europe, can be traced precisely to Auschwitz.⁷ The day of their deportation from their home country and the time of their arrival at Auschwitz was noted in transportation lists. After their arrival at Auschwitz, they were subjected to a so-called “selection.” The Jews selected for labor were deployed in enterprises connected to the Auschwitz Concentration Camp. A considerable number of these individuals survived, while no trace of the others can be found. A fact is also that the decision for the Final Solution, whatever this happens to be, was made around the turn of the years 1941/42. So much about the undisputed facts. It is conceivable that this decision was ultimately made by Hitler, because the so-called Jewish question played a major role in his thoughts. But how to continue?

For my essays on totalitarian theories I dealt extensively with Hitler’s so-called “table talks.” During his stays at the German headquarters, Hitler preferred to eat with a large company. Everybody who was there at that moment participated: German guests, such as Himmler, and employees, starting with Bormann all the way to the wife of Hitler’s chauffeur. On these occasions, Hitler loved to have conversations and to talk about a multitude of topics, whereby he dominated in many of these conversations.

Because matters of principle were also discussed, Bormann saw to it that they were duly recorded. Heinrich Heims (Jochmann) and Dr. Henry Picker were ordered to the headquarters for this job.

⁷ Editor’s note: The situation is very similar with regard to the camps Bełżec, Chelmno, Sobibór and Treblinka, where hardly any Jews fit for labor were taken off the transports.

I noticed that these dialogs mainly covered the time between mid-1941 and mid-1942, hence generously the time span when the decision for the Final Solution was made.

Another important presupposition arose: One does not decide the fate of millions of human beings without being utterly unaffected by this. Should Hitler be different in this respect? I assumed that I would find some slight implication concerning the Jews, even if concealed, in these table talks or in Hitler's monologues. It wouldn't be anything spectacular, as these texts were well known. I myself thought that I had read them thoroughly. Was there perhaps a small remark about the topic, a phrase, something which could easily be overlooked?

With these things in mind, I began to read again. Then I found the following passage in the entry for October 25, 1941 (Jochmann, p. 44):

"In parliament, I prophesized Jewry that the Jew will disappear from Europe if war is not avoided. This criminal race has to account for two million deaths in World War I, and now again hundreds of thousands. Don't anybody tell me that we cannot send them into the morass! Who cares about our people? It is good if the terror precedes us that we are exterminating Jewry. The attempt to create a Jewish state will be a failure!"

So, Hitler would "send the Jews into the morass."⁸ This was telling, albeit meager. But where was this morass? Probably, as I thought, in the Soviet Union, as the decision was made during the invasion of Russia. I came to consider the Pripet Marshes more closely because of a number of associations: namely that "morass" is a synonym for "swamps" or marshes; further comments from Hitler: "we don't want to overcome swamps. We will take only the better soil and initially only the best grounds" (*ibid.*, p. 55) and last but not least, references to the Pripet Marshes. The area is vast and was occupied by German troops in the early phase of the war. Maybe this was the "morass?" On the other hand, population movements going into the millions must leave traces! A map of the population density of Europe before 1969 shows the most unusual patterns for this area (see Document 1, p. 152).

Conspicuous is a rectangular area between Minsk and Pripet (Pripjet on the map) with an area of some 120 km by 40 km with a population density between 100 to 200 persons per square kilometer. As a rule, however, population agglomerations are found around industrial areas, ports, areas of

⁸ Aside from these citations, there are more with similar stipulations. They will be dealt with more extensively in the next chapter.

mineral resources and government centers. According to similar maps of the distribution of mineral resources and industry (*Dierke* 1969, pp. 78f., 80f.) there appears to be little reason for such an agglomeration of people in this region. An earlier map of the population distribution of this area is shown in Document 2 (see page 153).

When comparing the two maps, keep in mind that the classification of the population densities differs. Nevertheless, this area experienced a drastic population growth. This Growth extends beyond the mentioned rectangular area, although the increase is most apparent within this space. The rectangle has an area of some 120 km × 40 km, hence 4800 square kilometers. By comparing the earlier and later minimum population densities, one finds:

earlier: 96,000 inhabitants
later: 480,000 inhabitants.

Thus, the number of inhabitants has quintupled. I cannot explain such a drastic increase by the normal growth rate of a population, because fierce battles were fought in this area during World War II. Therefore, when did this population explosion take place and what caused it? In order to pinpoint this epoch, the peculiarity of this region needs to be pointed out. Until 1939, this region was divided; the west belonged to Poland, and the east to the Soviet Union. It is unlikely that both countries populated this rectangular area together. But such population agglomerations can also be found elsewhere in Byelorussia. Some are distributed randomly, while others may be found around Gomel and Mogilev. So, to repeat the question: when did this increase in population take place?

Surely, population censuses are the basis for these maps. The following censuses were made in this region:

1926 by the Soviet Union
1931 by Poland
1939 by the Soviet Union; the census of 1937 was annulled.
1959 by the Soviet Union

The region was controlled:

1926 – 1939 by Poland
1939 – 1941 by the Soviet Union
1941 – 1944 by Germany
since 1944 by the Soviet Union.

Quite logically, this population increase must have occurred between 1939 and 1959, as the information of the 1969 population map is based probably

on 1959 census data. I can think of no other source. Therefore, there are only two possibilities: the influx occurred either during the German occupation or after 1944, through the Soviet Union. Simple logic pleads against the latter: Why should the USSR consider the settlement of this region? Does the USSR not possess more land, especially east of the Urals, where a colonization would seem more appropriate? On the other hand, during the time of the temporary German occupation, this area must have been one of the least-populated regions. But this is no proof.

Thus, again the concrete question: Was there a substantial increase in the population of this region during the years 1941 and 1944? The German files on Byelorussia, as the region was called at that time, ought to throw light upon the matter. Normally, these files should be kept at the federal archive in Koblenz, Germany. However, no records from the General Commissariat of Byelorussia exist (Greiner, p. 156)

Information about any settlements ought to be contained on German army maps as well. But one must ascertain whether existing towns were enlarged, or new ones established. Both measures are capable of increasing the population density. In order to obtain meaningful information, at least two maps of the region are necessary, and both must have been made during the time of the German occupation, because the cartographers had access to the region only at this time.

Obtaining such maps was much more difficult than anticipated. The German Federal Archive in Koblenz only possessed a so-called guide map, which was totally unsuitable for the present purpose. The Military Archive in Freiburg was able to provide a complete set of army maps, but unfortunately the map encompassing the region in question was made in 1941. Finally, through various means, I managed to acquire three separate editions of the Sector U54:Minsk from the general map of the German army 1:300,000.⁹ I now possess a map from the year 1941 along with two updates from II.1943¹⁰ and VIII.1943.¹¹ This map covers the area of interest, even though the above-mentioned rectangle is not or only partially covered by it. Naturally, the updates are of importance. For our purposes, a sector southeast of Minsk is chosen. Please inspect the sector shown in Document

⁹ *Deutsche Heereskarte* 1:300,000 of 1941, published by the OKH Generalstab des Heeres. The atlas was continuously supplemented and updated; few addenda were published.

¹⁰ *Deutsche Heereskarte* 1:300,000, Special edition 1942, Update II.1943. Sector Vilnius – Davidgrodek T55/U55, ed. OKH/Generalstab des Heeres. Same edition as above, six separate maps were combined into one. Source: Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart M640-T55/U53. All rights reserved.

¹¹ *Deutsche Heereskarte* 1:300,000 from 1941, Map Minsk U54, Supplement August 1943, published by the OKH/Generalstab des Heeres.

3 from the Map II.43 with the one shown in Document 4, taken from Map VIII.1943 (pp. 154f.).

The following may be concluded: the number of inhabited places has sharply risen in this sector. While the map of II.1943 shows but 18 towns, the map of VIII.1943 has at least 45. Important among them is the new town Marjina Gorka. It is by far the biggest town in the region, which however was non-existent on the map of II.1943. We can conclude from this that the town was newly founded. Because of the importance of military maps for warfare, it stands to reason that Map II.1943 shows the actual state of affairs at some point of the German occupation. Not only does this sector show a substantial increase of inhabited areas, but also of the surrounding areas.

Consequently, the following can be ascertained: In the areas described above, new towns were founded and inhabited during the German occupation. The question is, by whom, and why?

As a preview I give a hint here, which seems paradoxical at first sight: no Jews! The interested reader will learn more in the next chapter.

Two questions which will certainly jostle the mind of the inclined reader are: Why didn't anybody involved in this on the German side point mention these settlement activities after the war? And: why didn't the Jews speak up? I believe that I can answer both questions reasonably well. But because a lot of facts are necessary to substantiate this statement, the response to this query will be dealt with in the chapter "Questions."

III. Facts I

This chapter discusses material from National-Socialist sources which, in my opinion, prove that the Final Solution meant transporting Jews to the eastern part of Byelorussia, or – to be more precise – to the militarily administered part of Byelorussia. The material is presented in logically cohesive segments. Quotations, especially those of Hitler, are reproduced extensively at times to overcome any suspicion that they have simply been torn out of their contexts. Generally, the translations maintain the same style as found in the original texts.

A. Hitler

As far as I am concerned, Hitler was the central figure in the Third Reich who possessed the power and against whose will no important decision could be made. He was the motor of the Final Solution as well, and saw his life's work in the realization of this project. Hitler was the matrix of the *Weltanschauung* (world view) of National Socialism who, as *Führer* (leader), imprinted this philosophy throughout his realm.

As I found out to my great astonishment, the National-Socialist philosophy did not necessarily call for the extermination of “the Jews.” According to this worldview, the Jew was by nature inferior to the Aryan who abided by the laws of racial purity. Jews can only win against the Aryans in the struggle of the races if they are able to undermine their racial laws (compare Werner 1984, pp. 39f.). The Aryan and the other races regain the upper hand again as soon as they keep themselves racially clean. Without the Jew, who incites the peoples against each other, a lot of things would fall back into place. Hitler said (Picker, pp. 106f.):

“Peace is only possible on the basis of a natural order. Prerequisite to this order is that the nations arrange themselves in such a way that those are leading who are most-capable. Those who are inferior gain more through this than they can ever attain by themselves. This order is destroyed by Jewry. It helps the beast, baseness and stupidity to win. It took Christianity 1400 years to develop its ultimate bestiality. Therefore, we must not assume that we have already overcome Bolshevism. Yet the more thoroughly we expel the Jews, the faster this peril is removed. The Jew is the catalysts that ignites the fuel. A people without Jews is given back to the natural order.”

Hence, “the Jew” needed only be isolated, not murdered; it suffices to allocate a common place to the Jews. In 1941, Hitler even expressed aspects that indicate that “the Jew” must not to be exterminated! Hitler was, in his own way, a religious person. He believed in a creator, in nature and in providence.¹² If one believes in a creator, however, then the question arises, why did He create “the Jews”? Does “the Jew” have a function?

Hitler (*ibid.*, pp. 78f.):

“We don’t know what sense there is in seeing the Jews destroying a nation. Is it so that nature created him so that through his destructive action nations come into motion? Then Paul the Apostle and Trotsky are the Jews most worthy of respect, because they have done the most to achieve this.”

Hitler often mentioned the Jews and the fate that he had in store for them during his “table talks” between August 8, 1941 and July 24, 1942. Quotes: 8th – 11th August 1941:¹³

“If one country has any right to evacuate anybody, then it is our country, because we have evacuated own people many times. From East Prussia alone, 800,000 people were relocated. How sensitive we Germans are can be seen from the fact that to us it seems to be extremely brutal to liberate our country from 600,000 Jews, while we accepted without objection the evacuation of our own kin as something that had to be done. We must not allow any Germanic persons to emigrate from Europe to America. We must divert all the Norwegians, Swedes, Danes and Dutch to the eastern territories; these will become parts of the German Reich. We are facing the great task for the future to carry out

¹² Ample proof to hand, compare Picker, pp. 81ff., pp. 113ff.

¹³ Jochmann, p. 55. Picker records the same dialogue, dating it to September. Because Heims noted the dialogue, I use his date.

racial politics systematically. We must do this already in order to avert incest, which is already taking place here. This Swiss, however, we will be able to use as patrons only.

We don't want to overcome swamps. We will take only the better soil and initially only the best grounds. We can build a large military training area in the swamp of 350 by 400 km, with rivers and all obstacles which nature can pose to the troops."

October 17, 1941 (Jochmann, p. 90):

"Compared with the abundance of beauty in the central German region, the eastern area seems desolate and barren today. However, even Flanders, one single plain, is nevertheless beautiful. People? We shall bring them there."

And (*ibid.*):

"I probably won't see it happening, but in twenty years this area will comprise 20 million people. In three hundred years it will be a rich park landscape of extraordinary beauty!

The natives? We will proceed to screen them. The destructive Jew will be relocated altogether. My impression of Byelorussia was better than of the Ukraine. We won't enter the Russian cities; they should all die out."

October 25, 1941 (*ibid.*, p. 106):

"In parliament, I prophesized Jewry that the Jew will disappear from Europe if war is not avoided. This criminal race has to account for two million deaths in World War I, and now again hundreds of thousands. Don't anybody tell me that we cannot send them into the morass! Who cares about our people? It is good if the terror precedes us that we are exterminating Jewry. The attempt to create a Jewish state will be a failure!"

Note: Guests were: Himmler and Heydrich!

November 19, 1941 (*ibid.*, p. 143):

"If today some citizens cried because Jews have to emigrate from Germany, then this throws a light on these types of self-righteous philistines. One ought to ask them whether they also cried earlier when hundreds of thousands of Germans had to emigrate. These Germans had no relatives in the world; they were on their own, while Jews, on the other hand, have enough relatives all over the world: hence, having pity on them is totally inappropriate."

January 12th – 13th (*ibid.*, p. 195):

“The Jews are the chosen dumbest people: they should, for God’s sake, never have instigated this war. They will disappear from Europe. All because of a few fools!”

January 25, 1942 (*ibid.*, pp. 228f.):

“If I extract one hundred and fifty thousand Wolhynia Germans, then this comes with just as much hardship as evacuating Southern Tyrol. If I extract the Jew today, then our bourgeoisie becomes distressed. What happens to him? But did the same people care what happened to those Germans who had to emigrate? One must do it quickly; it is no good if I extract a tooth a few centimeters a month. The pain stops once the tooth is pulled. The Jew must leave Europe. Otherwise we won’t come to a European understanding. He is inciting the most, everywhere. At the end of it: I don’t know, I’m being so colossally humane. At the time of the papal reign in Rome, Jews were maltreated. Until 1830, eight Jews were chased through the city each year, driven on donkeys. I simply say: they must go. If he goes phut in the process, I can’t help it. I see only one thing: absolute extermination, if they won’t go voluntarily. Why should I see a Jew differently than a Russian POW? Many die in the PoW camps, because the Jews have forced this situation onto us. What fault is it of mine? Why did the Jews instigate this war? It may take again three or four hundred years, until the Jews return to Europe. First, they’ll come as traders, then they’ll settle in to do mischief in their environment. Finally, they’ll become philanthropists, creating foundations. When a Jew does that, everybody takes notice – because one knows that he is a bastard..., but upon a closer look one notices that these are often the most cunning Jews. The Aryans then say, look, there are good Jews too. I assume that, at some point, the National-Socialist Party will build a firmly established society, will assume government positions, and will maintain the wealth. I hope that then, once again, somebody comes along to start a new club.”

Note: Guests were: Dr. Lammers, Himmler and Colonel Zeitzler.

January 27, 1942 (*ibid.*, p. 249):

“The Jews must get out of Europe! It is best they go to Russia. I don’t have any pity on the Jews. They will always remain an element inciting the nations against each other. They do it to the nations just as much as they do it in private life. They must be taken out of Switzerland and Sweden. They are most dangerous where they are few in numbers.

Within a short time, five thousand Jews are in all Swedish positions. It is all the easier to remove them. We have enough reasons; it's like a vessel with communicating tubes."

April 4, 1942 (Picker, p. 187):

"As in all areas, nature is also the best teacher on the subject of selection. One cannot conceive a better design of nature than the rise of life caused by it: only through tough struggle. It is therefore indicative that the upper classes, who never cared for the hundreds of thousands of German emigrants and their hardship, now feel pity on the Jews, although the Jews have their accomplices throughout the entire world and are the most climate-resistant species there is. Jews thrive everywhere, even in Lapland and Siberia."

May 15, 1942 (*ibid.*, pp. 305f.):

"Our so-called bourgeoisie laments over the same Jew who stabbed us in the back in the past when he is deported to the East. The most remarkable thing about this is that this very bourgeoisie didn't care that every year 250,000 to 300,000 German people emigrated from Germany, and that 75 percent of these German emigrants to Australia died en route.

No part of the population is politically more stupid than this so-called bourgeoisie. If a pronounced population parasite is rendered harmless on behalf of the state by slaying him, for instance, then the entire bourgeoisie screams that this is a brutish state. But if a Jew ruins the professional existence of a German through legal finesse, acquiring his house and property, destroying his family, finally forcing him to emigrate, and then this German dies while en route to his destination abroad, then this bourgeoisie calls the state that makes this possible a state under the rule of law, simply because this entire tragedy took place within legally defined boundaries.

Not a single one of those who shed crocodile tears at the deportation of the Jews to the east considers that the Jew as a parasite is the most climate-resistant individual on the planet who, in contrast to the German, gets accustomed to Lapland as much as to the tropics. However, these philistines are, as a rule, people flattering themselves for being versed in the scriptures but who are unaware that, according to the reports in the Old Testament, the Jew remains untouched both by staying in the desert and by wandering through the Red Sea.

As has happened often throughout history, when the Jew has become arrogant and has bled dry the peoples in whose midst he established

himself, one nation after another slowly begins to realize how much damage has been done to it by the Jew. Each will then try with its own ways to cope with him. According to a telegram from Turkey, it is interesting with what speed Turkey goes against the Jews."

May 29, 1942 (*ibid.*, p. 340):

"All of western Europe must be freed of the Jews within a given period. This is necessary already because there is always a certain percentage of fanatics among the Jews which will attempt to raise Jewry again. It is therefore not recommendable to deport them to Siberia because with their climate-resistance, they would only become even more hardened. It is better – as the Arabs don't want them in Palestine – to transport them to Africa and thus submit them to a climate which impairs every person of our resilience, thereby eliminating all points of common spheres of interest with the European part of humanity."

July 24, 1942 (*ibid.*, p. 456):

"In this World War II as a struggle between life and death, one must never forget that world Jewry, according to the declaration of war by the World Zionist Congress and its leader Chaim Weizmann (in his message to England's Prime Minister Chamberlain), is the unrelenting enemy of National Socialism, is enemy number one. Jewry seeks Europe for economic reasons, but Europe must, in an act of sacred self-preservation, refuse, as Jews are harder as a race. After the end of the war he [Hitler] will rigorously take the position that he will destroy one city after another, if the Jews don't come out and emigrated to Madagascar or some other Jewish homeland."

The exegesis of these texts produces some peculiarities. Regarding the resettlement of the Jews, Hitler justifies himself to the bourgeoisie on the following dates:

- 8th – 11th August 1941
- 19th November 1941
- 25th January 1942
- 4th April 1942
- 15th May 1942

He accuses the bourgeoisie of not having cared for the Germans who had to emigrate and who suffered a lot in the process. Thus, according to these texts, Hitler's Final Solution is comparable to emigration or evacuation. This subject seems to have troubled him deeply, as can be seen by his repeated justifications.

Question: What does it mean: Hitler sends the Jews “into the morass?”

Hitler also names destinations: he would send the Jews into the morass (October 25, 1941) or: it is best that they go to Russia (January 27, 1942), or that they are deported to the East (May 15, 1942). The latter formulation is found later in numerous documents. Was a convention of speech created here?

Question: Why does Hitler compare the Final Solution with emigration?

It is also conspicuous that Hitler repeatedly refers to the climate-resistant nature of the Jews. Jews would thrive everywhere, even in Lapland or Siberia. One should transport them to Africa after the war (May 29, 1942). Notice the minute details, such as: all of Western Europe must be freed of Jews, but that means: not Eastern Europe!

Question: Why does Hitler ponder about the fate of the Jews *after* the end of the Second World War?

B. Fundamentals on the Final Solution

On March 27, 1941, a meeting of the Institute for Research into the Jewish Question (*Institut zur Erforschung der Judenfrage*) took place in Frankfurt upon Main (Seraphim, p. 5). This institute was inaugurated on March 28, 1941 with a speech by Rosenberg (cf. “Der Zionismus...”), and this meeting was obviously part of the inauguration. Discussing the fundamentals, one of the speakers saw three alternatives in dealing with the Jews (Seraphim, p. 13):

1. Dissimilation (without special segregation)
2. Ghettoization (in city ghettos or regional ghettos in Eastern Europe)
3. Removal from Europe

These points were elaborated as follows:

1. Dissimilation

This method, Seraphim states, has been applied by the German Reich up until 1941. The disadvantage was that the Jews continued to exist within the nation as a foreign body. Excerpt (*ibid.*, pp. 13f.):

“The Jewish question remains a question of mass population policy, the only difference being that regrouping within Jewry reduces the number of rich Jews and increases the number of Jews in need of support. Social pauperization and regrouping of the Jews can be the result but never a physical self-dissolution of Jewry, because the death of a people doesn’t come about quickly; it is a process of hundreds of years, especially when not a few thousand, or ten thousand, but about 5 ½ million people in Europe are involved.”

2. Ghettoization

a. City Ghettos

Creating a city ghetto would be difficult. Cities are organic units: traffic arteries, highways, water, gas and electrical infrastructure crisscross every city. A city ghetto is not self-sufficient. Food, raw materials etc. must always be supplied. (*ibid.*, p. 20)

b. Reservation

Quote:

“In order to forestall difficulties resulting from the creation of city ghettos, one may suggest to separate a certain large territory and to concentrate the European Jews here. Territories populated mainly by Jews were thought best suited for this purpose, which can be turned into solidly Jewish ethnic areas by settling Jews there and removing the non-Jewish population.” (*ibid.*, p. 21)

These plans were said to have a number of advantages (*ibid.*, pp. 21f.):

- The population displacement operation can be spread out over time.
- The Jews would be radically removed from their present living sites.
- The rural/urban distribution of the Jews can change. They can feed themselves.

The speaker also named disadvantages by referring to the so-called Lublin Plan, i.e., to settle the Jews in the area of Lublin (*ibid.*, pp. 22f.). He specifically pointed out that (*ibid.*, p. 24):

- a. Large-scale population displacement would be necessary, whereby 5 million Jews and 2.7 million gentiles would have to be transported.
- b. The problem arising is where to put the gentiles?
- c. The area of Lublin is too small for the Jews. Having a present area of 26,800 sq. km, a 10-km security zone would have to be deducted, re-

ducing the county to 25,000 sq. km. If all European Jews were to be concentrated here, then a population density of 320 persons per square kilometer would result. In comparison, England has 271, the German Reich 135 persons per square km. A ghetto of that proportion would not be able to sustain itself. He asked if there was no place in Europe suited for Jewish residence.

3. Expulsion from Europe

This alternative possesses all the advantages of a European ghetto solution without its disadvantages (*ibid.*, pp. 24f.). Conclusion (*ibid.*, pp. 26):

"If it were possible to find a suitable settlement area for the Jews of Europe, which can be determined by scientific analysis and practical experiences, then emigration would be the best way both for the nations of Europe and for the Jews themselves. With this, however, the European Jewish question merges with the great question of colonial reorganization and restructuring of the world. Within the framework of this complex, the European Jewish question as an economic and ethnic problem could finally be brought to its final solution."

C. Developments from April 1941 to May 1942

The decision concerning the Final Solution of the Jewish problem was made during this period. A relatively large number of verifying documents are available. Hitler had decided to march into the Soviet Union. Rosenberg, the future *Reichsminister* for the occupied eastern territories, prepared himself for the job. The following are quotations from his pertinent memoranda:

April 2nd, 1941: Rosenberg's analysis concerning goals and methods of a future occupation of large portions of the Soviet Union (1017-PS, IMT, Vol. XXVI, pp. 547-554, here pp. 549f.). His conclusions:

"Byelorussia is a culturally and industrially speaking underdeveloped part of the Soviet Union. At the same time, it harbors the second largest Jewish reservoir within the USSR, including mainly Jewish cities like Bialystok, Minsk, Polodsk, Vitebsk and others.

It can be considered an extraordinarily time-consuming and also difficult venture to awake an independent existence and create a viable

state. Byelorussia is culturally more backward than for instance Lithuania, and more exploited by the Jews than Poland. But with respect to weakening central Russia, a venture of this kind should nevertheless be recommended.

The USSR has confined Byelorussia's territory from the north-western Polish border to just up to about the Pronja. The actual capital of the whole territory, however, should be Smolensk. Half of the administrative district of the same name as well as a part of the administrative district of Kalinin (originally Tver) could be considered an ethnic part of it and could be added to it administratively. That would extend the borders of Byelorussia to within about 250 km of Moscow."

April 29th: Rosenberg's memorandum concerning questions about the eastern Europe area (1024-PS, IMT, Vol. XXVI, p. 561):

"The Jewish question requires a general treatment in which a temporary arrangement must be found. (Forced labor for the Jews, ghettoization etc.)"

May 8th 1941: Rosenberg's instructions as Reichskommissar for the Ostland (Ostland is synonymous with the northeastern occupied areas; 1029-PS, IMT, Vol. XXVI, pp. 573-576, here p. 574)

"The goal for a Reichskommissar for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Byelorussia must be to strive to become a German protectorate. Then this area is to be transformed into a part of the Greater German Empire through Germanization of racially desirable elements, through colonialization of Germanic people and through expulsion of undesirable elements."

and later (*ibid.*, pp. 574f.):

"Byelorussia must be directly attached to these three areas. For a long time, Byelorussia had a strong separatist movement, but it has to be assumed that Bolshevism succeeded in suppressing it. In any case, initially Byelorussia will have the hard task to accommodate all those elements expelled from the Baltic states as well as from the Polish part of the Warthegau. It seems appropriate to settle the Poles not within the General Government but to put them into the eastern part of Byelorussia (Smolensk district), so as to form a buffer layer against the Russians. Because Byelorussia does not produce any surplus, the other function of the general commissioner would be to stimulate higher productivity by way of a strong labor movement."

20 July 1941: Rosenberg's speech before colleagues concerning the Reichskommissariat Baltenland (later Ostland, 1058-PS, *ibid.*, pp. 610-627, here p. 618):

"Byelorussia lies south of the Baltic states, and it is planned to include it into the 'Kommissariat Baltenland (Ostland)'. Although Byelorussia possesses a different character, a lot of asocial elements must be resettled here from the Baltic countries, and for these undesired persons, also from the General Government and the Warthegau, Byelorussia is a very well-suited collection area."

Later he returns to this (*ibid.*, p. 623):

*"Then comes Byelorussia as a collection area for many asocial elements, which will also be treated like a natural reservation. It may acquire a partial autonomy at some point. In contrast to the territories of Estonia, Lithonia and Latvia as Landeshauptmannschaften, the Byelorussia will be called a Generalkommissariat—
The area of that Reichskommissariat comprises 555,000 square km, and it contains 19.3 million inhabitants"*

June 22, 1941: German troops invade the Soviet Union.

July 1941: Göring's order to Heydrich (710-PS, *ibid.*, pp. 266f., here p. 267):

"As supplement to the task which was entrusted to you in the decree dated 24 January 1939, namely to solve the Jewish question by emigration or evacuation in a way which is most favorable in connection with the conditions prevailing at the time, I hereby commission you to carry out all preparations with regard to organization, the material side and financial viewpoints for a comprehensive solution of the Jewish question in the German area of influence in Europe."

August 10th, 1941: The plans for the General District of Byelorussia had the following structure (Reichsminister..., p. 5):

Main districts:	Baranavichy
	Minsk
	Mogilev
	Vitebsk
	Smolensk
Urban areas:	Minsk
	Mogilev
	Babruysk
	Vitebsk
	Smolensk

August 1941: Planned provisional guidelines for the treatment of the Jews in *Reichskommissariat Ostland* by the future commissar for the *Ostland*, Mr. Lohse (1138-PS, IMT, Vol. XXVII, pp. 18-25, here p. 19). Excerpt:

“The sole purpose of these provisional guidelines is to secure minimal measures by the general and area commissioners where, and for as long as, the application of further measures pertaining to the final solution of the Jewish question are not possible.”

Note the term provisional guidelines, which were only valid as long as the application of further measures pertaining to the Final Solution of the Jewish question were not possible.

It continues (*ibid.*, 24f.):

“a. Jews are to be removed from the countryside [...]

d. Jews are to be concentrated in cities or city districts that already have a predominantly Jewish population. Ghettos are to be formed. Jews are to be prohibited from leaving the ghettos.

The inhabitants of the ghettos manage their internal affairs in self-administration which is supervised by the district or city commissioner. For inner security, forces can be comprised of Jews. They may only be equipped with rubber truncheons or rods and must wear a white armband with the yellow star of David on their right upper arm.

To keep the ghetto hermetically sealed from the outside, native deputy policemen ought to be employed.

e. Jews fit for labor are to be deployed as forced laborers as needed. The economic interests of indigenous people worth supporting must not be impaired by Jewish forced labor. Forced labor can be done in work camps outside the ghettos, inside ghettos or, if the ghettos are not yet established, isolated outside the ghettos (e.g. in a Jewish workshop).”

August 14, 1941: according to Hilberg (p. 358):

“Goring himself declared that the Jews no longer had any business in German-dominated territories (dass die Juden in den von Deutschland beherrschten Gebieten nichts mehr zu suchen hatten). Wherever Jewish labor was needed, the Jews were to be grouped into work formations. Insofar as they had not had an ‘opportunity’ to ‘emigrate,’ they were to be incarcerated in ‘something like’ prison camps, to be organized there into labor battalions. Any other type of employment was not to be permitted, save in exceptional cases during the beginning of the occupation.”

August 22, 1941: Proposals of Dr. Carltheo Zeitschel of the German Embassy in Paris (Jüdisches..., pp. 250ff.):

“Minutes for Ambassador Abetz

The continuous conquest and occupation of the expansive eastern territories could satisfactorily solve the Jewish problem in all of Europe once and for all within a short period of time.

According to a cry for help by all the Jews of Palestine in their press, directed to the American Jews, over six million Jews reside in the areas occupied by us during the past several weeks, especially in Bessarabia. That is 1/3 of entire World Jewry. When reorganizing the eastern territories, these six million Jews would have to be put together somehow anyway, and a specially designated area would have to be cordoned off to them. On that occasion, it should pose no great problem if all Jews from all the other European nations are added to this, and if also the Jews currently living crammed together in ghettos in Warsaw, Lodz, Lublin etc. are deported there as well. As far as the occupied territories are concerned, such as Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Jews there could be mass-transported to the new territories via simple military order. Other nations could be encouraged to follow suit and dispatch their Jews there as well. Europe could then be freed of Jews within the shortest possible time.

I therefore suggest that my request be presented to the secretary of state at the next possible opportunity, and to ask for the sake of such a decision to get together with the already appointed, future minister for the Eastern Territories, Reichsleiter Rosenberg, and with the Reichsführer SS, and to consider this matter in the manner as suggested by me. Transporting the Jews to the eastern territories would be possible even during the war, and would definitely not be an insurmountable obstacle after the war, as all the Jews in the General Government could reach the new enclave with their own vehicles along country roads.”

Otto Bräutigam, Rosenberg’s deputy, kept a diary. On September 14, 1941 he noted (Langbein, pp. 42ff.):

“Kalinin ordered that all Volga Germans be deported to Siberia. Apparently, they were not only feared, living in the heart of the USSR, but they also wanted to make sure we don’t get access to them in case of a later German advance. About 400,000 persons were to share the sad fate of being exiled. It was obvious that most would not survive the exile, not even the transportation. In retaliation, the Reichsleiter (Rosenberg) considered deporting all Jews of central Europe to the east terri-

tories under our administration. I received a telegraphic order to secure the Führer's consent for this project. Thus, I started my Mercedes and drove to Lieutenant-Colonel von Tippelskirch at the Wehrmacht headquarters. However, he and General Warlimont decided that the Wehrmacht had little interest in this matter. Therefore, I continued my journey to the Führer's headquarters, where I asked for the Führer's personal aides, Colonel Schmudt and Major Engel. Both were not to be found. Colonel Schmudt accompanied the Führer at a meeting with the general field marshal, and Major Engel was en route to the Army High Command. I briefly talked to General of the Air-Force Bodenschatz, and was then led to General Jodl, who also tried to dismiss the matter, proposing that the State Department was responsible. Apart, the realization of this project would fail due to transportation difficulties. Finally, I discovered Colonel Schmudt, and to my great surprise, he immediately asked for the proposal, stating that this was a very important and urgent matter that would find the Führer's keen interest. He would keep me posted. Happy to have carried out my order, I drove home."

Another entry in Otto Bräutigam's diary, September 15, 1941 (*ibid.*, p. 46):

"As I was interested in the outcome of the Reichsleiter's proposal, so I called on Colonel Schmudt. He connected me to General Field Marshal Keitel, who told me that the Führer ordered that the State Department give their opinion first. So, I phoned Hevel, but he was represented by Baron Steengracht, who sent me to envoy Rintelen. He told me that von Rippentrop had not commented on the matter as of yet, but that he wanted to talk to the Führer personally."

October 8, 1941: Letter from Dr. Zeitschel (Poliakov/Wulf 1983, p. 120):

"On occasion of Ambassador Abetz's last visit to the headquarters, I gave him the proposal known to you, while proposing to deport our Jews located in the concentration camp as soon as possible to the east, due to overcrowding.

Ambassador Abetz talked to the Reichsführer SS personally about the proposal and was promised that the Jews in the concentration camp could be evacuated as soon as transportation means allowed this."

October 13, 1941: From a meeting between Governor General Hans Frank and Rosenberg (*Jüdisches...*, p. 252):

"Then the governor general began to talk about the deportation of the General Government's Jewish population to the occupied eastern terri-

tories. Reichsminister Rosenberg commented that a similar request had already been presented to him by the military administration in Paris. At present, however, he saw no opportunity to carry out such resettlement plans. He agreed to support the emigration of the Jews to the east in the future, since a plan exists to deport all asocial elements within the Reich in general to the sparsely populated eastern territories.”

October 17, 1941: Hans Frank writes (2233-PS, IMT, Vol. XXIX, p. 494):

“The city of Lublin had a Jewish population of roughly 40,000 people at the end of 1939. 12,000 of them have been resettled in the course of time, but almost the same number has been added through migration to this day. Although all of the Jews are crammed in an old city district, the limits of which they are prohibited from leaving without permission, an enclosed ghetto does not exist to this day. One of the main thoroughfares from the east runs right through this city district, so that a bypass had to be built first, which will be finished these days, so that the ghetto can then be contained with a barbed-wire fence. We could have kept abstaining from such a measure, as no more Jews have lived in the other urban districts for the past year and no Jewish shop can be found outside the ghetto, had it not been for immigrating Jews introducing typhus fever and other diseases to such large degrees, them being persistent carriers of these epidemics.

.....

Ultimately, the Jewish question will be resolved only after a complete deportation of all Jews has occurred.”

October 25, 1941: Hitler in the presence of Himmler and Heydrich:

“In parliament, I prophesized Jewry that the Jew will disappear from Europe if war is not avoided. This criminal race has to account for two million deaths in World War I, and now again hundreds of thousands. Don’t anybody tell me that we cannot send them into the morass! Who cares about our people? It is good if the terror precedes us that we are exterminating Jewry. The attempt to create a Jewish state will be a failure!” (Jochmann, p. 106)

November 17, 1941: Rosenberg is appointed *Reichsminister* for the occupied eastern territories. Dr. Alfred Meyer becomes his permanent deputy-in-chief. Hinrich Lohse is appointed *Reichskommissar* for the *Ostland* (Domarus, p. 1782).

December 16, 1941: Hans Frank (2233-PS, IMT, Vol. XXIX, pp. 502f.):

“Let me be frank with you: one way or another, we need to call it quits with the Jews. The Führer once said: Should unified Judaism succeed again in unleashing a world war, then the blood toll will not only be paid by the people driven into war, but then the Jew in Europe will have found his end.

Regarding the Jews, I will have but one expectation: that they disappear. They must go. I have initiated negotiations with the aim to deport them to the east. In Berlin, a large meeting will be held in January, to which I will send Herr State Secretary Dr. Bühler. The meeting will be held in the Reich Security Main Office by SS Obergruppenführer Heydrich. At any rate, a great Jewish migration will occur.

But what is supposed to happen with the Jews? Do you believe they will be sheltered in settlement villages in the Ostland? We cannot shoot these 3.5 million Jews; we cannot poison them, but we will be able to apply some means that will somehow lead to an extermination success, namely in connection with large-scale measures yet to be discussed by the Reich. The General Government must be freed of Jews just as the Reich is free.”

Note: The term “extermination success” will be dealt with at the end of this chapter.

December 20, 1941: Due to a proposal of the *Reichskommissar* for the *Ostland*, the plans for a General District of Byelorussia have been amended (Reichsminister..., Preface). The changes are not mentioned in the source given. Apparently, as can be derived from a later source, Byelorussia was split into a civilian and a militarily administered section (Essen, pp. 3ff.). Pursuant to an outline of March 14, 1942, the General District of Byelorussia was partitioned into nine counties, namely:¹⁴

- Minsk
- Baranavichy
- Sloönim
- Navahrudak
- Lida
- Sluzk
- Hanzewicz
- Glebojkie
- Vileyka

¹⁴ *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland (Riga)* from March 14, 1942.

Autumn 1941: I want to introduce another document here which is unfortunately not dated. It contains a supplementary guideline for the treatment of the Jewish question (212-PS, IMT, Vol. XXV, pp. 302-306). The date Autumn 1941 is inferred indirectly. The document is evidently younger than the related guideline of August 13, 1941, as it contains detailed instructions. But it is surely older than Document IMT 344-EC, which will be commented on later. The document also seems to be older than the protocol of the Wannsee Conference, as the former contains suggestions implemented by the latter. Excerpts (*ibid.*, p. 302):

“All measures concerning the Jewish question in the occupied eastern territories must be consistent with the principle that the Jewish question will be solved for all of Europe no later than after the war. Therefore, they have to be designed as preparatory partial measures and must be coordinated with decisions made on this subject otherwise. This applies urgently to the creation of at least temporary shelters for Jews from the Reich.”

Note: “at least temporary shelters for Jews from the Reich”!

Segregation of the Jews (*ibid.*, p. 304):

“Thereupon the marking of all Jews with always visible Jewish stars has to be carried out without delay, and the freedom of movement has to be abrogated for all Jews. A transfer into the ghettos with simultaneous segregation of the sexes is to be aimed at. The existence of many more or less entirely Jewish communities in Byelorussia and in the Ukraine facilitates this task. Besides this, such towns are to be chosen for this that allow an exhaustive exploitation of the Jewish workforce due to existing labor projects. Under supervision, these ghettos can be granted a Jewish self-administration and a Jewish security service. Guarding the border between the ghetto and the outside world, however, is to be done by the police.”

Cultural Activities (*ibid.*, p. 305):

“Cultural activities will be absolutely forbidden to the Jews. This also includes the prohibition of the Jewish press, Jewish theatres and school system.”

Compulsory Labor (*ibid.*, pp. 305f.):

“Both the present lack of workers in the occupied eastern territories and ideological as well as political consideration let it appear as a demand of profound importance to introduce compulsory labor for all

Jews and to lead them in the strictest form to a united labor deployment. This must go hand-in-hand with the elimination of the Jews from their present vocations, whereby activities in past occupations are to be granted as long as this is necessary within the framework of the labor deployment. Apart from this, the Jewish workforce is to be deployed in hard labor.

The decisive guideline for the Jewish labor deployment shall be only the complete and unrelenting utilization of the Jewish manpower, without any age limits, to rebuild the occupied eastern territories. The tasks to be assigned to the Jews in closed labor deployment will be mainly the construction of roads, railways and canals, as well as land improvement programs, etc. Their use in agriculture under strict supervision seems feasible initially, too. There also seem to be no objections for the deployment of the Jews in the wood-shoe, straw-shoe, broom or brush production within the ghettos.

It is imperative that the Jewish workforce is deployed only in fields of production which allow a later swift withdrawal of this force without any serious disruptions, and which prevent a specialization of the Jewish workers. It is to be prevented under any circumstance that Jewish workers become indispensable in existential production branches.”

January 20, 1942: The day of the Wannsee Conference. Excerpts from its protocol:¹⁵

“By order of the Reich Marshal a Reich Central Office for Jewish emigration was set up in January 1939 and the Chief of the Security Police and SD was entrusted with the management. Its most important tasks were:

- a/ to make all arrangements for the preparation of an increased emigration of the Jews,*
- b/ to direct the flow of emigration,*
- c/ to accelerate the emigration in individual cases.*

The goal was to rid the German living space of Jews on a legal basis. All offices realized the drawbacks coming with such accelerated emigration. For the time being, however, they had to be tolerated on account of the lack of other possible solutions.” (Sheets 168f.)

¹⁵ Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Berlin, R 100857, Sheets 166-180; online: www.ghwk.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf-wannsee/dokumente/protokoll-januar1942_barrierefrei.pdf; for a rather accurate English translation see http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1532.

“Pending the Führer’s consent, another possible solution has replaced emigration, namely the evacuation of the Jews to the east.

Such activities are, however, to be considered as provisional actions only, but practical experience is already being collected which is of great importance in relation to the future final solution of the Jewish problem.” (Sheet 170)

“Under proper guidance the Jews are now to be allocated for labor to the East in the course of the final solution. Able-bodied Jews will be taken in large labor columns to these districts for work on roads, separated according to sexes, in the course of which action a great part will undoubtedly be eliminated by natural causes.

The possible final remnant will, as it must undoubtedly consist of the toughest, have to be treated accordingly, as it is the product of natural selection, and would, if liberated, act as a bud cell of a Jewish reconstruction (see historical experience).

In the course of the practical execution of this final settlement of the problem, Europe will be cleaned up from the West to the East. Germany proper, including the protectorate Bohemia and Moravia, will have to be handled first because of reasons of housing and other social-political necessities.

The evacuated Jews will first be sent, group by group, into so-called transit-ghettos from which they will be taken to the East.” (Sheets 172f.)

“Under Secretary of State Dr. BUEHLER stated that it would be welcomed by the Government General if the implementation of the final solution of this question could start in the Government General, because the transportation problem there was of no predominant importance and the progress of this action would not be hampered by considerations connected with the supply of labor.” (Sheets 179f.)

January 27, 1942: Hitler declares (Jochmann, p. 241):

“The Jew must get out of Europe. It is best they go to Russia.”

February 10, 1942: Letter from Rademacher to Envoy Bielfeld:

“In August 1940 I gave you, for your records, the plan developed by my department on the Final Solution of the Jewish question, for which the island of Madagascar was to be demanded from France as a term in a peace treaty. The practical implementation of this project, however, was to be transferred to the Reich Security Main Office. According to these plans, Gruppenführer Heydrich was charged by the Führer with carrying out the solution of the Jewish question in Europe.

In the meantime, the war against the Soviet Union has opened up the possibility to set aside other territories for the Final Solution.

Therefore, the Führer has decided that the Jews need not be deported to Madagascar, but to the East. Madagascar no longer needs to be considered for the Final Solution.” (Poliakov/Wulf 1983, p. 142)

February 14, 1942: Letter from Woermann to Rademacher (*ibid.*):

“Envoy Bielfeld notified me of your note of February 10 – DIII 145/42g – according to which the Führer has decided to deport the Jews not to Madagascar but to the east. Madagascar need no longer be considered for a Final Solution.

Due to the importance of this decision, I would appreciate your naming the source where these minutes are registered.”

March 7, 1942: Goebbels in his diary (Lochner, p. 114):

“I read a detailed report from the SD and police regarding a final solution of the Jewish Question. Any final solution involves a tremendous number of new viewpoints. The Jewish Question must be solved within a pan-European frame. There are 11 million Jews still in Europe. They will have to be concentrated later, to begin with, in the East; possibly an island, such as Madagascar, can be assigned to them after the war. In any case, there can be no peace in Europe until the last Jews are shut off from the continent.

That, of course, raises a large number of exceedingly delicate questions. What with those related to Jews? In-laws of Jews? Persons married to Jews? Evidently, we still have quite a lot to do and undoubtedly a multitude of personal tragedies will ensue within the framework of the solution of this problem. But that is unavoidable. The situation is now ripe for a final settlement of the Jewish Question. Later generations will no longer have the will power or the instinctive alertness. That’s why we are doing a good work in proceeding radically and consistently. The task we are assuming today will be an advantage and a boon to our descendants.”

March 23, 1942: Letter from Dr. Zeitschel to Dr. Strack:

“In confidence, the German Embassy was informed about a decree from Reichsmarschall Göring of July 31, 1941 which cannot be forwarded due to its classification.

It is a supplement to the decree of January 24, 1939 pertaining to the Jewish question, especially their emigration and evacuation of Jews.

Subsequent to this decree, a meeting of the state secretaries is said to have taken place in Berlin, about whose progression the German Embassy would like to be informed. Because I am not allowed to make use of the Reichsmarschall's decree in an official letter due to its confidentiality, I would greatly appreciate it if you could try, just as confidentially, to obtain [a] protocol of this meeting of undersecretaries of states from Undersecretary of State Woermann and to send the German Embassy a copy of it.

The topic of the discussion is, as you will understand, of fundamental importance for my assignment, namely the solution of the Jewish question. Hence I would be very grateful if you would take the necessary steps." (Poliakov/Wulf 1983, p. 121)

March 27, 1942: Goebbels in his diary (Lochner, pp. 142f.):

"Beginning with Lublin, the Jews in the General Government are now being deported eastward. The procedure is a pretty barbaric one and not to be described here more definitely. Not much will remain of the Jews. On the whole it can be said that about 60 percent of them will have to be liquidated whereas only about 40 percent can be used for forced labor.

The former Gauleiter of Vienna, who is to carry this measure through, is doing it with considerable circumspection and according to a method that does not attract too much attention. A judgment is being visited upon the Jews that, while barbaric, is fully deserved by them. The prophecy which the Führer made about them for having brought on a new World War is beginning to come true in a most terrible manner. One must not be sentimental in these matters. If we did not fight the Jews, they would annihilate us. It's a life-and-death struggle between the Aryan race and the Jewish bacillus. No other government and no other regime would have the strength for such a global solution of this question. Here, too, the Führer is the undismayed champion of a radical solution necessitated by conditions, and therefore inexorable. Fortunately, a whole series of possibilities presents itself for us in wartime that would be denied us in peacetime. We shall have to profit by this.

The ghettos that will be emptied in the cities of the General Government will now be refilled with Jews thrown out of the Reich. This process is to be repeated from time to time. There is nothing funny in it for the Jews, and the fact that Jewry's representatives in England and America are today organizing and sponsoring the war against Germany must be

paid for dearly by its representatives in Europe – and that’s only right.”

April 20, 1942: Goebbels in his diary (*ibid.*, p. 167):

“The most recent act of sabotage [in France] against a German military train which resulted in several deaths will be punished with severe reprisals. The number of people to be shot will be doubled, and over a thousand Communists and Jews will be put into freight cars and shipped to the East. There they will soon cease to see any fun in disturbing Germany’s policies for order in Europe.”

April 21, 1942: Goebbels in his diary (*ibid.*, pp. 167f.):

“Because of the railway attack on the 16th of this month, the military commander in France has implemented severe measures. Thirty – instead of the originally planned twenty – hostages (Jews and persons close to the perpetrators) are to be shot. If the perpetrators are not captured within three days, another 80 executions will follow, furthermore the deportation of 1000 Jews and communists (instead of the initially planned 500) to the East.”

1942: The last document to be introduced is No. 344-EC, which was already mentioned under “Autumn 1941.” It is also undated. We can conclude indirectly that it is from 1942, since it was introduced as part of the so-called “Green Map” (September 1942 is mentioned; IMT, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 331-355). In it, guidelines for the treatment of the Jewish question are published. They coincide almost verbatim with the document “Autumn 1941.” There are also a few interesting deviations. There is no mention of temporary shelters for Jews from the Reich. Instead one finds (*ibid.*, p. 348):

“On the other hand, the experience gained in the occupied eastern territories in dealing with the Jewish question can act as guidance for the solution of the entire Jewish question, because the Jews in these areas, together with the Jews in the General Government, form the largest contingent of European Jewry.”

It is interesting that the proviso “segregation of the sexes” is missing, while the topic of cultural activity is handled more intensively now, as it was suddenly permitted subject to certain restraints (*ibid.*, pp. 350f.):

“Step by step the Jews must be segregated from the cultural activity of the remaining populace and confined to internal Jewish establishments. Individual areas have numerous Jewish schools with Yiddish as the language of instruction; these schools must take up also the other Jew-

ish children formerly taught in schools with other instruction languages. If necessary, Jews can build new schools of this kind using Jewish funds. Aside from Yiddish, the Hebrew language is to be promoted, since it helps to segregate the Jews from the rest of the populace. The teaching personnel and school curriculum of Jewish schools are to be kept under continuous supervision."

Note: Hebrew as language! This will be dealt with in the next chapter.

The documents confirm various interesting developments, also the role which Byelorussia, or White Ruthenia as it was later called, played in the deliberations of the powers of the Third Reich.

- April 2, 1941: Plan to enlarge Byelorussia by integration of the Smolensk area.
- May 8, 1941: Byelorussia is slated to accommodate “undesirable elements” from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and from the Lublin area.
- August 10, 1941: Byelorussia becomes a general district with the main districts of Mogilev, Vitebsk and Smolensk as main counties.
- August 13, 1941: Rosenberg combines his plan to evacuate asocial elements to the sparsely populated Eastern territories (i.e. to Byelorussia) with the “emigration of the Jews” to the East.
- October 25, 1941: Hitler sends the Jews “into the morass.”
- December 20, 1941: The General District of Byelorussia is reduced substantially. The main districts of Mogilev, Vitebsk and Smolensk are detached. Mogilev and Vitebsk become the main part of Byelorussia under military administration. These grave changes are made without any public justification. A detailed review of this process will follow in the next chapter.

The development of the “Jewish Question” is also interesting:

- April 29, 1941: Rosenberg proclaims a temporary solution: compulsory labor and ghettoization.
- July 1941: Göring orders Heydrich to find a solution of the Jewish question “most favorable in connection with the conditions prevailing at the time.”
- August 13, 1941: Further regulations on the ghettos, compulsory labor for all Jews fit for work.
- August 22, 1941: Dr. Zeitschel proposes that Jews in the area of influence be concentrated in a designated territory in the East.
- September 14, 1941: Rosenberg wants to send all Jews of Central Europe to the Eastern territories. His proposal is presented to Hitler.

- October 13, 1941: Rosenberg connects his plan to deport asocial elements to the sparsely populated Eastern territories with the Jewish emigration to the East.
- October 25, 1941: Hitler sends the Jews “into the morass.” Note various characteristics of the entire text, specifically his words: the attempt to establish a Jewish state will be (not would be!) a blunder. Furthermore, the presence of Himmler and Heydrich is highly interesting. After all, Heydrich had received orders from Göring to execute the Final Solution. Himmler was Heydrich’s chief. Was this the day the course was set, in strict secrecy? Did Hitler fear that this version of the Final Solution would have the same fate as his euthanasia program, which had to be terminated because of public protests? Did Hitler fear protests against the “morass”? Was it possible that there had already been protests from high-ranking officers, as his formulation “Don’t anybody tell me that we cannot send them into the morass!” suggests? The area had already been under German control during the First World War, thus numerous German officers might have known this territory well.
- Autumn 1941: The measures regarding the Jewish question in the Eastern territories are further detailed.
- January 20, 1942: The Wannsee Conference determines the modalities of the deportations.
- January 27, 1942: Hitler declares: The Jews must get out of Europe. It is best they go to Russia.
- Further details about the measures pertaining to the Jewish question. Among them general directives on school policies.

Highly interesting is this expression in the Wannsee Conference’s protocol: the Jews will be deployed at work, “separated according to sexes.” Consider a remark by Rauschning, according to which Hitler declared:¹⁶

“If I send Germany’s finest into the steel hurricane of a future war without having any remorse at the most-valuable-German bloodshed, then should I not have the same right to remove millions of an inferior race breeding like vermin – not by exterminating them but only by systematically preventing their high natural fecundity to unfold? For example, by keeping the men separate from the women for years.”

¹⁶ Rauschning, p. 129. I am aware of the problem of citing Rauschning. Rauschning had undoubtedly had dialogues with Hitler. I’m convinced that a central theme existed. The quoted passage deals with the main theme. It appears very typical of Hitler, especially in his larger political sphere; that’s why I used it.

In this retrospective, Frank's expression of December 16, 1941 – "[...] will be able to apply some means that will somehow lead to an extermination success" – has a special meaning.

In general, many questions can be deduced from these quotations. For example: Why did the Jews' cultural activities get so much attention in these texts? Or: What happened to the French who were sent to the East? If they wanted to kill them, why was this not done in France, as happened to the others? The next chapter will deal with the fate of Frenchmen in the Soviet Union.

D. Byelorussia

The creation of a Byelorussian General District was preceded by various considerations, which will be discussed next. The meager German literature on Byelorussia agreed that the settlement area of the Byelorussians, as it was generally called, is larger than the Soviet Republic of Byelorussia. The most important area which must be added is the district of Smolensk and also the area east of Vilnius (von Engelhardt, pp. 220ff.). Based on these considerations, Rosenberg's plans in 1941 called for an extension of White Russia or Byelorussia to a point 250 kilometers short of Moscow (1017-PS, IMT, Vol. XXVI, pp. 549f.). Rosenberg's administrative structure of August 10, 1941 foresaw the subdivision of the general district of Byelorussia into five main districts, namely (Reichsminister..., p. 5):

- Minsk
- Mogilev
- Babruysk
- Vitebsk
- Smolensk

The civilian administration was also adjusted to this area, as can be gleaned from an article in the *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland* (German Newspaper of Ostland) on the inspection tour of *Reichskommissar* Hinrich Lohse. According to this, the area between Smolensk and Minsk and between Vitebsk and Sluzk had already been handed over to the civilian government by the German military. The district commissars were either already on duty or were expected to arrive on site shortly.

Three months later, this administrative structure of Byelorussia was fundamentally changed for unknown reasons. It was unusual that these changes were done quietly. The first indication of this change can be de-

rived from a publication for official use by the *Reichsminister* for the occupied Eastern Territories of December 20, 1941. Based on a suggestion by Hinrich Lohse, this structure was already abolished at this time (*ibid.*, Preface). Evidence for a new structure can be inferred from a list of German armed forces' command posts in charge of each county.¹⁷ According to this, the General District of Byelorussia was divided into the following counties:

- Minsk
- Baranavichy
- Slonim
- Navahrudak
- Lida
- Sluzk
- Hancewiece
- Glebokie
- Vileyka

This means that the General District of Byelorussia was reduced to the former main district of Minsk. Other publications verify this indirectly. More-detailed information can be derived only from an essay of 1944 (Essen, pp. 3ff.). According to this, Byelorussia was divided into a civilian and a militarily administered part. The civilian-administrated part had eleven counties. To the above-mentioned nine, another two were added (*ibid.*, p. 7):

- Urban area of Minsk
- County of Barisau.

While information pertaining to the part of Byelorussia under civilian administration is only difficult to acquire, next to nothing can be found on the part under military administration. The sole source is a map that was included in the above essay. The original size of Byelorussia was not increased, but rather substantially reduced. In the south, large areas were detached and came under the jurisdiction of the *Reichskommissar* of the Ukraine. The border then ran along the Pinsk – Mosyr – Gomel line, where these places already belonged to the Ukraine. In the east, the border coincided with the old boundaries of the former Soviet Republic of Byelorussia, while in the west, a large area around Białystok was detached. The border between the parts under military and civilian administration is especially peculiar, because it does not adhere to any previous administrative

¹⁷ *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland (Riga)* from February 14, 1942.

partitioning.¹⁸ For example, a salient of land projects into the area of the County of Minsk. The border seems to be drawn at random. However, if one compares the border with a map of soil qualities of the land, then the border seems to make sense. Byelorussia is subdivided into eight topographical areas (Generalstab..., p. 47 and Chart 11). Coming from the north, the border divides the lake district of Polozk in such a way that the western part belongs to the civilian-administered part. It divides the Byelorussian Ridge and the plains of Orsha and Mogilev. This also explains the curious border salient. Further to the south, the border runs in a relatively straight line through the morass and forest flatlands of northern Polesia. This part of the country is saturated with swamps and bogs (*ibid.*, pp. 49ff). According to the above description, one can imagine this area being one morass, especially during rainfall. Add to this special seasonal conditions, especially during spring and fall, when the area gets choked up with mud. A publication by the *Reichskommissar* for the *Ostland* dealing with these seasonal conditions states (Reichsamt..., p. 40):

"The mire originates as follows:

During thaw, slush mixes with the melting upper layer of the ground. The latter is itself soaked with water, because it still contains the remnants of the autumn rain and waters of the thawing snow. The ground, thawed only a few inches deep, warms up only slowly, as a lot of heat is needed for the melting. Evaporation occurs only slowly, and the water supply by spring precipitation can be considerable. Finally, the permafrost layer underneath the thawed layer is impermeable for water, hence it prevents the water from trickling from higher to lower layers. Thus, the soil can dry only when the thawing process has reached sufficiently deep layers, and if the water can run off, and if temperatures are high enough to cause evaporation. This over-soaking of the top layer and its mixing with slush causes the known impassability on unpaved ground. The wheels of vehicles sink into the mud all the way down to the still-frozen layer. The more the upper layer thaws, the deeper the mud becomes, and the impediment to vehicles increases proportionally."

If Hitler sent the Jews into this part of Byelorussia, then his comment that he would send them into the morass would make sense.

¹⁸ Compare for instance the Soviet administrative sections: von Engelhardt, pp. 278ff.

1. Special Role of Byelorussia

The few extant contemporary publications on Byelorussia contain peculiar demands and statements. In an essay with the indicative title “Byelorussia’s Path” we read (Behrend, p. 11):

“The Greater German Reich has given the Byelorussians their native ancestral living space. The challenge now is to reclaim this living space by work and sacrifice of every individual, supported by the best of the German work force.”

Two other quotations claim that the Byelorussians are oriented toward western Byelorussia: (*ibid.*, p. 12):

“Through the small double-windows of the wooden houses, they prefer looking toward the west. They look toward Warsaw, Vienna or Berlin and since Napoleonic times, in the mixed Byelorussian Polish-speaking area to Paris.”

“Baranavichy, Slonin and Lida cannot be mentioned in the same breath with Minsk or Smolensk. Doing this would mean to mention with the same breath two radically separated worlds.”

Another chapter with a similar title “Byelorussia’s Road to Freedom” states (Kurtz, p. 71):

“The forces that put themselves instantly at the disposal of the German administration and that were prepared for an honest cooperation came from the Byelorussian part of the population. Thus, it appeared to be only natural to put together in one administrative district, to the General District of Byelorussia, the ethnically predominantly Byelorussian parts of the area.”

That the above pertains to the civilian-administered part of Byelorussia results from a later section of the chapter, which refers to eleven district commissars (*ibid.*, p. 72). Highly interesting is Byelorussia’s special role, which is mentioned occasionally. The *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland* reports on a convention of the district commissars titled: “New Structure for Byelorussia”:

“Within the Reichskommissariat of the Ostland, Byelorussia has immense problems to solve which are unknown to the other general districts or are of a different nature.” (“Neuformung...”)

The *Reichskommissar* of the *Ostland*, Mr. Lohse, speaks of a “new, unique mission” in Byelorussia (cf. “Weissruthenien...”). For the Germans in the eastern frontier, their mission in Byelorussia has a “special character”

(*ibid.*). Specific details about what that may be, however, were never mentioned. But there are hints that these unique tasks are of importance beyond the local region. Thus one reads:

Byelorussia “*must be totally reorganized so it can become a useful member of the New Europe after victory.*” (“Neuformung...”)

Another part mentions:

“[...] *that Byelorussia will faithfully fulfill its duties for the evolving new Europe.*” (“Weissruthenien...”)

But not even here is it obvious what these duties were. Nevertheless, fact is that Byelorussia was to be limited basically to its western part, the home of its forefathers, where the Byelorussians had their ethnic center of gravity. Byelorussia had to be restructured and fulfill a unique mission for the new National-Socialist Europe. Note that the statements made here about the homeland of the Byelorussians expressly contradicts Rosenberg’s statements (see previous note of April 2, 1941).

2. Resettlement Program

Within Byelorussia, resettlements were carried out from the military- to the civilian-administered part. The *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland* reports on this subject extensively. According to this, District Commissar Dr. Kaiser handed over farmsteads to nine farmers. The pertinent paragraph states (“Eigener...”):

“*The farmers resettling from Borowlany to the new farms were promised all support from the district commissar and the agricultural council.*”

According to my only accessible local register, the place of Borowlany does not exist (*Official Standard...*, Vol. I, p. 615). However, a locality named Borovlyane exists, having the coordinates of 55 19 N and 30 06 E. Given this information, it can be found on the German army maps, there spelled Borowljane. One must consider the basic problem of transliterating Cyrillic names into the Latin alphabet. Thus, one finds places like Baranovichy called either Baranowitschi or Baranowicze. Certain Cyrillic letters are difficult to transliterate into the Latin alphabet. The root of Borowlany “Borowl” is relatively simple, and there is little room for ambiguity. A general correlation for “v” is “w” in German. According to the very-comprehensive American register I used, there is no locality beginning with the

word “Borowl.” However, more than one place commences with the word “Borowl,” but they all lie in other parts of the country. Another Borovlyane lies east of the Ural Mountains, and a lot of Borolyankas, but they all are in Siberia. The most similarly named town to be considered is Borovievo (*ibid.*, p. 613), but the name deviates too much from Borowlany. Furthermore, this town lies east of Smolensk, thus outside of Byelorussia. Consequently, the town in question is probably Borovylane. As Borovylane lies in the vicinity of Witebs, the farmers were resettled from the military to the civilian zone, to the county of Minsk. This transfer was of such importance to the *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland* that it returned to the issue two weeks later with an article containing fundamental deliberations with the aim – so my impression – to dampen the hopes of further extensive assignments of farms to other farmers (“Einzelhöfe...”). It is likely that further, large-scale resettlements occurred, but that those affected usually did not receive their own farms. This was promised to them at a later date. The second article reads (*ibid.*):

“Naturally there are other aspects to be considered during war. Thus, the necessary land consolidation, the reduction of population density in overpopulated villages by the creation of new settlements can only be achieved after the war. Then, quite a few other open questions in the agricultural field can be dealt with as well.”

Note: Overpopulated villages and the creation of new settlements! Why were the villages overpopulated to the extent that one had to create new settlements?

3. Special Treatment of Byelorussia

With regard to the many issues pertaining to the occupied eastern territories, Byelorussia was treated differently than other areas. A characteristic trait is already the lack of information on this area. Information on the eastern occupied area ought to be contained in the “East File,” which was published by the *Zentralverlag* (Central Publishing House) of the NSDAP (National-Socialist Party) located in (Hohenstein). It contains extensive material also on the *Reichskommissariat* of *Ostland*. However, only the Baltic parts of it are being dealt with: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Byelorussia is omitted as a rule. One simply reads there about the population: “No data on the ethnic structure of Byelorussia is available” (*ibid.*, Issue 4, No. 1, p. 1). Or, in another file dealing with the same topic:

“The [...] general district of Byelorussia [...] had a [...] totally different political, social and human development. It will be dealt with later at the end [of the series].” (ibid., No. 3, p. 1) – only that part never appeared...

Unfortunately, I can't find this information. Questions arise here as well: Why did this district take an entirely different development? Furthermore, Byelorussia is totally ignored in the chapter on science and education of the *Reichskommissariat Ostland* (*ibid.*, Issue 4, No. 18. pp 1ff.). Where information is to hand, they confirm Byelorussia's special treatment. The reason for this special treatment, if it is discussed at all, is explained as follows (“Die Völker...”):

“The general district of Byelorussia belonging to the Ostland is not included in these measures, because in this old Soviet area, the prerequisites with regard to personnel and organization are still missing due to long-term Bolshevik rule.”

This assertion, which seems credible at first, is incorrect, however. The main part of Byelorussia was Polish up until 1939. It was occupied by the Soviets a mere nine months longer than the Baltic states. Above all, a number of institutions were denied Byelorussia which were introduced in the Ukraine. A few areas originally belonging to Byelorussia were detached and attached to the Ukraine. These areas were governed differently than the rest of Byelorussia. To illuminate this, four areas of this special treatment are analyzed here:

- Postal Services
- Press
- Traffic Rules
- Local Authorities

a. Postal Services

So-called official postal services were introduced to the occupied areas by the German Postal Service, which had little to do with the German *Reichspost*. Quotation (Schultz, p. 9):

“The ‘German Postal Service’, which is dealt with here, was an independent organization, separate from the official German Reichspost. It emerged from it and also merged with it again, so to say. It was not the vehicle of transportation for the German Reichspost, but a far-reaching newly created postal organization active in the east, west, north and south of the German Reich, with special duties: transporting the official

mail of the German authorities, party headquarters and administrations of the armed forces such as military hospitals, commissary and quarter offices of the army, air force and navy; the replacement, training and staffs units in the occupied areas; the offices of the four-year plans including all its authorized personnel, the Organization Todt, and the widely ramified labor administration and surveying authorities. Besides the duty of transporting the official mail of the aforementioned from and to the homeland, which was naturally all postage-free, the duties further encompassed postage-due transporting of the private mail of an army of hundreds of thousands of officials, employees and workers of the aforementioned bureaus – again from the occupied territories to Germany and from Germany to these territories. With the ever-expanding war and the increasing mobilization of the large French, Belgian, Dutch, Nordic and even Russian armament industries, numerous German firms were compelled to open branches in the occupied areas and assign hundreds if not thousands of employees, workers and specialists to these branches abroad. The construction of the Atlantic Wall from the North Cape to the Spanish border, the fortification of the southern approaches in the Alps, and the construction of sturdy barriers in upper Italy led numerous German construction firms to post their engineers, specialists and workers into those foreign countries. This entire workforce wanted to and had to be personally serviced with mail in order to keep in touch with their relatives. Although postage was due for the mail of all these firms, it could not be transported as regular mail, as the post offices of the occupied countries were subject to espionage or were under the influence of foreign agents during the war.”

During the course of the years, offices of the German Postal Service covered the entire East, from Narwa, Slansky and Pleskau in the north, close to the front, to deep into the south, in Crimea and the Donetz Valley. Wherever the area was fairly pacified, these offices were established (*ibid.*, e.g. pp. 221, 306f.). In Byelorussia, in the civilian-administered part, there were twelve such office, none, however, in the militarily administered part. Judging by task of these offices, one can conclude that the economic potential of the latter region was not being used for war production. This is hard to understand. The surrounding areas in the north, west and south all had such post offices. Even the former Byelorussian districts with the cities of Pinsk, Petrikow, Mosyr, Retschiza, which were allotted to the Ukraine, had these offices (*ibid.*, pp. 330ff.), but not cities like Vitebsk, Mogilev,

Babruysk, and Gomel. The militarily administered part of Byelorussia remained devoid of these offices.

Separately from the above was the resumption of postal services for civilians. In the Baltic States, this was accomplished swiftly. Quote (“6000 Poststellen”):

“Since the late summer of 1941, 80 main post offices, 580 branches and nearly 6000 postal-bureau and supplementary offices were opened in the three general commissariats of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In Riga, the Rail & Mail, postal bank, telecommunication and stamp departments were reopened under German auspices. Further telecommunication centers were established in Dorpat, Reval, Vilnius and Kaun.”

As for the Ukraine, we read (*ibid.*):

“In the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, the establishment of postal services unfolds in the same way. Here too, the population is included in the postal services and is using the centers intensively.”

Only Byelorussia no postal services were established, not even in the civilian-administered part (Schultz, p. 294).

b. The Press

Press services for the Eastern Territories were established quite rapidly. But here as well, the military administration of Byelorussia was omitted entirely, and the civilian part received minimal attention. The extent of press services is listed below:

Country	Size [km ²]	Population	Newspapers /Circulation
Estonia:	47,549	1,017,811	15/211,250
Latvia:	65,791	1,803,104	25/663,500
Lithuania:	67,199	2,797,840	18/509,400
Byelorussia with:	60,461	2,400,000	4/190,000
without school papers:	60,461	2,400,000	3/95,000
Ukraine:	?	?	50/?

For data, compare Hohenstein, Issue 4, Nos. 1 & 19; Issue 5, No. 19

The largest newspaper in Byelorussia was the *Bjelaruskja Schkola*, a school newspaper intended as “*Ersatz*” (replacement) for schoolbooks. Because it was no real newspaper, Byelorussia is listed with and without it.

The newspapers density allows us to infer the permitted regional information density (*ibid.*, Issue 4, No. 19, p. 7):

Estland	3,170 sq.km/copy
Latvia	2,632 sq.km/copy
Lithuania	3,170 sq.km/copy
Bjelorussia with:	15,115 sq.km/copy
without school paper:	20,154 sq.km/copy

The number of inhabitants per newspaper copy is:

Estland	4.8 inhabitants/copy
Latvia	2.7 inhabitants/copy
Lithuania	5.5 inhabitants/copy
Bjelorussia with:	12.6 inhabitants/copy
without school paper:	25.3 inhabitants/copy

These lists also reflect Byelorussia's special treatment. In the towns detached from Byelorussia and merged with the *Generalkommissariat* Ukraine, local newspapers did appear, for example in Mosyr (*ibid.*, Issue 5, No. 19, p. 4). Even in areas of the Ukraine that were occupied only later, local papers appeared, as in Cherson, Nikopol, Krivyi-Rih and Berdiansk (*ibid.*, p. 6).

c. Transportation

In general, the indigenous population was initially not allowed to travel by rail (Pottgiesser, p. 56). In 1943, civilian railway traffic was allowed on certain routes in the General Districts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania ("Reisegenehmigungen..."). Among other things, private journeys in urgent cases were allowed. Again, Byelorussia was excluded from these liberalizations.

d. Autonomous Authorities

In 1942, autonomous authorities were permitted in the General District of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The General District of Byelorussia is not mentioned. Every county had an elder who was responsible for finances, employment, health care and local government (Runte).

4. Fortified Villages

A characteristic of Byelorussia that apparently was non-existent in any other part of the occupied Soviet Union was the construction of fortified villages ("Wehrdörfer..."). The reason given was the necessity of defense for the Byelorussian farmers against their enemies from Moscow-

organized terrorist groups. Thus, these forts were meant for the self-defense of Byelorussia's peasantry. It seems noteworthy that these fortifications were to be constructed along the border of Byelorussia (meaning the borders of the civilian-administered part; *ibid.*, p. 174). The question arises: why along the border? Would it not have made more sense to build these sites along the boundary of partisan areas? A concrete example is given of the fortified village Kurgany (*ibid.*, pp. 175f.).

The name of Kurgany does not appear in the local register, but Kurgani appears seven times (*Official Standard...*, Vol. III, p. 295). Since the Russian alphabet prevails, various transliterations must be considered. Kurgani ends in the Russian alphabet with the letter "bi." The Latin script transliterates this either into "y" or into "i." Of the seven Kurgani, two lie in Byelorussia; one in the military, one in the civilian zone. I presume that the Kurgani in question was located in the civilian zone, since it is unrealistic to assume that the total information embargo for this area was breached for such a precarious matter as a fortified village. Thus, Kurgany lies southwest of Minsk in the border area of the military and civilian administration. It is shown on the German Army Map as U54 VIII.43¹¹ The strategic pattern according to which the fortified villages were to be built is odd as well. At first, chains of fortified villages were to be built, and only later an entire network (*ibid.*, p. 175). As a military layman, I'm surprised. A chain seems plausible in case a border must be guarded. A network, on the other hand, is better for area control.

When planning the Final Solution of the Jewish question by way of "super ghettos," surveillance was mentioned as an unresolved problem (Seraphim, p. 24). Was this perhaps the solution?

5. A Model Calculation

The plan of concentrating the Jews in the area of Lublin failed because the population density would have been too high (*ibid.*, p. 23).

Would the area of Byelorussia suffice according to the quantitative projections? The area of the civilian-administered zone was 53,662 sq.km (Essen, p. 7; other sources have other values, but I used this source for consistency's sake). The size of the military zone was nowhere to be found. Map comparison (*ibid.*, see map) shows the military zone being about 33% larger than the civilian part. Thus, Byelorussia had an area of 125,000 sq.km. According to various sources, the population density was about 40 persons per square kilometer (Generalstab..., p. 22 and Reichsminister...,

p. 9). Generally, it is assumed that the Jewish population was 10% of the total population of Byelorussia (*ibid.*). Accordingly, the following rough calculation can be made (the civilian zone is rounded up to 54,000 sq.km.):

	Size/sq.km.	Population	Jews	Non-Jews
Civilian zone	54,000	2,160,000	216,000	1,944,000
Military zone	71,000	2,840,000	284,000	2,556,000

According to the Lublin Plan, five million Jews were to be resettled (Sera-
phim, p. 22). Surely, this number must be considered. If it is assumed that
non-Jews were resettled from the eastern to the western zone and that five
million Jews were to be settled in the eastern zone, then the following dis-
tribution arises:

	Size/sq.km.	Population	Population Density
Civilian Zone	54,000	4,500,000	83.33 per sq.km
Military Zone	71,000	5,000,000	70.42 per sq.km

As far as population density is concerned, such a plan would be feasible.
Of course, such estimates are problematic, but even if assuming six million
Jews, which matches the number of disappeared Jews, then the population
density of 84.5 is still realistic.

6. The German Military Map V43 Babruysk

The sole source of detailed information on the militarily administered part
of Byelorussia comes from the German Military Map 1:300,000. This map
is also readily available in the archives. However, for the sake of compar-
ison it is imperative to consider various updates of the initial map. At least
two versions published during the German occupation are needed, that be-
ing the only time in which the cartographers had access to the area. In my
opinion, these prerequisites are only fulfilled for Map V43 Babruysk. I'm
in receipt of the following updates:

- effective: 1.II.1942
- effective: V.1943

By direct comparison of the two, a problem arises. The graphical rendering
of townships was changed in these two maps. In the earlier update, small
villages were drawn as circles only, while in the later update, towns were
drawn in as miniature town maps, as is customary in German maps. Thus,
the visual picture is greatly distorted, because a far greater number of in-

habitants might be assumed from this difference of illustration. From a comparison, the following changes may be noted:

a. Roads

Main roads illustrated for the Babruysk area on the map from 1942 have completely disappeared. Note that Jewish ghettos were not to be connected to main roads (*ibid.*, pp. 19f.).

A totally new road connecting Ossipowitschi and Bychoff (earlier Star. Bychow) had been constructed recently. On the legend of the map of 1943, an entirely new key to the symbols used was introduced to reflect this (overprint). Note that the Wannsee Protocol states “Able-bodied Jews will be taken [...] to these districts for work on roads” (see quote on p. 43).

b. Railways

Despite a missing legend, an argument by analogy leads to the conclusion that evidently a new railway line was built as well, *i.e.* a connection between Ossipowitschi and Sagatje (*en route* to Mogilev).

c. New Settlements

There are a multitude of new villages shown north of Ossipowitschi in the area of Bolschaja Grawa. A network of interrupted lines crisscrosses the local swamp area, devoid of any legend entry, but they could represent a drainage system. Such lines are very numerous in the updated map of 1943, but were not present in the map from 1942.

E. Transportation

1. Railway Networks and Depots

In order to understand certain aspects of transportation to the extermination camps, I have to elaborate on the structure of railway system in Germany and in the occupied Eastern Territories. At least since spring of 1942, three planning authorities responsible for railway transportation existed:

- the German *Reichsbahn* was responsible for the German Reich;
- the *General Direktion der Ostbahn (Gedob)* as responsible for the General Government (of Poland; Pischel, p. 30);
- the *Generalverkehrsdirektion Osten (GVD Osten)* was responsible for the occupied Eastern Zone (Pottgiesser, pp. 26, 36). The *GVD Osten*

consisted of individual main railway headquarters (*Haupteisenbahndirektion* – *HBD*). There were *HBDs* in Kiev, Minsk, Polawa, Riga and Rostow (*ibid.*, p. 138).¹⁹

Not only the German *Reichsbahn*, but also the *Gedob* and the *GVD Osten* made a multitude of autonomous decisions within their areas of jurisdiction. The *Gedob* was, for example, solely responsible for the distribution of freight cars within the General Government (Pischel, p. 49). The *HBDs* of the *GVD Osten* were responsible for management, allocations, preparation of time-tables and for basic management issues. They had to allocate each and every train, as only they were able to assess enemy damage, for example (Pottgiesser, p. 48). In order to plan a complete transportation modus, an operating schedule of all border crossings between the *RVD* region (German *Reichsbahn*), the *Gedob* and the *GVD Osten* had to be compiled for a period of one week or of one month. Thus, it was exactly determined for each border junction of each region, how many trains were to be handed over or taken over at the border (*ibid.*, p. 69).

If one considers the location of the extermination camps of Auschwitz, Treblinka, Sobibor and Bełżec, then one notices that they are all aligned along the border between two transport regions.

Auschwitz lies near the *Gedob* region. The distance between Auschwitz and the *Gedob* region can be estimated at 20 km (Pischel, p. 30).²⁰ For transportation from Auschwitz to Minsk, an efficient railway line from Auschwitz-Radom-Brest-Minsk was at hand (cf. e.g. Kreidler, Map 11).

Treblinka lies directly on the border of the *Gedob* region with the German Reich. Transports can be routed via Białystok-Vilnius-Minsk (see Gilbert 1982b, p. 133).

Sobibor lies on the border between the General Government (*Gedob*) and the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine (*HBD* Kiev; Arndt/Scheffler, p. 14). It is suitable as a transfer station between the *Gedob* and the *GVD Osten*.

Bełżec seems to be the only camp relatively far away from the *Gedob* region (Gilbert, p. 136). However, one must take into account that the original General Government (of Poland) was enlarged after the invasion of the Soviet Union. Bełżec lies near the original border. The function of Bełżec as a transit camp can be proven quite readily. A file memo exists which mentions Bełżec's border location. Excerpt (*Jüdisches...*, pp. 269f.):

¹⁹ On December 1, 1942 the *HBD* was renamed *RVD* (*Reichsverkehrsdirektion* = Reich Traffic Administration). Its cognizance probably was not affected by this.

²⁰ Compare the location of Auschwitz relative to Krakow, Tarnow and Częstochowa.

"1. It would be conducive to divide the Jewish transports going into the district of Lublin already at the train station of departure into Jews fit for labor and Jews unfit for labor. If this segregation at the train station of departure is not possible, then the Jews ought to be divided in accordance with the above criteria in Lublin.

2. Non-deployable Jews are to be brought to Bezec [Bełżec], the outermost border station in the Zamosz District.

3. Hstuf. Höfle is building a large camp where deployable Jews can be registered in a file system according to their profession, and from where they can be requisitioned.

[...]

6. H. asks, where 60,000 Jews could be unloaded along the route of Deblin – Trawniki. Informed of the Jewish transports now departing from here, H. declared that, of the 500 arrivals in Susiec, those unfit for work could be separated out and sent to Bełżec. According to a telegram from the government of March 4, 1943, a transport of Jews is on the way from the Protectorate [of Czechia] destined for Trawniki. These Jews were not unloaded at Trawniki, but were brought to Izbica. The request of the district commissioner at Zamosc was approved by H for 200 Jews to be engaged in work there.

Finally, he declared that he could take on 4 – 5 transports of 1000 Jews each destined for Bełżec. These Jews would cross the border and would never return to the General Government again."

There are clues that Auschwitz also had the function of a camp for resettlers. In the statements by Höss, the following can be found pertaining to Gypsies (Höss, p. 110):

"Although they caused a lot of trouble, they were my favorite prisoners – if one can say such a thing at all. They were not capable of sticking to any work for a longer period of time. Instead, they loved to 'gypsy' about too much. They were most keen on a transport commando, because then they could go places and satisfy their curiosity."

Question: What transport commandos did Höss organize? What was transported and where to?

In Jewish reports on Auschwitz, there are clues as well. One of the first reports on Auschwitz, the Vrba-Wetzler Report, states (Gilbert 1982a, p. 274):

"[This] report, which contains an incredible description of mass massacre of Jews of all countries in occupied Europe in the gas chambers

of Auschwitz-Birkenau, mentions that [the] first group of some 4,000 Czechoslovakian Jews, who arrived from Terezin at Birkenau in early September 1943, were gassed after a six-month quarantine on March 7, 1944.

[The] Report discloses [that] the treatment of both Czechoslovakian transports (so-called SB-Transports = special-treatment transports) differed conspicuously from the treatment of normal transports.

Families were not broken up, not even children; schooling was allowed, and a six-month quarantine was imposed, which was absolutely unusual.

Because of the fact that [the] first group was liquidated entirely, [there is a] severe danger of ensuing liquidation of the second group."

Jehuda B., apparently a member of the transport, reports about this (Adler/Langbein/Lingens-Reiner, p. 121):

"In Auschwitz we were assigned to Camp Section B IIB of Birkenau, which was set up as a Czech family camp. We all received a special treatment, because we all arrived at the camp, while as a rule Jews arriving in Auschwitz were selected. Later we discovered that we were to receive 'special treatment after six months.' This meant that we were to be gassed six months after arrival."

This report contains highly interesting statements. For instance, the consternation that the treatment of this transport "differed conspicuously" from other transports. Were not all transports gassed? Why were these Jews given a six-months' quarantine? For what purpose? This makes sense only if Auschwitz was a transit camp as well, from where Jews were transported to their actual destination. If they wanted to kill them all, why not immediately? The quarantine indicates that one was afraid of importing an epidemic, and this could also account for the missing selection at the ramp.

2. Destinations

Most of the so-called *Judentransporte* (Jewish transports) were destined for the camps of Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka and, especially for the non-Polish Jews, Auschwitz. Records showing destinations in Byelorussia exist almost without exception whenever the *Reichsbahndirektion* (RBD) of the *Reichsbahn* (German Railway) was involved in the transports.

Transportation List of the *Reichsbahn* to Byelorussia:

Date	Train No.	from	to	Remarks
5/8/42	Da201	Vienna	Kajdanowo	Kajdanowo lies between Baranavichy and Minsk
5/15/42	Da202	Vienna	Kajdanowo	additional trains every Friday
	Da203	Vienna	Minsk	regular schedule
	Da204	Vienna	Minsk	regular schedule
6/2/42	Da205	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
6/9/42	Da206	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
6/16/42	Da207	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
6/23/42	Da208	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
6/24/42		Königsberg	Minsk	
6/25/42	Da40	Königsberg	Minsk	
6/30/42	Da209	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
7/7/42	Da210	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
7/14/42	Da211	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
7/16/42	Da220	Theresienstadt	Minsk	
7/21/42	Da212	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
7/22/42	Da219	Cologne-Deutz	Minsk	to Minsk freight station
7/28/42	Da213	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
7/30/42	Da221	Theresienstadt	Minsk	
8/4/42	Da214	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
8/6/42	Da222	Theresienstadt	(Minsk)	original destination
8/9/42	Da222		Kolodischtschi	detour of Da222 to Kolodischtschi instead of Minsk. Kolodischtschi is the second station along the Minsk-Smolewiece line.
8/11/42	Da215	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
8/13/42	Da223	Altreich Vienna Theresienstadt	Kolodischtschi	8 special envoys according to schedule No. 62
8/14/42	Da230	Altreich	Minsk	8 full trains until 10/8/42
8/18/42	Da216	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
8/25/42	Da217	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg
9/1/42	Da218	Vienna	Minsk	from Vienna-Arnsberg

All data from: Lichtenstein, pp. 70-74

Further destinations can be gleaned from other sources (Randecker, pp. 107ff.):

- Sept. 22, 1942 to Maly Trostinec
- Sept. 23, 1942 to Maly Trostinec
- Sept. 26, 1942 to Maly Trostinec
- Sept. 29, 1942 to Maly Trostinec

Maly Trostinec lies southeast of Minsk on the road from Minsk to Dukora.²¹

A further document is very revealing. According to a letter from *Generalkommissar* Kube dated July 31, 1942 and addressed to the *Reichskommissar* for the *Ostland* Lohse, a transport of 1000 Jews arrived in Minsk from Warsaw on the same date (3428-PS, IMT, Vol. XXXII, pp. 279-282, here p. 282). The resettlement of the Warsaw Jews began on July 22, 1942 (Bartoszewski, pp. 32f.). All these transports went through Treblinka. So far it has always been assumed that all these people were exterminated at Treblinka. Apparently at least one train did arrive in Minsk!

The theory presented here seems to contradict information about some transports going in the opposite direction. There are transports from Białystok to Auschwitz between the 5th and 7th of February 1942 (Lichtenstein, p. 67). The map would suggest that it seems quite pointless to transport people from Białystok to the East via Auschwitz. However, Auschwitz consisted not only of Birkenau. It was also a large labor camp, and workers were needed there. There are documents proving that in 1943 a large number of Jews were transported from Białystok to Auschwitz in order to be enlisted for work (1472-PS, IMT Vol. XXVII, pp. 251-253).

Further light is thrown on this matter by transport prohibitions. Hilberg quotes a letter to Himmler (Hilberg, p. 345):

“SS and police leaders reported to me today unanimously that, due to transport prohibition between December 15, 1942 and at least January 1, 1943, there are no means of transport for the resettlement of the Jews. Due to this measure, the entire planning of the resettlement of the Jews is gravely jeopardized. Respectfully request that negotiations with the central agency of the OKW-Reichsverkehrsministerium (German High Command – National Transportation Department) reach agreement that at least three train pairs be made available for the urgent task.”

²¹ Compare *Deutsche Heereskarte* in Note 11.

According to the literature at hand, the transport prohibitions in winter were due to extreme climatic conditions in the new eastern territories. One reads there (Pottgiesser, p. 35):

“The failure rate of locomotives was catastrophic, reaching up to 70% and at times even more. At FEKdo 3, engine failure reached 80% of the normal and 60% of the wide-track locomotives. Bw Minsk managed only with difficulties to get 10 of its 100 engines going. An improvement was reached only after the German locomotives were radically honed down, whereby all frost-sensitive parts were removed or insulated and tender-water tanks and cabins were made heatable.

The already adverse operating conditions deteriorated further. Not only did water faucets, containers and pipelines freeze – which had to be buried 2.00 meters underground to be frost-free – the groundwater level also receded, the wells went dry, water production was insufficient. This was compounded by further impediments of train traffic due to considerable snowdrifts in the treeless plains of the Ukraine, so that the train traffic at FEKdo 3 and 4 broke down altogether on February 4th, for example. On the Brest-Minsk-Smolensk railroad, only eight trains were able to reach the front daily in February 1942.”

“The trains going to the front backed up into the district of the Gedob, blocking the shunting lines of the stations, increasing the operational difficulties. The backlog in the district of Minsk, for instance, consisted of 185 trains headed for the front and 80 trains headed for the homeland. All told: 850 trains were held up.” (ibid., pp. 35f.)

The reasons explained here for the transport prohibitions all pertain to the turn of the year 1941/42. Cancellations pertaining to the turn of the year 1942/43 are not mentioned in my sources at all. Should altered circumstances have prevailed, then one might expect them to be noted. Since the climatic conditions in the area presumably changed little, the transport prohibition mentioned for the year 1942/43 probably had the same reason. According to this, however, transportation in the area of the *Gedob* would not have been affected.

Apart from Auschwitz, which definitely was not subject to the portrayed climatic conditions, however, all other extermination camps lie within the above *Gedob* area. The transport prohibition mentioned above only made sense if all transports were to continue on into the area of *GVD Osten*.

3. Transportation Directives

A number of proclamations are preserved concerning the evacuation of the Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto, which for example contain directions concerning personal effects (Bartoszewski, pp. 33f.):

“1.: By order of the German authorities, all Jews living in Warsaw will be evacuated to the East, regardless of age or sex.

[...]

3.: Every Jewish evacuee is permitted to take along 15 kg of his personal belongings as personal effects. All valuables: gold, jewelry, money, etc. may be taken along. Food is to be brought along to last for three days.

4.: Evacuation commences on July 22, 1942 at 11:00 hours.”

A proclamation from the Jewish Council in Warsaw on July 24, 1942 states that (*ibid.*, p. 41):

“1. Due to unfounded reports circulating in the Jewish housing area of Warsaw bearing on the evacuation procedures, the Jewish council of Warsaw has been authorized by the authority to declare that the resettlement of non-productive individuals to the Eastern territories will definitely take place.”

From a proclamation dated July 29, 1942 (*ibid.*, p. 44):

“By order of the authorities, the following notice is given to persons subject to evacuation. Each person showing up voluntarily for resettlement on July 29, 30, and 31 of this year will be furnished with victuals, i.e. with 3 kg of bread and 1 kg of marmalade. The gathering and issuing point is Stawki Place on the corner of Dzika Street.”

Last but not least, a general directive from the Reich dated February 20, 1943:

“Guideline for the technical implementation of the evacuation of the Jews to the East (Auschwitz Concentration Camp)

The following guidelines concerning the evacuation of Jews from the territory of the Reich and from Bohemia and Moravia to the East, thereby suspending all foregoing ordinances, are hereby promulgated and must be carried out to the letter:

III. Transportation

It is advisable to concentrate all Jews being evacuated in one area before transport. At least 1000 Jews will be transferred in accordance

with the Reichsverkehrsministerium (Ministry of Transport) proposed timetable, which will be sent to the departments involved.

The following provisions must be supplied per person:

Food to last for approximately five days

One piece of luggage or rucksack containing:

one pair of coarse working boots,

two pairs of socks, two shirts, two underpants,

one overall, two woolen blankets,

two bed-clothes including linen,

one bowl, one mug, one spoon and

one pullover.

It is prohibited to take along:

bonds, currency, savings accounts etc., valuables of all sorts (gold, silver, platinum, etc. exception: wedding ring), living inventory, ration

coupons (to be handed over to the local household bureau.)” (von

Lang, Appendix)

These instructions are very revealing in various aspects. For instance, the explicit notice that “the evacuation will take place to the eastern territories.” It is not stated that Jews leaving Warsaw were to be sent to Treblinka.

Then the provision for all volunteers to receive 3 kg of bread and 1 kg of marmalade. Why? For camouflage purposes? It is interesting to note the number of days for which food must be taken along. Jews from the Warsaw Ghetto are to take food for three, Jews from the Reich are to take food for five days. The journey from the Reich to Auschwitz would normally last two days. If one assumed that these Jews were actually being evacuated to Byelorussia, then they would – as for Auschwitz – have to complete the same distance as if they had set out from Warsaw. Then the extended length of the journey would make sense. Also, the order that a pair of coarse working boots, overalls etc. must accompany the journey, can only indicate that the Jews should in effect truly be sent to the East. Eichmann stated as much already (*ibid.*, p. 120). The objection of his interrogator Less that this was a typical German aspect of doing things thoroughly and neatly since the people should not arrive looking oafish, make little sense. Wearing normal shoes would make them look more normal.

F. Indications of Jews in Byelorussia

I have found a few subtle indications of Jews living in Byelorussia. Letters were sent from the deported Warsaw Jews in the first half of January 1943 (Dawidowicz, p. 321). These letters originated from the areas of Pinsk and Babruysk. Pinsk was in the Ukraine and Babruysk in the military zone. They fit into my puzzle.

Quite revealing also is an atlas for the Final Solution (Gilbert 1982b), which gives an overview of the so-called “*Judenaktionen*” (actions against the Jews). Resistance and flight by Jews in Byelorussia from July until December 1943 are registered in many places (*ibid.*, Map 224). Notionally, the Jews should all have been killed by this time. The efficiency of this atlas suffers from the fact that its author does not always distinguish between massacres, deportations and uprisings. I have surveyed each map and have found the following “*Judenaktionen*” in Byelorussia (except Bialystok):

Overview of the Numbers of Affected Jews:		
Military Zone of Byelorussia		
1941	Map 86:	20,000
	Map 94:	43,000
	Map 96:	15,000
1943	Map 147:	8,350
	TOTAL:	86,350
Rest of Byelorussia (without Bialystok):		
1941	Map 73:	8,000
	Map 74:	13,000
	Map 88:	18,000
	Map 94:	23,000
	(including possibly 12,000 deportees)	
	Map 96:	96,400
1942	Map 111:	8,000
	Map 128:	20,500
	Map 131:	28,000
	Map 167:	5,000
	Map 180:	6,500
1943	Map 193:	2,000
	Map 198:	thousands
	Map 202:	6,500
	Total:	138,900 plus thousands

BOTH REGIONS:	
military zone:	86,350
civilian zone:	138,900 plus thousands
Sum:	225,250 plus thousands

The numbers were rounded up. The correlation to each area was not very easy. Thus, small deviations are possible. According to the Wannsee Protocol, 446,484 Jews lived in these areas (*ibid.*, Map 99). If considering that a multitude of transports from the Reich went to Minsk and surroundings, then the number of persons killed must be substantially higher than can be derived from this survey. Also revealing is the minute number of killed persons in the military zone, especially around Vitebsk. The maps report of 4,090 and 8,360 dead. But Vitebsk had 167,420 inhabitants, 50% of whom were Jews (Reichsminister..., p. 9).

If one would suppose that deportation was falsified into extermination, then a fairly precise explanation can support these numbers. In the military zone of Byelorussia, deportation must have been at a minimum. Furthermore, there is still evidence of a ghetto in Minsk in May 1943. (see Klobß).

1. Unusual Indications

With reference to the Wannsee Protocols, Jews transported to the east were to be employed as a labor force. Such labor forces did exist.

A memorandum of the *Reichsminister* for the Occupied Territories of October 25, 1941 confirms that (von Lang, Appendix):

"Those fit for work, on the other hand, are being transported to the East. It goes without saying that among the Jews fit for work, males and females are to be kept segregated."

An article in the *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland* of September 2, 1941 notes that (Frötschner):

"Of the 11,000 people returning home to the town of Sluzk, half are Jews. They are conscripted for work, are being deployed, as forever new tasks arise which need be solved. The power plant is being repaired. Wherever there is a possibility of creating something new, it will be seized upon."

On December 12, 1941 the same newspaper printed a picture with the subtitle "Jewish labor column led to a construction site" (Gilfert). A report of

June 30, 1943 deals with the solution of the Jewish question in Galicia (018-L, IMT, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 391-431, here p. 393):

“The best solution was the creation of mandatory labor camps managed by the SS and Police leaders. Employment consisted of the extremely important repair of the Dg 4 [major highway], which had been in a catastrophic condition and which was imperative for the southern section of the front. October 15, 1941 marked the beginning of the construction of work camps adjacent to the highway. Within a few weeks, altogether seven camps were constructed, despite immense problems. They were occupied by 4,000 Jews. These first camps were followed by further constructions so that, within a short period of time, the use of 15 camps could be reported to the Higher SS and Police Leader. In the course of time about 20,000 Jewish workers passed through these camps. Despite the immense difficulties emerging from these problems, 160 km of finished road could be reported today.”

The existence of such camps in the *Ostland* up until May 1944 is reaffirmed in a notice from the Ministry of the East to *Obergruppenführer* Pohl (Hilberg, p. 388).

There are a multitude of indications concerning the transports to the eastern occupied territories, all of which are usually ignored. A discussion of these facts is nowhere to be found. For example, all incoming Jews were told at the camps that they would be deported and had to be bathed and disinfected (Rückerl, p. 141). A file memo by an official of the General Government (of Poland) in the district of Lublin confirms that Jews leaving the General Government would remain outside it (*Jüdisches...*, p. 270).

The relocation of the Polish and German Jews was planned in two phases:

1. Transit from the General Government to the East.
2. Transit from the Reich to the General Government (*ibid.*, 271).

This entire operation was known among the local commissioners as “*West-Ost-Bewegung*” (West-to-East Movement), a fact which is substantiated by a report by Gert Erven in the year 1942, which is very informative in general (Schoenberger, p. 134):

“In the county cities, after carrying out the auxiliary work for the West-East-Movement, Jewry will be eradicated except for the most urgently needed craftsmen and specialists. As the Wehrmacht is no longer willing to carry out operations in the countryside, I will round up all Jews of the area in two or three county cities, deploy them exclusively in con-

fined work columns in order to eradicate at last all black marketeering and partisan support through them. Under my supervision and in my trade schools, the best specialists among the Jews must share their knowledge with intelligent apprentices, so that in the long run the Jews are dispensable in these trades as well and can be eliminated.

Relationship to the Wehrmacht:

After initial conflicts and questions on jurisdiction which, however, were less the fault of the local commander than of the district headquarters in Baranowitschi, the relationship to the Wehrmacht evolved after a short while not merely into a passable one, but within a few weeks into an excellent, close and fruitful cooperation. The situation today is that every Wehrmacht duty station that has requirements to fulfill within my area comes to see me first in order to work together after mutual planning. This cooperation was especially productive in the current planning for the West-East-Movement and I sincerely hope that this cooperation continues."

On the number of deportees, we read in Globocnik's final report on "Operation Reinhardt" (4024-PS, IMT, Vol XXXIV, pp. 58-92, here p. 64):

"Government estates:

4. Accommodation of the entire resettled population on government estates is not possible because of overcrowding of the area."

As far as I know, the term "government estates" is used only in the Soviet Union for the so-called "Sovkhozes." Further measures also indicate actual deportation. Quotation (Globocnik; *ibid.*, p. 66):

"7. It is intended to give the settlers a receipt for the houses, farms, animals and inventory left behind. It does not stipulate any pledge for restitutions. The future will show if these restitutions will be made in Brazil or rather in the Far East. The deportees must get the feeling that restitution for property lost will be made in the near future."

The reference to Brazil or the Far East can only apply for the Jews, because there was never a desire to deport any other groups in such a way. As far as Polish deportees were concerned, the sole indemnity was to consist of goods or cash (*ibid.*, p. 64). The final report calls "Operation Reinhardt" expressly as a deportation procedure. The core of that report states that (*ibid.*, p. 72):

"The entire Action Reinhardt is subdivided into four titles:

A) the deportation itself

B) the use of the workforce

C) the exploitation of the belongings

D) the seizure of hidden valuables and real estate

A. The Deportation

This is complete and finished. The prerequisite was to round up the people with methodically correct methods and the very limited personnel available without impinging too much on war production.

By and large, this was accomplished. Major damage was done only in Warsaw, where the operation was concluded with the wrong methods due to a misjudgment of the situation.

Because of my transfer, Litzmannstadt [Ghetto] could not be liquidated by me."

In the year 1942, 10,000 Romanian Jews were deported over the River Bug into the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine. In a letter addressed to the German Ministry of External Affairs, Eichmann lamented (Poliakov/Wulf 1983, p. 132):

"On the other hand, the disorganized and premature deportation of the Romanian Jews into the occupied territories strongly jeopardizes the already initiated evacuation of the German Jews."

Notice the formulation: "premature deportation"! Apparently, the Romanian Jews were also to be deported to the occupied eastern territories. It is also puzzling as to how a premature deportation should inhibit the evacuation of the German Jews. Were they really meant to pass through Auschwitz alive?

Another report contains the following passage (Adler, p. 9):

"In this context, SS O'Stuf Eichmann stressed the absolute necessity to conform to the given directives, especially in considering age and frailty etc. as, in a transport to Riga, approximately 40-45 cases were unjustly evacuated, according to the Jewish elders in Riga who protested to SS-Oberguppenführer Heydrich via Gauleiter Lohse and Meyer."

Why did this matter? Were not all these people to be killed anyway? The same question can be posed regarding this report, which Hilberg quotes (Hilberg, p. 354):

"The Wehrmachtbefehlshaber in the Ostland protested against the arrivals on purely military grounds. The German Jews, he pointed out, were far superior in intelligence to Byelorussian Jews; hence there was danger that the 'pacification' of the area would be jeopardized."

A transport of German Jews to Byelorussia is indicated here as well. What happened to these people? Did none survive? Also well-known is a notice

of the *Reichskommissar* for the *Ostland* (135-R, IMT, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 371-375, here p. 371):

“That the Jews receive a special treatment need not be elaborated. But that things do happen as described by the report of the Generalkommissar of June 1, 1943 seems unbelievable. What is Katyn in contrast? Just imagine such things should leak out through enemy lines and be exploited! Probably such propaganda would simply have no effect because listeners and readers would not be willing to believe this at all.”

Kube forwards a draft of the warden of the court jail of Minsk, which states that (*ibid.*, p. 373):

“On April 13, 1943 the German former dentist Ernst Israel Tichauer and his wife Elisa Sara Tichauer nee Rosenthal were admitted to the court jail through the Security Services (Hauptscharführer Rübe). As of this date, golden crowns, dental arches and fillings were removed from the teeth of German and Russian Jews. This always happens 1-2 hours before the respective action.

Since April 13, 1943, 516 German and Russian Jews were finished off. An investigation shows that only on two actions the gold items were taken away, namely on April 14, 1943 from 172 and on April 27, 1943 from 164 Jews. About 50% of the Jews possessed golden teeth, dental arches or fillings. Hauptscharführer Rübe was always personally present and took custody of the gold. Before April 13, 1943 this, however, was not done.”

This dispatch is of interest first of all because there were evidently many German Jews present in the Minsk District in 1943! But if one supposes that all these Jews had actually been murdered while *en route* to the east, then the above documents would be absurd. From the warden of a penitentiary to the *Generalkommissar* for Byelorussia, to the *Reichskommissar* for the *Ostland*, this incident causes general indignation, as it must trigger indignation in the rest of the civilized world. However, if thousands of human beings are murdered daily, including women and children, then that one incident is by comparison of little moment. Or does one suggest that Kube and Lohse did not know of the murders taking place in their district? Quite apparently, for Kube “special treatment” must have meant something else than mass extermination. One must also ask why bother to involve a court jail with Jews to be “finished off” there?

That the term special treatment could mean something else than to kill, can be inferred from the following report of Operation Hornung, which

was deployed in the Pripet Marshes in the fight against partisans (3943-PS, IMT, Vol. XXII, pp. 563-570, here p. 570):

“Result of the operation:

Enemy losses: 2219 dead, 7378 specially treated,

65 captives, 3,300 Jews.

Own Losses: dead: 2 Germans, 27 foreign legionaries;

wounded: 12 Germans, 26 foreign legionaries.”

What a strange category of enemy losses: dead, specially treated, captives and Jews. Apparently, there are differences amongst the dead, specially treated persons and Jews. Furthermore, some of the specially treated must still be alive; otherwise they'd be listed as dead. If one does suppose that the dead lost their lives in battle and the specially treated persons were shot after the battle, then why does the list contain apparently 3,300 still-living Jews? There is no logic whatsoever in the above when considering the Auschwitz theory. Neither have I found any literature interpreting this curiosity. These reports are simply accepted and thereafter not further examined.

As far as I am concerned, the following presumption can be made: special treatment means that the individual was subjected to a special treatment, for instance marking them with a tattoo, similar to an Auschwitz inmate, with concurrent transfer to a particular destination. Then the difference between Jews and those specially treated could be explained. The specially treated fled and the “non-treated” Jews were not yet controlled by the German authorities.

G. Positions on the Final Solution from August 6, 1942 to December 1943

During the above period the following positions concerning the Final Solution prevailed amongst the leaders of the Third Reich.:

August 6, 1942: Rosenberg's speech before the *Reichskommissars* and delegates of the military command for the occupied territories (Poliaikov/Wulf 1955, p. 330):

“Instead of humanity, scum has been poured onto the peoples of the Earth. Now we are proceeding to eradicate this scum, eliminating the Jews from all countries of the European Continent. This can also be

termed as 'humanity,' a hard, biological humanity, to boot (enthusiastic applause).

It means that the racial corpses will be cleansed, become sound and humane once more (further enthusiastic applause), just as was the case in the past. Lately I read one of my older books which happened to have fallen into my hands again: 'The November Heads,' and I must say, as I read it, the old anger rose in me again which we felt fourteen years ago about this filthiness (enthusiastic applause). It is good to read our revolutionary works from our revolutionary times every now and then. Some of it has faded in our memories, and what gall these people had back then when writing on Germany and German history, we must memorize this over and over again so that we won't get weak, as the grand purge is now under way (general agreement). We must not be content with the Jews simply being pushed from one country to another, and that a larger Jewish ghetto can still be found here and there. Our goal can only be the old one: The Jewish question in Europe and Germany will only be solved when there are no Jews left on the European continent [...]"

The interpretation of Rosenberg's words allows ambiguity; a reader might reason that they are proof of the extermination. However, they may also be interpreted as Rosenberg wanting the Jew out of "his" *Ostland* just as Frank wanted them out of "his" General Government, as the following texts will illuminate.

October 9, 1942: Sensitive Information. National Socialist German Workers Party. Party Chancellery, Sequence 66/42 (PL-45, IMT, Vol. XLII, pp. 328-330, here p. 329:

"Preparatory measures for the Final Solution of the European Jewish Question. Rumors on the situation of the Jews in the East.

Notes

restricted to

f.G.u.K.²²

During the course of carrying out the Final Solution of the Jewish question, there seems to arise within the population in various sections of the Reich debates over 'very severe measures' against Jews in the Eastern Territories. Investigations determined that such statements are passed on usually in a distorted and exaggerated way by soldiers on

²² Meaning "für Gau und Kreis" (for district and county) [original footnote in IMT].

furlough from the various units deployed in East, who have had the opportunity to observe such measures.

It is plausible that not all fellow countrymen can sufficiently comprehend the necessity of such measures, especially not those parts of the population that have no opportunity to get an impression of Bolshevik atrocities from their own experience.

"In order to counter the formation of rumors, which frequently have a tendentious character, the following instructions are given:"

Following a few historical elaborations on the Jews, it continues (*ibid.*, p. 330):

"Due to the tightly limited living space available to the German people, it was hoped that the problem could be solved by accelerating the emigration of the Jews. Since the beginning of the war in 1939, these emigration possibilities have become less and less feasible. On the other hand, the living space and the economic sphere of the German people have grown steadily, so that today, in view of the large numbers of Jews residing in these areas, driving them back completely through emigration is no longer possible. Since already our next generation will not regard this problem as vitally and as clearly due to experiences made, and because this matter has already been initiated and needs to be resolved, the entire problem must be solved by our generation.

In our fight for securing the existence of the German people, the complete expulsion and segregation of the millions of Jews residing within the European economic sphere is of utmost importance.

Commencing in the Reich and transitioning to other European countries to be included in the Final Solution, the Jews are being continuously transported to the East into large camps which either already exist or have yet to be built. From there, they are either deployed for labor or transported further to the East. Old Jews and Jews with high military honors (Iron Cross I, Gold Medal of Valor, etc.) are being regularly transferred to the city of Theresienstadt in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia."

Note the title of this memorandum: "Preparatory measures for the Final Solution of the European Jewish Question." Of interest is also the explicit remark that non-working Jews are transported further to the east!

November 23, 1942: Himmler before SS Junkers (SS officer candidates) in Bad Tölz (Smith/Peterson, p. 200):

"The Jewish question in Europe has also been totally transformed. The Führer said once in a speech in the Reichstag (German parliament):

Should Jewry initiate an international war to eradicate the Aryan races, then not the Aryan but the Jewish race will be eradicated. Today the Jew has been exiled from Germany; he lives in the East and is building our roads and railways, etc. This process has been carried out consequently but without cruelty. We don't torture anybody, but we know that we are fighting for our existence and for the preservation of our Aryan blood."

On April 16, and 17, 1942 Hitler explains to Horthy (Domarus, p. 2005):

"Should the Jews not want to work there, then they would be shot. If they cannot work, then they would have to degenerate. They ought to be treated like tuberculosis germs, which can infect a sound body. That would not be cruel if one considers that even innocent creatures in nature, such as hares and deer, would have to be killed in order to prevent harm. Why should we spare these beasts who want to infect us with Bolshevism? Races which do not defend themselves against Jews will decay."

Question: What does "there" mean?

April 19, 1943: Korherr writes to Dr. Brandt and attaches the so-called Korherr Report. It is to render information concerning the fate of the Jews in the enlarged Reich territory. It contains tables such as the one on page 80 (von Lang, Appendix).

Or one reads there (*ibid.*):

"From January 1, 1943 until March 31, 1943 113,015 Jews from the Reich including Bohemia and Moravia, the new Eastern Territories and the district of Bialystok were evacuated to the East, including the change of residence of 8,025 Jews to the old folks' ghetto, Theresienstadt. The number of Jews in Germany, foremost in the eastern region, was therefore greatly reduced recently."

Notice that the report does not specify any information concerning Jews in the Soviet Union. Had the report concerned itself with the physical annihilation of the Jews in Europe, then their numbers would have had to be mentioned as well. Was the intention, however, to concentrate the Jews in various parts of the Soviet Union, then the lack of their numbers in the Soviet Union is plausible.

Himmler remarking on the Korherr Report (Poliakov 1983, p. 241):

"The Reichsführer of the SS has received your statistical outline concerning the Final Solution of the Jewish question in Europe. It is his

Area	Period from... to 12/31/42	Reduction (-) or Increase of Jews				
		due to				Total
		Emigra- tion	Mortality Surplus	Evacuation	Other Changes	
Reich (incl. Sudetenland)	1/31/33 (8/29/38)	-382,534	-61,193	-100,516	+4,570	-539,673
Ostmark (Austria)	3/13/38	-149,124	-14,509	-47,555	-710	-211,898
Bohemia and Moravia	3/16/39	-25,699	-7,074	-69,677	-	-102,450
Eastern Territories (incl. Białystok)	Sept. 39 (June 40)	-334,673		-222,117	-	-446,790
Generalgouv. (incl. Lemberg)	Sept. 39 (June 40)	-427,920		-1,274,166	-	-1,702,086
Totals:		-1,402,726		-1,714,031	+3,860	-3,112,897

data taken from Poliakov 1983, p. 241

wish that the term special treatment not be applied under any circumstances. Page 9, Point 4 must read as follows:
‘Transporting Jews from the eastern provinces to the Russian east: Persons passed through the camps in the General Government... through the camps in the Warthegau...’
No other expression may be used.”

Note: I have not been able to find any page 9, or Point 4, in the Korherr Report that I examined. Was this report truncated? Note also: Transporting Jews... to the Russian east! The prohibition of the word special treatment is also peculiar. Was that not the code word for the mass murder?

May 11, 1943: The *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland* writes with reference to Rosenberg (“Der Zionismus...”):

“The Jewish Question [...] will now be solved through the National-Socialist revolution for Germany and for all of Europe. In due course, – following total victory in the war for the whole of Europe – the time will also have come for a final solution of the Jewish question.”

Should not almost all Jews have been killed during the course of the war? Then why even think about this? Similar questions are applicable to the ensuing text.

July 11, 1943: Bormann declares, by order of Hitler (von Lang, Appendix):

“When dealing with the Jewish question in public, all elaborations on the future comprehensive solution must be avoided.

One may say, however, that Jews are conscripted as a whole for conducive labor deployment."

December 16, 1943: Himmler before navy commanders in Weimar (Smith/Peterson, p. 201):

"So many Jews were transported to the East. Population displacements, which we endow with great names in history, have been realized within this short period of time [...]"

H. Various Political and Military Events

1. Partisan Warfare

The partisan movement in the occupied part of the Soviet Union is quite unusual. The topic is partially discussed here, as well as in the next chapter. Byelorussia was unmistakably the epicenter of that activity. This emerges clearly from the accounts of partisan attacks on the German railway transports. Most attacks registered in the vicinity of *GVD-Osten* were made in the county of *RVD Minsk* (Pottgiesser, p. 86), whereby these concentrated on the military administered part of Byelorussia. Examples derived from the pertinent literature mention this area, as Pottgiesser's diagram (see following graphic) demonstrates (*ibid.*, p. 91).

Except for two, the bulk of the railway lines lies in the eastern part of Byelorussia. A Soviet account of partisan activity concentrates on the areas around the cities of Minsk, Vitebsk, Brest, Gomel, Mogilev, Orsha, Bobruisk, Pinsk and Kalinkavichy (Kühnrich/Pech/Schaul, p. 9). Most of these cities are in the military-administered zone! The international composition of the partisans is also revealing (*ibid.*):

"In the brotherly family of the Byelorussian partisans, Czechs, Slovaks, Frenchmen and Yugoslavs, Greeks, Dutchmen, Spaniards, Austrians, Germans and members from other nations fought bravely against fascism.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government paid tribute to the heroic fight of these true internationalists. For their antifascist involvement, 703 Poles, 184 Slovaks, 33 Czechs, 36 Greeks, 25 Germans, 24 Spaniards and 14 Frenchmen were honored with medals and decorations of the Soviet Union."

How did these foreigners come to Byelorussia in the first place and what made them join the partisan movement? Who can explain that? Except for the Spaniards, who will be dealt with later, the Jews of the above-mentioned nations were transported to Auschwitz or to the East. For Jews it would also be comprehensible that they joined the partisans. Concerning the Spaniards, the explanation is simple. After the end of the Spanish Civil War, many Spaniards fled to France. There they were interned in detention camps. During WW II, they and their fellow combatants from other nations were transported to Auschwitz. Quote (Hinze, pp. 257f):

“From the summer of 1942 onward, the Vichy regime extradited French and foreign Jews to the German occupation authorities. While the forced deportation affected mainly Jews, the pro-fascist Vichy authorities used this process also to extradite communists. Roughly on August 8th, the first such transport was organized at the city of Le Vernet. Until the deportation began, this camp was surrounded with machine guns. No visitors or mail were allowed to enter, and no mail permitted to leave the camp. The transport focused on Jewish inmates of various nationalities. The French selected primarily communists for this. Of eighty persons affected, forty were non-Jewish individuals. With this transport, the German communists Hermann Axen, Leo Cussel, Kurt Goldstein, Gustav Hartog, Erich Hoffmann and the Austrian communists Wilhelm Kaminec, Letschmann, Ludwig Lokmanis (pseudonym), Hermann Peczenig, Siom, the Polish communists Buch, Ender Maizlik, the Soviet communists Elijwitsch and Benjamin Rapoport, the Czech communist Theodor Guttmann and others were brought to the demarcation line by the French authorities, where they were handed over to the Nazis, who transported them via Drancy to Auschwitz. Almost half of those mentioned here lost their lives in this fascist concentration camp.”

The quotation is reproduced completely because Hermann Axen is mentioned here. His résumé is highly interesting because it is so contradictory. Carola Stern writes about him (Stern, p. 13):

“With reference to the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty of August 1939, Axen was released from [German] detention and handed over to the Soviet Union. In 1942 he joined the communist party. Instruction

courses at the Frunse Academy; later he lectured at political schools. After 1945 he was a cofounder of the FDJ.^[23]”

In the *SBZ-Biographie* we read (Bundesministerium..., p. 20):

“According to Eastern sources subsequently an inmate at the Zwickau Penitentiary until 1937/38. From 1938 to 1940 emigrant to France and from 1940-45 confinement in the Vernet Concentration Camp, France. Acc. to Western source released to the USSR honoring the German-Soviet non-aggression treaty. There teacher at party schools and in antifascist camps. 1945 member of the Communist German Party; 1946 cofounder of the FDJ.”

According to this, Axen’s résumé was considerably altered. His transport to Auschwitz was not mentioned. Why? And how did Axen manage to get to the Frunse Academy and the antifascist camps? Was he liberated at Auschwitz, or was he transported to the eastern part of Byelorussia and found there by the Soviets in 1944?

Interestingly, partisan activities didn’t commence with the withdrawal of Soviet troops either. A report from Minsk dated 28th of July 1943 notes (3000-PS, IMT, Vol. XXXI, pp. 462-470, here p. 463):

“Until the month of May, in some western areas even until June/July, the former Polish area of Byelorussia was very peaceful. Only slowly were activists, which were organized by the Soviet here as well, joined by individuals from POW camps, by Jews, by the agricultural proletariat and by city dwellers.”

Comparison of the two maps depicting partisan activity confirms that development (Philippi/Heim, Map 23). The maps show that partisan activities started in eastern Byelorussia and spread from there to adjoining areas. Its epicenter always remained in eastern Byelorussia, however.

2. The Collapse of Army Group Center

In early summer 1944, the eastern front had stabilized in a precarious way. Byelorussia was still held by the Germans, while the Ukraine had been mostly lost to the Soviets. The German High Command expected further attacks in the south against its Army Group Northern Ukraine (Gacken-

²³ *Freie Deutsche Jugend*, youth organization of communist East Germany, similar to the infamous *HJ – Hitler Jugend*.

holz, p. 321). The pertinent map in the Appendix (Document 7) shows where that army was located.

But in June 1944, the German High Command changed its evaluation of enemy intentions profoundly. It realized that the enemy would mount strong attacks against cities like Bobrinsk, Mogilev and Orsha (*ibid.*, p. 320). But until June 20th, Keitel did not count on immediate attacks (*ibid.*, p. 321).

The assault began on the 22 of June 1944, the third anniversary of the Barbarossa invasion (*ibid.*, p. 323). The Germans were overrun by strong and superior Soviet forces, which employed new attack tactics (*ibid.*, p. 332). The German High Command was also completely taken by surprise by the long-range operational goal, the attack on Minsk (*ibid.*, p. 220). On June 27th, the position of Army Group Center was irrevocably destroyed. On June 28th, Hitler ordered categorically that the front line: Lake Chernovoye – St. Dorogi – Beresina be held (Philippi/Heim, p. 248). To ensure that result, he even changed the military command. Field Marshal Busch was replaced by Field Marshal Model. On June 30th, Model realized that he could not hold nor reoccupy this line (*ibid.*, p. 249). Finally, on July 3 the Germans lost all of eastern Byelorussia (Gackenholtz, p. 331).

But the offense encompassed farther-reaching goals still. By June 28th, the German High Command realized that the Soviet armies would push far beyond Minsk (*ibid.*, p. 328). By the 9th of July 1944, Baranovichy and Vilnius had been reconquered by the Soviets, and they had reached way beyond Molodechno. One month after the commencement of this operation, all of Byelorussia was in Soviet hands. The new front line ran in an almost straight line from Brest-Litovsk to Kovno (Philippi/Heim, Map 26).

The German Wehrmacht lost 350,000 men, twice the number of troops lost at Stalingrad. Twenty-eight German divisions were annihilated (Gackenholtz, p. 317). Army Group Center had deployed the following divisions (*ibid.*, pp. 323ff.):

3 rd Tank Army	
4th Army	
9th Army	
Tank Grenadier Division “ <i>Feldherrnhalle</i> ”	detained
1st Hungarian Cavalry Division	
4th Tank Division	detained
5th Tank Division	detained
12th Tank Division	detained
14th Tank Division	
20th Tank Division	detained
24th Division	detained

28th Jäger Division	detained
95th Division	detained
132nd Division	detained
170th Division	
206th Division	detained
212th Division	detained
290th Division	detained
707th Division	detained
VI Army Corps	
IX Army Corps	
XII Army Corps	
XXVII Army Corps	
XXV Army Corps	
XXXIX Army Corps	
XXXXI Army Corps	
LIII Army Corps	detained
9th Army Chief of Staff	
4th Cavalry Brigade	

The next chapter will explain the units employed and the meaning of the term “detained.”

Even though history overlooks it, this battle was probably the world’s bloodiest battle of annihilation ever fought. Judged by the fast way it unfolded, it cannot be expected that any civilians could have escaped the Red Army’s onslaught in Byelorussia.

3. The End of the “Final Solution”

No unequivocal information concerning the cessation of the “Final Solution” can be obtained. Most authors agree, however, that the “Final Solution” was stopped in July 1944 at the latest, and the *Eichmann Kommando* was dissolved in September 1944. The source situation is obscure to me because some claims are made without giving sources. Details:

- 26 June 1944: Horthy commands deportation stop of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz (von Lang, p. 197).
- 18 July 1944: Jewish circles in Switzerland and Sweden verify that the deportation of Hungarian Jews has stopped (Gilbert 1982a, p. 337).
- 26 July 1944: Himmler orders deportation stop from Hungary (Biss, p. 350). Another source dates this to 25th of August 1944 (von Lang, p. 197)
- 30 August 1944: Himmler transfers Eichmann from Hungary (Biss, p. 351).

- 26-30 September 44: Klages announces Himmler's final order to stop gassings (*ibid.*).
- 28 September 1944: Himmler's order to dissolve *Sonderkommando* Eichmann (von Lang, p. 197).

In his *Atlas* of the Final Solution, Gilbert impressively shows the transportation of Jews to the different concentration camps, and especially to Auschwitz. See for example the graphic from October 1943 reproduced in Document 9, on page 160 (Gilbert 1982b, Map 222).

The pictures showing continual deportations to Auschwitz are impressive. Suddenly, as of August 1944, the direction of transportation reverses (*ibid.*, Map 271). At first the routes cross each other. Some transports go to Auschwitz, but others go from there to western Germany, to Ravensbrück, see Document 10, page 160.

The direction of the transports turns around increasingly. Transports away from Auschwitz assumes proportions equal to those towards it earlier, see Document 11, page 162 (*ibid.*, Map 276).

The Red Army reached Auschwitz on January 27th. 1945 (*ibid.*, p. 217). A surprising discovery is observed when reviewing the "Final Solution" from its beginning to its end. The Final Solution started very erratically after German troops had occupied the area of Byelorussia and ended abruptly after Germany lost the territory to the Soviets. The course of events:

- 22 June 1944: The Soviet Union attacks Byelorussia
- 26 June 1944: Horthy orders the transportation stop of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz.
- 3 July 1944: Eastern Byelorussia is lost for Germany.
- 18 July 1944: News reaches Switzerland and Sweden that the deportation of Hungarian Jews has been cancelled.
- 22 July 1944: The Germans lose all of Byelorussia.
- 26 July 1944: Himmler cancels deportations from Hungary.
- 30 July 1944: Eichmann is withdrawn from Budapest
- 1 September 1944: The Red Army reaches Warsaw, the front in south-east Poland moves 150 kilometers to the West (Philippi/Heim, Map 26).
- 28 September 1944: Himmler dissolves *Sonderkommando* Eichmann.

The loss of the above territories dictated the end of the "*Endlösung*." In September 1944 the Germans had little hope of ever reoccupying the above territories.

Note: Even though Auschwitz remained under German control for another half year, no effort was made to continue any extermination. Allied pro-

tests? No Allied statesman had officially protested against the mass executions, at least not until after the final German defeat!

4. The Iron Curtain

In the main article of *Das Reich* of 25 February 1945, Goebbels used the term “iron curtain” to describe the situation at the German-Soviet front. (Goebbels).

On May 12th, 1945, Churchill telegraphed Truman using the same terminology (Churchill, pp. 498f.):

“I am profoundly concerned about the European situation. [...] An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind.”

Understandably, a country fighting a war will practice censorship so that the enemy receives little or no information. It is strange, though, that the Soviet Union deployed this tactic only after the occupation had been reversed and victory was close at hand. In fact, this non-disclosure policy was maintained even after victory and was even extended to its allies. What did Stalin have to hide?

IV. Facts II

This chapter explicates considerable facts pertaining to developments in the Soviet sphere of influence that support the ensuing proposed thesis.

A. Unusual Developments in the Soviet Sphere of Influence from 1943 to 1953

1. The New Anti-Semitism

After the October Revolution, the Soviet Union was in general a pro-Jewish nation. Many discriminations of the czarist regime were abolished: The Soviet Union treated, within the realm of its national policy, the Jews as equals amongst its other nationals. Although numerous Jewish schools and seven Jewish theatres were closed during Russification campaigns between 1936 and 1939, this can nevertheless not be classified as a new anti-Semitism (Hardmann/Wippermann, p. 162). However, this attitude changed in 1943, in the middle of the war (*ibid.*, pp. 162f.):

“Jews fought together with the other peoples of the USSR against deadly fascism. But in 1943, a new wave of anti-Semitism swept through the country which exceeded everything known from the czarist regime. The point of origin of this anti-Semitism was the occupied territories; from here anti-Semitism spread amongst the ranks of the partisan movement, the Red Army and its rear guard. Discrimination against Jews in the army became increasingly noticeable. Thousands of Jews, who had performed heroic acts during the war, remained without awards due to their nationality. At the same time, stubborn rumors spread that Jews

didn't fight, but stayed back safe behind the front lines." (*ibid.*, pp. 162f.)

It is peculiar that anti-Semitism began in the German-occupied areas, where all the Jews had been exterminated! Who can explain this?

2. Auschwitz

On January 27, 1945 Soviet troops reached Auschwitz (Gilbert 1982b, p. 217). The Soviet Union set up an "Extraordinary State Commission for the Assessment and Investigation of the Atrocities of the Fascist German Invaders and Their Accomplices Concerning the Horrific Deeds and Crimes of the German Government in Auschwitz (Oswiezim)." This commission interrogated and examined 2,819 former inmates of Auschwitz Concentration Camp and examined German documents. On May 6, 1945, the commission published a detailed report stating (008-USSR, IMT, Vol. XXXIX 39, pp. 241-261, here p. 242):

"1. Through execution by firing squads and horrific torture, the Germans exterminated over four million nationals of the Soviet Union, of Poland, France, Belgium, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and of other countries in the concentration camp of Auschwitz.

2. German professors and physicians performed so-called medical experiments on living men, women and children in the camp."

There is no mention of gassing here, but of shootings and horrific torture. Gas chambers are mentioned only later in #2 and afterwards as well as when quoting witness reports, where it is stated for example that "[...] selected inmates were put into the gas chambers to be exterminated" (*ibid.*, p. 251). The report is internally contradictory, but it is also the first and most immediate report concerning Auschwitz. However, the reaction of the Soviet Union is odd.

1. The numerous documents and protocols, which according to the above findings must exist, were never published.
2. The Soviet Union did not forward one single document to Israel during the Eichmann trial (von Lang, p. 273).
3. The subject of mass extermination of Jews is taboo in the Soviet Union. Stalin, for instance, only "mentioned but once that the Nazi policies aimed at annihilating the Jews [...]" (Hardmann/Wippermann, p. 163).

In the Soviet sphere of influence, other documents pertaining to the mass extermination have also disappeared, and prominent witnesses have been withheld from the western public.

The Gerstein Report, a report of the SS officer Kurt Gerstein on mass extermination in the camps of Belżec, Treblinka, Sobibor and Majdanek, which inspired Rolf Hochhut's drama *Der Stellvertreter* (*The Deputy*), contains various grave discrepancies. Gerstein probably committed suicide on July 25, 1945 in his prison cell in Paris (Friedländer, p. 7). Thus, he cannot be questioned any more. But in order to throw light on the discrepancies, the interrogation protocols would help. The Gerstein file has disappeared. The French authorities supposedly sent it to Professor Gros at the French Embassy in London on November 10, 1945 so that it might be forwarded to the Polish delegation at the United Nations. Since then, there is no trace of the document (*ibid.*, pp. 8f.).

There are also strange events concerning Rudolf Höss, the commandant of Auschwitz. He was arrested in the vicinity of Flensburg. During the war-criminal trials at Nuremberg, he was interrogated briefly as a witness(!) and extradited to the Poles on May 25, 1946. Eleven months later, on April 2, 1947, the Polish High Court sentenced him to death. He was executed at Auschwitz fourteen days later (Höss, pp. 7f). Here as well, a crucial personality concerning the mass murders was withheld from the western public. He made his sensational testimonies only while in Poland. Inexplicably, Höss, who was a willing and cooperative prisoner (*ibid.*, p. 9), was not presented to the international public. His writings were published only nine years later and in Polish (Höss, p. 11)!

On May 2, Berlin was totally occupied by Soviet troops (Schulz, p. 489). Up until the arrival of the western Allies on July 3rd and 4th 1945, they had exclusive control of Berlin (*ibid.*, p. 491), and as such access to all documentary centers of the Third Reich. Thus, the Soviet Union could have screened the documents easily. Contemporary witnesses report that this was actually done (Lochner, p. 7):

"When the Russians occupied Berlin in 1945, they rummaged through the official German archives, using more force than care: some material was sent to Russia, some destroyed and the rest was either thrown away or simply ignored."

It is difficult to tell whether this was only due to a lack of care. To decide this, one needed to know what "the Russians" were looking for and whether they had found it. Of Goebbels's diaries, which were strewn about the courtyard of his ministry (*ibid.*), pages 9 to 36 of his entries concerning

February 14, 1942 are missing, and their context suggests that they bear crucially on the fate of the European Jews! (*ibid.*, pp. 87f., especially footnote on page 88).

3. The Establishment of the United Nations

On June 26, 1945 the UN was established by 51 countries in San Francisco (Ploetz, p. 235). It's odd that one of the founding nations is Byelorussia (Steinberger/Göschel, p. 694). It would have made more sense if the Baltic states, which were independent until 1940, had been founding-members. But they were not.

4. Partisans in Byelorussia after 1944

After the "liberation" by the Soviets in 1944, a new partisan movement was established in Byelorussia, of all places! Or was it the old movement? (Hingley, pp. 280f.):

"During the first years after the war, Soviet control was resented by the population especially of those territories that were annexed by the USSR in 1939-1940, were lost to Germany in 1941 and reconquered after the victory. These areas, the Baltic Republics and the former Polish territory (now part of Byelorussia and western Ukraine), were annexed by the Soviet Union after the war. Extended deportations of the Polish undesirables followed. Discontented indigenes who remained free in these areas continued their sporadic guerilla actions against the Soviet authorities from secret hide-outs in the forests. The MWD/MGD was deeply involved in the armed conflict against these 'bandits' lasting into the 1950's. They applied similar techniques as were used by the 'Cheka' during the civil war: the use of under-cover agents as MWD partisans within the partisan groups. Both sides had tremendous losses during this period."

5. Wallenberg and Others

Raoul Wallenberg was attaché at the Swedish Embassy in Budapest. He got into this position due to the explicit wish of the government of the United States of America. His aim: to save as many Jews as possible from

the deportation to Auschwitz (Poliakov/Wulf 1955, p. 416). When the Red Army reached Budapest, Wallenberg was apprehended on January 17, 1945. He was charged with theft of Jewish property. Investigations proved Wallenberg's innocence and the fact that he had saved 30,000 people from deportation. However, the government in Moscow demanded his extradition to the Soviet Union. He was transported to the Soviet Union on February 4th, 1945 ("Wallenberg..."). Due to an intervention of the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, Stalin promised in the summer of 1946 to take notice of Wallenberg's fate. In August 1947, the Soviet side stated that one could not find the Soviet officer who had apprehended Wallenberg and had reported his capture to the Soviet authorities (Poliakov/Wulff 1955, p. 419). Wallenberg disappeared. Yet in the late 1980s, he was supposedly still alive, living under a pseudonym in Krasnoyarsk due east of Novosibirsk in Siberia ("Wallenberg...").

Note: According to widespread descriptions of Wallenberg and his mission, he surely must have had knowledge of the actual fate of the Jews in Auschwitz.

Wallenberg is not the only foreigner who disappeared in the Soviet Union after 1945. 600 to 700 French nationals were kept in the Soviet Union against their will, amongst them inmates of German concentration camps. They were deported to transit camps in the Soviet Union after liberation. It was said that they had seen too much ("Sie haben...").

Note: Since the middle of 1944, many Auschwitz inmates were transferred to German concentration camps. Höss reported transport commandos of Gypsies. Did the French receive too much information on this? What could they possibly have learned about the Soviet Union in a German concentration camp?

6. The Year 1948

The Year 1948 is distinguished because many of the following events happened or had their origin in this year.

a. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee

This committee was founded in the Soviet Union during the war. Its task was to raise support for the Soviet Union, the Red Army and the population through Jewish organizations in the United States (Heller/Nekrich, p. 187). President of the committee was S.M. Mikhoels, a renowned Jewish

actor. Mikhoels visited the US in 1943 to mobilize public opinion and to raise funds. It is said that the journey was very successful. On January 13, 1948 Mikhoels was murdered by members of the Russian Secret Service on a road in Minsk. The corpse was mutilated by a truck in order to feign an accident (*ibid.*). Stalin himself gave that order by telephone, according to his daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva, who was a coincidental witness (Hingley, p. 294).

The committee was banned in the fall of 1948 (“Ärzte...”), its members were arrested, tortured and shot in 1952 (Heller/Nekrich, p. 187). What charges were made? In 1944 the committee directed a letter to Stalin asking that the depopulated Crimea be set aside for the Jews. It wanted to create an autonomous Jewish republic (*ibid.*). Stalin accused the committee of trying to sever the Crimea from the USSR (Hingley, p. 294).

Note: Is it not peculiar that in 1934, when many more millions of Jews existed in the Soviet Union than in 1944, only one autonomous region was established? (Hardmann/Wippermann, p. 162) Now, after millions were murdered in the Soviet Union, an autonomous region was to be created, and that during the course of the war! The year 1944 seems important because in that year, Byelorussia was recaptured by the Soviets. Why should the Soviet Jews demand Crimea from the Soviet Union? Did they not already possess a homeland? It would have been more understandable if Jews from the other European countries had made such a claim.

b. Foundation of the State of Israel

Due to a vote of the United Nations, the state of Israel was proclaimed on May 14, 1948 (*Meyers...*, p. 459).

c. Destruction of Jewish Organizations

During the second half of the year 1948, important Jewish organizations were prohibited or closed in the Soviet Union (cf. “Ärzte...”, p. 102):

- *Einikeit*, the leading Yiddish Newspaper in the Soviet Union
- the Yiddish magazine *Schtern* in the Ukraine
- the Jewish publishing house Emes in Moscow
- the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee in Moscow

Furthermore, Ilya Ehrenburg published anti-Zionistic articles directed against “a certain group of anti-patriotic theatre critics.”

d. Limited-Access Areas Were Created

In an ordinance of September 30, 1948, a list of areas prohibited for foreign diplomats was promulgated (cf. note in *Osteuropa* 1952, pp. 119f.).

e. Detained Troops

In 1948, the Soviet Union commenced comprehensive investigations of German POWs. Hence, veterans of certain units were detained until further notice (Böhme, p. 319).

7. Slánský and Others

On November 28, 1951, the Czech newspaper *Rude Pravo* reported the arrest of Rudolf Slánský. Slánský was the general secretary of the Czech Communist Party. He was sentenced to death exactly one year later (Lesny, p. 11). The offense: The Slánský group was a Zionist conspiracy (*ibid.*, p. 1). The details:

“Slánský, Geminder, Sling, Clementis etc. had never been communists. They came from the well-situated lower middle class, thus susceptible to all sorts of deviations. Already in their youth, they tended to be Trotskyites. They were at once Jewish chauvinists and cosmopolitans using the Zionist organization for illegal financial transactions and smuggling. They also cooperated with British and American agents, sought to break Czechoslovakia out of the Soviet Bloc, to which end they collaborated with both Tito and Gomulka in Poland, just as they were the true confidants of Beneš and Masaryk. Some of their treasonous connections had been formed by members of the former International Brigade in Spain. They attempted to hinder trade with the Soviet Union, and for merchandise going to the east, they asked for much higher prices than were common in western trade. For their trade deals with the west, they used Masonic connections, which were easily accessible to them as Jews.” (*ibid.*, p. 3)

As the indictment saw it:

“President Gottwald was to be liquidated by his personal physician. The Czech disengagement from the Soviet Union was prepared on the immediate orders of American and British imperialism. These powers continuously received secret political and military information. Their agents employed predominantly Zionist organizations, which thus mutated to proponents of western imperialism. Therefore, all Jews were

particularly susceptible to western corruption, just as the former Red-Spanish combatants were. American and British 'fellow travelers', like the Americans Noel and Hermann Field as well as the British Labor MP Zilliacus used their leftist views merely as camouflage. In reality, they were particularly dangerous agents of the Secret Service and of the American central intelligence. Beneš was a western spy and a traitor. Tito, Gomulka and Rajk also belong to this conspiracy. Furthermore, the Zionist conspiracy also had an immediate influence on Tito through his confidant Pijade. The defendants were moreover also anti-Soviet chauvinists, who fought against Czechoslovakia's alignment with the Soviet Union, and sabotaged foremost by economic means." (*ibid.*, p. 4)

Similar to the Moscow show trials, the defendants confessed to nearly all points. They and the witnesses were mostly Jews (*ibid.*, p. 5). In contrast to other similar 'purges,' however, there were not just 'Westerners' among them but also 'Moscovites,' *i.e.* persons who had lived for a longer period of time either in the West or in the Soviet Union. The result: no Jews remained in the Prague party secretariat, the party presidency and in higher army and state positions (*ibid.*). An interesting aspect: The planning and development of the downfall of Slánský goes back to the year 1948! In late August 1948, Zhdanov, an influential contemporary theorist, died. Quote:

"The day after Zhdanov's death, Gottwald was called to a conference in the Crimea. In Russia, the Malenkov group had gained the upper hand. Zhdanov's men were all removed from central positions. When Gottwald returned to Prague, he was the new strongman. In a speech, where no names were yet mentioned, he summarily accused his opponents as Trotskyites. From this time onward, Slánský was on the defensive." (*ibid.*, p. 9)

Aside from Slánský and his followers, another powerful communist Jewish group was eliminated as well (Hacker, pp. 420f.):

"Much less bloody and with some delay, the purges were carried out in Romania. In May 1952, vice-president Vasile Luca and the minister of the interior, Theohari Georgescu, were dismissed from office, and Ana Pauker was removed from the Secretariat and Politburo of the Party. In June, she had to resign as foreign secretary. By these means, the 'national communist' Gheorghiu-Dej succeeded in eliminating the most important representatives of the 'Moscovite Branch.' Luca, Georgescu and Ana Pauker, all of Jewish origin, were never heard of again."

These actions within the Czech and Romanian Communist Party are unique, when compared to the other purges (Fejtő, p. 298):

“The affair Luca – Georgescu – Pauker shows how difficult it is to form a general theory of the purges, if all purgatory actions were to be reduced to a simple pattern such as ‘Titoism.’ Because the ‘crimes’ of which Luca, Pauker and Georgescu were accused by the Romanian Central Committee have nothing in common with ‘Titoism,’ old-fashioned ‘nationalism’ or ‘anti-Sovietism’. On the other hand, the Romanian crisis shows a striking similarity to the political crisis in Czechoslovakia, which led to the liquidation of Slánský and his followers. Ana Pauker is, as is Slánský, of Jewish origin. By using them – like the Hungarian Luca (his real name being Laszlo Lukacs) from Transylvania – as scapegoats, it is possible that the discontent of the population was to be steered into a cleverly concealed anti-Semitism or chauvinism. This is a hypothesis that should not be dismissed summarily, especially since the Pauker affair coincided with an anti-Zionistic exhibition. In Czechoslovakia the affair Slánský also led to the arrest of several Zionists, even of an Israeli diplomat and of an extreme leftist Israeli journalist.”

Such actions, however, are not the sole work of Stalin. Later, when Khrushchev was in charge, the methods were more-subtle. While Jewish groups had been eliminated before, now Khrushchev demanded the elimination of leading Jewish personalities (Brzezinski, p. 190):

“That’s why Khrushchev sought to secure unity and consistency with new methods. Malenkov was able to ignore the political problem for the time being by allowing economic leniency. Khrushchev, who enforced an economic ‘Neostalinism,’ had to deal with the problem directly. He apparently came up with a solution at the end of the year: he accentuated economic similarities and allowed limited, not well-defined political autonomy, which would have been unthinkable in the Stalin era. That led to the support of such communist leaders who seemed to be acceptable within the population. Khrushchev made it crystal clear that Jewish communists like Rákosi, Berman or Ana Pauker were, as far as he was concerned, a liability for the Party.”

8. The Doctors' Trial

On January 13, 1953, *Pravda* printed an article to the effect that the most-renowned physicians of the Kremlin Hospital, who were personally responsible for Stalin and other high-ranking members of the party and of the military, had deliberately maltreated their patients (“Ärzte...”, p. 102, and Heller/Nekrich, p. 188). Of the nine physicians accused, six were Jews (“Ärzte...”, p. 102). Amongst them was Professor Vovsi, a cousin of Mikhoels who had been executed in 1948 (Heller/Nekrich, p. 188). Stalin's intentions (*ibid.*, pp. 188f.):

“Stalin dealt with the ‘conspiracy of the physicians’ personally. His invented plot consisted of several acts. Act One – the sentencing of the physicians after their total admission of guilt. Act Two – death by hanging. It is said that, just as in the old days, the execution was to take place in Red Square in Moscow, the former execution site. Act Three – pogroms against Jews throughout the country. Act Four – renowned Jewish culture functionaries’ plea that Stalin protect the Jews from pogroms by allowing them to leave the cities, resettling them in the countryside. Act Five – mass deportation of the Jews ‘according to their own wish’ to the eastern districts of the country. A member of the Central Committee of the Presidency of the Communist Party, the philosopher D. Chesnokov, wrote a book describing the grounds for the deportation of the Jews. Originally, the book was intended for party functionaries. They just waited for the signal for the book to be distributed. Not only had the plea of the Jewish culture functionaries already been formulated, it also had all their signatures on it.”

Stalin died on March 5, 1953. This stopped everything (*ibid.*, p. 191).

B. Important Aspects

1. Situation of the Jews

After Stalin's death in 1953, the Jews were removed from political, social and economic life (Ingold, p. 857). Neither Khrushchev nor his successors changed this situation. The methods simply changed. The following buzzwords describe them:

- economic trials inspired by anti-Zionism
- anti-Zionist agitation (since 1967)

- the Jewish question is taboo (*ibid.*)
- Israel is “the worst of all states.” (*ibid.*, p. 859)

An indication of how much Jews have become a taboo is the shrinking length of the entries on “Jews” in the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (*ibid.*, p. 857):

- 1932 (1st edition) 108 columns
- 1952 (2nd edition) 4 columns
- 1972 (3rd edition) 2 columns

One spoke of decreed silence as far as Jews are concerned, which impeded the resurrection of Jewish organs and institutions destroyed by Stalin (*ibid.*, 858). In 1971, not one Yiddish school existed anymore, and only one Yiddish classroom (Schloss, p. 16). There were no Yiddish publishing houses, no agencies to distribute any Jewish books either (*ibid.*, p. 17).


Jewish religious life was strongly suppressed. No cult items were allowed to be manufactured, such as prayer robes or phylacteries, which are necessary for daily prayers (*ibid.*, pp. 18f.). Synagogues were reduced to:

- 1956: 450
- 1963: 96
- 1969: 62
- 1971: a small handful (*ibid.*, p. 19).

Rabbis or culture officials had no successors, and this situation was achieved by subterfuge (e.g., denial of permission to live near the only school of religion; *ibid.*). Jews did not get any work, especially not at the two great universities of Moscow and Leningrad (Ingold, p. 18). The colleges only accepted a marginal percentage, ranging from two to five percent. To those institutions training personnel for the defense industry, Jews had no access whatsoever (Hardmann/Wippermann, p. 166). In general, the past of each Jewish individual was screened before work was granted (“Ärzte...”, p. 106). In cases of emigration, detailed information was demanded. Quote (Schloss, p. 185):

“Complete Questionnaire returned to OWIR with all details of the applicant, his kin, curriculum vitae, places of work, earnings, etc.”

Even the almighty KGB was modified for this surveillance program. The KGB was divided into main agencies. In 1969, a fifth agency was instituted. It was to suppress political opposition and increase the surveillance of the population (Barron, p. 113). This branch had a conspicuous structure (*ibid.*, p. 97):



Only this Fifth Main Agency had a special department attached to its upper level. Quote (*ibid.*, p. 115):

“A special Jewish Department was installed in 1971. Its goal was to intimidate Russian Jews, suppress public protest and discourage those willing to emigrate. Because this department is fairly new, there is little confirmed information concerning its organization and field of work.”

Note: The Soviet Union thus had the instruments to suspend contacts of Jews with the West. It could control who had connections to the outside.

Many Jews in the West were furious that the Soviet Union systematically remained silent about the mass murder of Jews by the National Socialists. It has already been stated that Stalin presumably mentioned this but once. Places where mass executions of Jews had taken place had no memorials; Babi Yar is given as a prominent example (Hardmann/Wippermann, pp. 167, 163). In this context, the following declaration of Ilya Ehrenburg seems odd (Ingold, p. 863):

“The graves where the Hitlerites buried old women and small children bind me to the Jews. In the past, I am bound to them by the streams of blood; later by the malicious weed that germinated from a racist seed; by the persistency of prejudice and bias. When I spoke on the radio on my seventieth birthday, I told my listeners I would always confirm that I am a Jew as long as there is even one single anti-Semite in the world.”

This is an odd, ambiguous circumscription of the fate of the Jews, its interpretation conceding to ambiguity, with no word whatsoever on Auschwitz.

Thus, it is consistent that the Soviet Union did not support Israel with a single document during the Eichmann trial (von Lang, p. 273).

Concrete impressions on the situation of the Jews in the Soviet Union were gathered by the American Jew Prof. Dr. David W. Weiss, when he was invited to visit Russia in 1965. Quote:

"My report states that my first contact with the Jews in the Soviet Union was shocking. Thus, I decided to investigate their situation more thoroughly than I had originally planned. I used up to eight to twelve hours daily in the Soviet Union to contact either Jews or the officials responsible for Jewish matters. During my stay in the USSR, I had talks – private talks – with at least one hundred and fifty Jews of every age group and of every social status." (Schloss, p. 25)

"Indeed, all Jews in the USSR with whom I spoke – the young, the middle aged, the old – showed in some way of form a fearfulness: the only reason for which was the fact that they were Jews." (ibid., p. 28)

"When I asked the Jews why they were so afraid, their answers revealed a uniform picture: they feared losing their job, their position or even their permit of residence in certain cities. It was fear of arrest, of deportation or even of much worse consequences as official reactions against them: simply because they were Jews." (ibid., pp. 28f.)

During a visit to a synagogue, he writes:

"When I entered the synagogue in Kiev in the late afternoon for the first time in order to participate in the afternoon prayer, a few old men responded to my greetings in the outer court of the synagogue. They seemed to be intimidated. When I entered the building, one man left the crowds, came up to me briskly and asked me what my business was here anyway." (ibid., p. 33)

"He indicated that I was welcome, but only under the condition that I participate in the service. However, I should not attempt to get in touch with anybody. This man was – as I discovered later – the dean of the Jewish cultural community in Kiev." (ibid.)

"One evening while waiting in the synagogue for the commencement of services, two members of the Israeli Embassy in Moscow entered the synagogue, who were in Kiev probably for some official reason. This dean of the Jewish community demanded that the two men interrupt their parley with the older men who had immediately surrounded them, and to take a seat in the front of the synagogue beside me, separate from the others. When the two Israeli visitors resisted, the dean began a vituperative tirade that lasted over half an hour. He insulted them per-

sonally, then all Israelis, stating that they were all fascists, exploiters of the Arabs and of the Jewish proletariat, who cooperated with the Germans, etc. Without doubt, this man's function was primarily to prevent all contacts between visitors and the Jewish population" (ibid., pp. 33f.)

Pertaining to Babi Yar:

"Shortly after my arrival in Kiev, I asked my guide to bring me to Babi Yar, that place near Kiev where the Germans had killed thousands of Jews in 1941 after they had conquered the city. The following debate occurred: When I first mentioned my wish, he told me: 'There is no place called Babi Yar.'" (ibid., p. 39)

Because of his tenacity, he finally managed to get to Babi Yar after all. The upshot of it all:

"I emphasize this experience in particular in order to show the profuse hesitation whenever a visitor wants to see a place of special Jewish interest. My view was confirmed during my contacts with all the officials of Intourist. Whenever and wherever I wanted to visit a place of especially Jewish interest, everything was tried to discourage me – either they tried to convince me that the place did not exist, or – if I insisted – I was informed that the area was not accessible to the public, or in repair, or some similar excuse." (ibid., pp. 40f.)

His most important realization:

"I had the firm impression that Jews in the Soviet Union had the feeling of being ostracized. On the one hand, the government opposed all forms of Jewish religious and cultural aspirations, having only one goal in mind: assimilation by force. On the other hand, Jews are relentlessly attacked as racists and as an ethnic group, which makes assimilation impossible, driving them away from all areas and forcing them into seclusion: Jews can't even find comfort in their Jewishness anymore, because all means of expressing Jewishness are strongly prohibited." (ibid., p. 29)

"The second general conclusion is: the civilian officials in the USSR do their utmost – including those Jews who officially represent the Jewish Community – to maintain a barrier between the Jews of the Soviet Union and foreign Jewish visitors." (ibid., p. 32)

The question arises: What's behind all this?

Finally, one last point: The use of Yiddish diminished rapidly in the Soviet Union. In 1926, 72% of the Jews spoke Yiddish; in 1959, 20.8%

(Selegen 1960, p. 488). Yet the still-available, meager literature which was published in the Soviet Union in Yiddish was published in the ancient Hebrew alphabet (Steinberger/Göschel, p. 39). Who, one must ask, was capable of reading this ancient script? Maybe more Jews than was thought possible. Keep in mind that in the previous chapter a National-Socialist directive was quoted stipulating:

“Aside from Yiddish, the Hebrew language must be promoted since it helps to segregate the Jews from the rest of the populace.”

Was this instruction copied by the Soviets?

2. Population Statistics

a. Byelorussia

This chapter deals with the population trends of Byelorussia between 1939 and 1959 in general and with the Jewish population trends in the Soviet Union since 1939 in particular.

Official statistics of the Soviet Union must be regarded with great care since they could have been easily manipulated. The term *“bias in the statistics”* (Markert, p. 117) was used quite often, especially during the Stalinist period. It is said that Stalin had *“clapped a giant lock onto Soviet statistics”* (Medwedjew, p. 211). One example is the falsification of the wheat harvest in the Soviet Union:²⁴

According to a 1951 report:

- crop yield in 1940 was 119 million tons
- crop yield in 1950 was 124 million tons

According to a 1958 report:

- crop yield in 1940 was 95.5 million tons
- crop yield in 1950 was 81.5 million tons

Western officials highly mistrust the results of the 1939 census. Quote:

“Part of the deviation may be due to the fact that the number of individuals determined for the years 1939/40 was too great. As is well-known, the Soviet Union did have a census in 1937. The results were annulled because they contradicted expectations. The responsible statisticians were held responsible. It would have been comprehensible if the heads of the census bureau, striving for a higher population number, had simply not amended possible duplicates. But to what extent this

²⁴ “Agrarproduktion...”, p. 417. Further falsifications are mentioned there.

falsification of the 1939 census led to inflated numbers, cannot be evaluated. At any rate, part of the total difference is explicable this way." (Schubnell, p. 156)

Two different official sources concerning the number of people who lived in Byelorussia in 1939 exist.

- 1st. Report: The population of Byelorussia in 1939: 10.5 million people (*Grosse...*, p. 28).
- 2nd. Report: The population of Byelorussia in 1939: 8.91 million people (Steinberger/Göschel, p. 690).

Note that the second figure relates to the "current borders." The Soviet Union returned part of the area around Białystok to Poland in 1945. But even if that fact is taken into consideration, there is still a considerable difference between 10.5 and 8.91 million. The area of Byelorussia in 1939 was roughly 225,000 sq.km (von Engelhardt, p. 277). Today this area is 270,600 sq.km (Steinberger/Göschel, p. 690). Accordingly, the difference is 17,400 sq.km. If one assumes an average population density of 43 persons per square kilometer for the region of Białystok (von Engelhardt, p. 235), then roughly 0.750 million people must have lived in the part returned to Poland. These numbers are plausible, since the Białystok region had about 1.372 million inhabitants in 1941, and since half of the area went to Poland in 1945 (*ibid.*, pp. 235, 279). Thus, it can be concluded:

- 1st Report (amended): The population of Byelorussia in 1939: 9.75 million people.

As shown, the official census reports of Byelorussia must be regarded with great care. We wish to present another example of a dubious report. The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* states that (German edition of 1955, *Grosse...*, p. 28):

"By number of inhabitants, the Byelorussian SSR ranks third amongst the Soviet Republics (preceded only by the Russian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR). In 1939, 10.5 million inhabitants were registered. The areas of Gomel and Grodno are the most-densely populated; the areas of Polessje and Pinsk, the most-thinly. Byelorussians predominate. According to a census of 1926, the population in the eastern part of Byelorussia consisted of 80.6% Byelorussians; 7.7% Russians; 8.2% Jews; 2% Poles; 0.7% Ukrainians and 0.8% of other ethnic groups. Byelorussians make up more than 80% in western Byelorussia. Following the Great Patriotic War, the fraction of Byelorussians increased, because

the Poles living in Byelorussia were resettled to their homeland while the Byelorussians living in Poland were resettled to Byelorussia."

These figures are also contradictory. Not only that the number of 10.5 million inhabitants is mentioned here as well, also contradictory is the increase in population of the Byelorussians or White Russians. According to this, the fraction of Byelorussians exceeded 80% in 1939. According to the census of 1959, however, that fraction was 81.1% (Steinberger/Göschel, p. 691). That is not really an increase. According to Western sources, no (or merely a statistically insignificant number of) Byelorussians were resettled; only Ukrainians from Poland were resettled to the Soviet Union (Schubnell, p. 157).

The result of the next census of 1959 in the Soviet Union showed:

– Population 1959 in Byelorussia: 8.055 million people.

In view of the earlier figures, a higher number of individuals should have been expected. However, one could also opine that this number is much too high! To support this, various peculiarities of Byelorussia must be taken into account. After the Polish part of Byelorussia was annexed in 1939, the Soviets deported a large number of the local population to the Urals or to Siberia. Their goal: to find a final solution for the "Polish Question" (Revesz, p. 209). A very suggestive expression, indeed. Concerning the extent, Revesz reports (*ibid.*):

"An exact number of the deportees can hardly be established. The Soviet historical literature avoids this topic; the already mentioned Warsaw source, written by one of the best military historians of today's Poland, estimates the number of those deported in September 1939 to have reached 800,000 to 900,000; he puts the number of voluntary 'emigration of Polish workers' to Russia at 50,000. This figure probably lies far below the number of victims of the Soviet 'resettlement policy.' The literature of emigrants speaks of various numbers that may be much closer to the truth. According to a very reliable Polish author, 1.2 million Poles were deported according to 'careful calculations.' Another Polish author, quoting humanitarian activities carried out between December 1941 and April 1943 by the Polish Embassy in Moscow among the Poles deported to the Soviet Union, estimates the number of deportees at 1.5 million. Roman Buczek assumes 1.5 million deportees and arrested persons, of whom only 52% had Polish citizenship; 30% were Jews, 18 to 20% were Ukrainians and Byelorussians."

After 1945, further population displacements took place in Byelorussia:

“Kulischer figures that until December 1946, the date at which the agreed repatriation between Russia and Poland was to end, about one million Poles had returned to Poland from the annexed eastern, formerly Polish territories, including those who, having crossed the border, were already controlled and registered. According to the Polish Office for Statistics, about 500,000 Ukrainians were evacuated, so that the Soviet Union should have lost at least half a million inhabitants.” (Schubnell, p. 157)

Because those people who were evacuated from Poland to the Soviet Union were Ukrainians, it is plausible that they were resettled to the Ukraine. Thus, the following calculation can be made:

1939:	8.9 million
1940/41:	– 1.5 million
1945/46:	– 1.0 million
<hr/>	
Total:	6.4 million

The Soviet Union lost many persons during World War II, just as Byelorussia did. Between 1939 and 1959, the following population developments took place in the Soviet Union (in thousands; Selegen 1959, p. 715)

Country	1939	1959
USSR	190,678	208,826
Ukraine	40,469	41,893
Lithuania	2,880	2,713
Latvia	1,885	2,094
Estonia	1,052	1,196

Accordingly, during the period of 1939 – 1959 the population of the Soviet Union increased by nearly 10%. In areas directly involved in the war, the population increase remained substantially below this point. Thus, as far as Byelorussia is concerned, it is reasonable to expect a population of 6.5 million people.

As one can see, the numerical population of Byelorussia is quite mysterious, because according to the above calculation, there is an excess of 1.5 million people. It stands to reason that there is an explanation for this peculiar behavior on the part of the Soviet government. I think that the disclosure of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, namely that the number of the Byelorussian people did increase substantially, has a real background. I posit that the Jews form the National Socialists' area of influence were concentrated here. It is possible that, at the time the *Encyclopedia* was published, one wanted to publish exact numbers derived from a future census, and

these remarks were preparative in nature. Maybe the Jews from the Ukraine and the Baltic States were resettled there again. Then the number 8.055 million wouldn't even deviate that much from the actual numbers. But this is speculation. What remains are irregularities in the Soviet census. According to the judgment of an expert (*ibid.*, p. 716):

"A preceding, methodical examination is especially necessary if one wants to evaluate the results of the latest census. A first review of this census gives the impression that the series of key figures is the result of a deliberate selection, just as was the case for the 1939 census, whose results were similar by content and scope. This impression is reinforced by the method by which this material is presented, for instance by the fact that a comparison with the numbers of 1939 is made which are one million lower than those recently published (in Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSR v 1956 godu, p. 18), and which deviate greatly with respect to the Ukraine and Byelorussia, while total agreement exists regarding the Russian SSR and other Soviet Republics. No explanation is given for these differences."

Note here as well the reference to Byelorussia and to the low figures. What's behind all this?

b. The Number of Jews in the Soviet Union

The examination of the development of the Jewish population in the Soviet Union is equally complicated. It seems to be quite simple. According to the respective censuses, the number of Jews was (Selegen 1960, p. 488):

1926:	2,673,000 Jews
1939:	3,020,000 Jews
1959:	2,268,000 Jews

However, these numbers cannot be compared. The area of the Soviet Union was much smaller in 1939 than in 1959. It did not encompass the Baltic states and Bessarabia. Many Jews lived in those areas. If one adds their numbers to the census of 1939, then the following results:²⁵

Lithuania:	269,600 Jews
Latvia:	93,479 Jews
Estonia:	9,000 Jews
Bessarabia:	290,000 Jews
Sum:	662,079 Jews

²⁵ Wellers, p. 30. Evidently Wellers made the mistake of counting the Memel area as one of the Baltic states while omitting Estonia. This was corrected here.

Thus, the updated census of 1939 would read:²⁶

1939: (adjusted): 3,682,000 Jews.

This means first of all that the number of Jews in the USSR did not increase, but declined substantially:

1939 (adjusted):	3,682,000 Jews
1959:	2,268,000 Jews
Deficiency:	1,414,000 Jews

According to Georges Wellers,²⁷ on whose work I rely, one has to consider a natural increase. If one adjusts Wellers's numbers,²⁸ then one would obtain the following expected numbers for 1959:

$$3,682,000 + (1\% \times (3 + 14)) = 4,307,940 \text{ Jews} \\ \text{rounded up} = 4,308,000 \text{ Jews.}$$

Thus, the shortfall increases even more:

1959 (expected):	4,308,000 Jews
1959 (counted):	2,268,000 Jews
Shortfall:	2,040,000 Jews

Wellers's calculation, however, omits one main aspect, which I will consider here. His method also allows the calculation of the number of Jews who ought to have lived in the Soviet Union 12 years after 1959, in 1971:

$$2,268,000 + (1\% \times 12) = 2,540,160 \text{ Jews.}$$

If we compare the rounded-up expected and actual figures derived from the 1971 census (Lewytkyj, p. 51), then we get the following result:

1971 (expected):	2,540,000 Jews
1971 (counted):	2,151,000 Jews
Shortfall:	389,000 Jews

Accordingly, the deficit count in 1971 comes to 389,000 Jewish individuals. Where had they gone, and how did this come about? The answer is simple: assimilation! But since when did this assimilation take place – since 1959? Or already earlier? Was the pressure to assimilate always

²⁶ Actually, the part of Białystok that was returned to Poland in 1945 should not be considered. But because the numbers are rounded up, a correction is not necessary.

²⁷ *Ibid.* Wellers's evaluation system can be questioned, but since the error is marginal and my numbers are estimates only anyway, I use his numbers.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 31ff. Wellers assumes an annual growth of 1% and excludes the war years 1942–1945 in his calculations.

equally strong? How were the Jews able to assimilate in the USSR? I have found various answers. Quote:

“According to Soviet law, every Soviet citizen can, at the age of 16, with his first application for a passport, determine his own nationality, independent of origin, family name, mother tongue and religion. Thus, someone unable to speak a single word of Russian (e.g., because he comes from an Uzbek family) could register as a Russian (or a member of any other ethnicity). Mother tongue and nationality need not be identical. To what nationality a person wants to pledge himself depends instead on traditional ties (family influence) and on individual affiliation.” (Jahn, p. 314)

“The definition of Jewish nationality posed a problem right from the start: ‘In Soviet passports, the nationality of its bearer entered is identical to the parents’ nationality, regardless of the place of birth and residence. [...] Should the bearer be the offspring of a mixed marriage, then he has the right to choose the nationality either of the father or of the mother upon receipt of the passport’ (Sowjetunion heute, Vol. 16, No. 3, Feb 1, 1971, p. 33). However, the definition Jewish National is not that easy. Due to the czarist persecution, there was the tendency, especially among the better-educated classes, to rid oneself of the discriminating Jewish nationality in favor of the Russian nationality. By renouncing their religion, large sections assimilated in such a way into the surrounding Russian populace, without losing their Jewish nationality, that only an entry in the passports permits to distinguish them. These Jews did not and do not strive for autonomy. In fact, they have basically assimilated into the host nation.” (Golczewski, pp. 204ff.)

“Jews in the Soviet Union are recognized as an ethnic group as well as a religious community, thus having a legal status. If both parents declared themselves as Jewish, then the offspring can be recognized automatically as Jewish. This remains primarily the decision of the parents, however, and the Soviet assimilation policy basically prefers that parents review and determine at the registrar’s office whether they want their child to be declared Jewish or not.” (Schloss, p. 14)

“And to top it all off, Jews are encouraged to accept racial integration. As a rule, children from mixed marriages are not Jews. Eduard Kusnezov gives an example in his ‘Diaries.’ Despite his wish to be accepted as Jewish, because his father was Jewish, he is always portrayed as a Russian.” (Hardmann/Wippermann, p. 167)

These statements are confusing and contradict each other. It is stated that either one is free to choose any nationality, that one can choose only either the father's or the mother's nationality, or that the parents can choose for their children. This contradiction may be due to the fact that certain rules were altered, or that they were interpreted differently in different regions. A report by Professor Weiss on a meeting with a Jew attests to the fact that the rules changed over time:

"He asked, 'Do you know that I am a Jew?' We answered, 'Yes, your name seems to be of Jewish origin'. He told us that his spouse is not Jewish and that they have children. Then he told us that his children were born at a time when Soviet national policy dictated that children from mixed marriages where one partner is Jewish had to be declared as Jews in their passports and in other documents. His youngest child, however, was born at a time when that law was amended and that children who had one Jewish parent had the right to choose between the nationality of either the father or mother as soon as they became of age." (Schloss, p. 45)

This observation from Weiss reveals that the rules change with time; another depicts regional differences in practice:

"And on the other hand, they are not accepted in the general society, even if they are willing to cut all traditional bonds – no matter whether they are secular or religious. Jews in the Soviet Union have made the painful discovery that they have reached a point of no place to go and of no return." (ibid., p. 29)

Apparently, the Soviet Union uses various methods. Either a Jew can change his nationality quite readily or not at all. Maybe it's subject to the individual Jew, where he is from, how long he has lived in the Soviet Union, which experiences he had. Who knows?

Finally, one further aspect needs consideration. Quote (Jahn, p. 325):

"In 1959, altogether 309,000 Greeks lived in the Soviet Union, 104,000 of them in the Ukraine, 73,000 in Georgia and 47,000 in the Russian SSR (13,000 in the Stavropol District, 12,000 in Krasnodar). This breakdown shows that the Greeks were registered as such only in their original areas of settlement, where they had lived since 1813. A total of 96,000 are not registered, 21,000 of whom live in the Russian SSR and 85,000 outside of areas mentioned above. Other statistics mention 5,000 Greeks in Armenia (Narodnoye khotsyaystvo Armyanskoy SSR v 1964 g, Yerevan 1965, p. 6), so that 80,000 are still missing. These are

probably the Greeks who were resettled by force after 1943. In 1939, altogether 186,000 Greeks lived in the USSR, 84,960 of them in Georgia. In 1959 they numbered 309,000, 72,938 of them in Georgia."

If we consider that, among those Jews deported "to the East," 13,435 came from Greece (Wellers, p. 27), it is feasible that, statistically speaking, they can be easily "hidden" as Greeks. Just as German Jews can be "declared" as Germans. Is it possible to "promote" the assimilation of long-established Jews while impeding the assimilation of new arrivals? An entry in the passport is all the officials need to be informed that emigration is not permissible, and that these people be denied employment in Moscow, for example. Many of the described peculiarities could be explained through this procedure.

Therefore, the Soviet Union has numerous means that would allow it to "hide" Jews who had been resettled from Europe to the USSR. Just consider how many Jews, after such an ordeal, would be willing to forget their Jewishness, and would do anything to disappear forever among their fellow human beings?

3. The Partisans

The development of partisan activity has already been discussed in an earlier chapter. Soviet reports on partisan movements in the individual Soviet republics are very revealing as well. A *Handbook of the Soviet Union* gives the following picture (Steinberger/Göschel; page numbers from there):

Estonia

No details.

Latvia:

Of the 2,365,000 inhabitants, according to the 1970 census (p. 736), 12,000 partisans and illegals are reported (p. 738).

Lithuania:

Of the 2,925,000 inhabitants, according to the 1970 census (p. 742), 16,000 partisans received rewards (p. 746).

Russia:

No numbers given, only “ferocious attacks by partisan units” in the western region, in the districts of Bryansk, Smolensk, Leningrad, Pskov are mentioned (p. 771). Number of inhabitants 1970: 130,900,000 (p. 755).

Ukraine:

No numbers given. Reference is made to a large network of underground organizations. 4,300 basic organizations of the communist party are mentioned, all of which are said to have developed activities (p. 821). In 1970, the Ukraine had 47,136,000 inhabitants (p. 820).

Byelorussia:

Medals and decorations were awarded to 120,000 partisans and insurgents (p. 694). In 1970, Byelorussia’s population counted 9,003,000 people (p. 690).

Once more, Byelorussia’s dominant role is conspicuous. This gives the impression that being a partisan in the Soviet Union basically meant being a partisan in Byelorussia. The missing involvement of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic is noteworthy. In spite of 40,000,000 inhabitants, hardly any activity evidently occurred. The reference to 4,300 basic party organizations is way too meaningless and looks more like the usual statistical blague to which every party organization succumbed after the war. Specific data about Russia are also missing. The data referring to Lithuania and Latvia are conspicuous, because many Jews were deported to camps near Riga, the capital city of Lithuania.

It is unusual that, of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, those among them produced the most partisan warfare who had suffered most: Western Byelorussia, which was (re-)occupied by the USSR in late 1939, and the Baltic states, which were annexed by force in 1940. Evidently, Russians and Ukrainians largely refrained from partisan activity to such a degree that the handbook mentions no partisan numbers active there. Considering that the Soviet Union deported a large part of the population of western Byelorussia – 1.5 million people are mentioned – what would have motivated the relatives, friends and neighbors of these deportees to fight for the Soviet Union? That remains wholly incomprehensible. If we assume, however, that the main part of Byelorussia’s population was resettled and that the then-vacant areas were repopulated with deported Jews, then that could suggest an explanation.

Partisan activity was also planned outside Byelorussia. That can well be demonstrated by actions taken by the Soviet government. On July 3, 1941, Moscow initiated the creation of a “Central Partisan Movement Staff.” In early 1942, it was structured as follows (Redelis, p. 41):

Central Partisan Movement Staff

1. Marshal Voroshilov, Politburo member and its commander-in-chief.
2. Lieutenant General Ponomarenko, secretary of the Central Committee of Byelorussia, as chief of staff.

Ukrainian Partisan Movement Staff:

1. Khrushchev, Politburo member and its commander-in-chief
2. Strokach, as its chief of staff (later General Major)

Byelorussian Partisan Movement Staff:

1. Lt. General Ponomarenko, secretary of the Central Committee of Byelorussia, and here the leader of the partisan movement

Kubanian Partisan Movement Staff:

1. Ignatov, leader of the partisan staff in the Kuban

Partisan activities were planned not only for Byelorussia, but for the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Kuban Area as well. Specific operations mentioned by Redelis happen again within Byelorussia. He primarily deals with the activities of the partisan leader Federov in the Chernihiv area (*ibid.*, p. 48). Chernihiv lies approximately 120 km south-east of Gomel and is therefore not in Byelorussia but in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. In 1943, an odd thing happens: Federov receives orders to proceed west to the area of the Rokitno Swamps (*ibid.*, p. 68). He marches 400 kilometers and establishes his headquarters south of Pinsk (*ibid.*, Chart 2), near the border between Byelorussia and the Ukraine. He moves his activities to those areas already under partisan control, thereby weakening the regional influence around Chernihiv. The operation seems incomprehensible but has a simple explanation: If we assume that the partisan activities in Byelorussia either eluded the control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or had emerged and were operated independently, then Federov’s relocation would make sense. Federov’s mission was then to try to control these activities.

Some more data on the scale of the partisan movement in Byelorussia (Kühnrich/Pech/Schaul, pp. 7f.). According to this, a total of 370,000 partisans operated there. Of these, 35,000 were communists, while 10,000 became communist members during the war. 100,000 of these partisans are said to have been Komsomol members (communist youth organization). Hence, the majority of the partisans were not associated with communism!

4. German POWs

The fate of the German POWs shows unusual patterns as well. Immediately after the war, numerous verdicts against German POWs were handed down (Böhme, p. 156). In 1948, a huge new wave of trials hit the POWs. The Soviet procedure can be derived from this quote (*ibid.*):

“Mistrust of the imprisoning power could not be overcome. Such would have been possible only if that power had laid its cards open on the table. But the Soviet government never mentioned names, only numbers, and these came late, primarily after the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Moscow of 1947, when repatriation of the POWs until late 1948 was decided. The families of deceased prisoners didn’t receive notice from Moscow either, and those returning home from Soviet detention camps were forbidden to take along documents of any kind about living or deceased comrades. No wonder that public opinion was convinced that the Kremlin had ‘something to hide.’ It is also not surprising that the illegal retention of POWs after the end of hostilities and the so-called ‘war-crimes trials’ of 1949/1950 – with their unique methods of investigation and collective accusations followed by collective sentencing (membership in a certain former unit of the Wehrmacht was enough to lock up a defendant, that is to say, to send him to a ‘labor rehab camp’) – contributed considerably to the impression that the Soviet Union not only wanted to secure cheap labor for years to come, but also tried to decimate the German intelligentsia, as they had done before by establishing the so-called ‘silencing camps’.”

Using the POWs’ terminology, those Wehrmacht units whose members were collectively sentenced by the Soviet Union, were known as “Detained Units” (*ibid.*, p. 319). A list was compiled and published in the West containing the names of these units (*ibid.*, pp. 320ff.; see list here on page 84). Böhme writes about these units (*ibid.*, p. 319):

“The list (excluding police units, the S.D. (security service), the field police and the secret field police and others, whose members were automatically accused of war crimes), relies solely on the testimonies given by returning POWs and thus cannot claim to be complete and free of error. For instance, there used to be 22 other divisions on that list, but upon examination it turned out that some of them never existed while others never participated in the eastern theatre of the war. It’s impossible to know whether the error was made by those testifying or by the detaining power.”

Although three army corps and one army unit appears on the list, the main particulars refer to the division level. Many divisions are listed by their name, including divisions of the Waffen SS. Almost all army divisions of Army Group Center, which collapsed in Byelorussia in 1944, are mentioned in that list. In the previous chapter, these divisions were classified under the term “detained.” Since army corps are made up of divisions, it is well possible that their divisions also fell into that category. This is even highly likely, because 13 of the 15 divisions mentioned as belonging to Army Group Center when it collapsed were marked as detained. If we look at the normal divisions on the list of detained units, we notice that, of the 108 divisions making up Army Group Center, 46 were deployed in Byelorussia, or at least they had incorporated soldiers from units that had been destroyed there. Seven other divisions were not deployed on the eastern front at all. Hence, the total number of Army Group Center’s divisions from Byelorussia present on that list is unusually high.

It is moreover remarkable that a large number of the detained divisions were destroyed in the Iasi area. Here, camps containing Romanian Jews from Podolia and Transnistria might have existed (Gilbert 1982b, p. 78).

Many of the POWs who were actually seen in captivity have disappeared (Böhme, p. 138). Careful estimates account for at least 96,000 missing inmates (*ibid.*, p. 149 and Chart 11). One wonders why the Soviet Union does not account for the fate of these people, considering that not even their total numbers are mentioned (*ibid.*, p. 133).

The deportation of civilian captives represents another aspect of Soviet internment. Quote (*ibid.*, p. 155):

“The lot of the POWs equals that of the civilians deported from the eastern territories to the interior of the Soviet Union, as reported by refugees. For a long time, nothing was heard of them in Germany – no postcard, no letter, no sign of life. Wherever they might have been, their camps undoubtedly were ‘silencing camps.’ They were not protected by

international law, not even by the Hague Land Warfare Convention of 1907, which normal POWs could invoke. Before Stalin's death in 1953, those civilians who returned to Germany stated truthfully that they had been forbidden to write letters."

The following news item is from 1988 ("Immer..."):

"More than forty years have passed since WW II, and yet 400,000 Germans are still missing in the Soviet Union, without any official investigation having been carried out. Of 424,000 further cases, which the tracing services of the German and the Soviet Red Cross try to resolve, only 15% have been resolved successfully according to a statement by the president of the German Red Cross, Prinz zu Sayn-Wittgenstein."

The book *Soweit die Füße tragen* gives the following details concerning the fate of the cartographer Danhorn (Bauer, p. 13):

"Nothing happened to Danhorn after his internment. The interrogators didn't spend much time on him. Questioned on how those Russian maps which had fallen into German hands could be distributed so quickly, with German inscriptions to boot, among the German troops who until then had to work with maps of a scale of 300,000 : 1, he willingly explained it."

What offense had Danhorn been guilty of, having spent most of his time as a cartographer? Did his interrogators spend little time on him because his "case" might have been too clear? Did everybody who had worked in cartography have to vanish? Consider the decisive role which the maps of the Minsk region play for my observations at the beginning of this book. After all, these maps had to be produced.

Generally speaking, a lot of questions do arise. Why were the troop units detained only in 1948? Why are there so many regular units among them that were deployed in Byelorussia? What motives did the Soviet Union have? The measures described here would have permitted the Soviet Union to let all those disappear in the wide expanse of the Soviet Union who knew anything about Jewish camps in Byelorussia or elsewhere, be they soldiers or civilians.

C. Travel Restrictions

In the Soviet Union, free travel was almost impossible. Almost everybody could travel only within tightly controlled limits within the Soviet Union.

In principle, restrictions applied to all, namely to:

- Soviet Citizens,
- Diplomats,
- Tourists.

Aside from the few privileged persons, it was very difficult for a Soviet citizen to move house. Quote (Hardmann/Wippermann, p. 26):

“The so-called ‘Propiska’ plays an important role in the life of a Soviet citizen. Assume you lived in Pushkino (15 km from Moscow) and wanted to move to Moscow. That is just as impossible as traveling to America. You have a ‘Propiska’ for the countryside, but not for Moscow. It is even more difficult to move from other (adjoining) areas into the vicinity of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev or Odessa. All these areas are restricted. Even moving from city to city is unbelievably difficult, e.g. moving from Kuybyshev to Saratov. An endless questioning starts: Why are you moving, on what grounds do you have relatives in that city, do you have a domicile, etc. If you don’t submit sufficient information, you won’t get a ‘Propiska’. For somebody living in the countryside – on a collective farm – it is almost impossible to obtain a ‘Propiska.’ Even in the days of serfdom, there was no such restraint, no such fixation of an individual to a piece of soil...”

The *propiska* or passport was not only necessary when moving house, but also a requirement for simply traveling from one place to another. Until 1974, many citizens, especially members of collective farms, were not issued passports (“Der neue Paß...”). In 1974, an ordinance appeared stipulating that all Soviet citizens receive passports (*ibid.*, pp. A250ff.). However, the conditions for exceptions are such that suspicion whether this actually happened is justified (*ibid.*, pp. A260f.). People wanting to travel with the new passport couldn’t do so without problems either. They had to register even if their journey was of short duration (under six weeks; *ibid.*, pp. 255f.). The new ordinance can be summarized as follows:

“This alone does not imply that a member of a collective farm or any other Soviet citizen, for that matter, had not only de jure the right to move freely, but also de facto. The last but one paragraph of the annotation states: ‘Until the passports of the new type are issued in general, those citizens living in the countryside who did not receive passports in

accordance with previous regulations, will receive a passport for a longer journey to another location, and identification papers for traveling less than one and a half months.’’ (Hunacek, p. 250)

But even the bearers of passports, according to the ordinance, could not travel without certain restrictions:

“Travelers within the USSR are subject to compulsory registration, which can be complied with either by registration (if staying less than one and a half months) or by registering a temporary domicile. The registration of a permanent residence must coincide with a notice of departure at the old residence.” (*ibid.*, p. 251)

Foreign diplomats have the liberty of free movement in most countries of the world. But not so in the Soviet Union. In 1948 – note the year! – a decree was promulgated on September 30 which drastically reduced free movement for diplomats (*Osteuropa*, 1952, pp. 119f.). Vast areas inaccessible to foreigners were introduced; all these regions were catalogued. The catalogue valid as of the writing of this book (1990) contains a surprising fact: Byelorussia is not listed as a prohibited area! If one takes a closer look at the decree, however, then one notices that Byelorussia is nevertheless still inaccessible for diplomats. As far as Moscow is concerned, those areas and roads are listed primarily which diplomats are allowed to use:

“Administrative District of Moscow, accessible areas are:”

and then all permitted areas are described. For example:²⁹

“from Volokolamsk Avenue: to Istra, Volokolamsk, to the station Dubossekovo (via Volokolamsk) and to the town of Terjajevo (via Maslennikovo);

from Minsk Avenue: To Svernigorod (until Golizyno continuing to along Svenigorod Avenue), Moshaisk and to the Boronia settlement (to Modenovo continuing on Moshaisk Avenue);

from the avenue in the direction of Kashira (Kashirskoje shosse): to the airport Domodedovo and to the districts of Kashira, Osjory, Saraisk, Serebrjanye prudy;”

Apparently, it’s impossible to get to Byelorussia from Moscow, if all roads can only be traveled via certain checkpoints. I must admit, however, that I don’t have any knowledge of the road system of the Soviet Union. But if Minsk Avenue is only sporadically open for traffic, then it’s hard to believe

²⁹ *Verzeichnis der Städte und Gebiete der UdSSR, die für Ausländer gesperrt sind* (List of Cities and Areas of the USSR closed to foreigners), p. 6. I received this list from the Secretary of State of the Federal Republic of Germany in Bonn.

that one can reach Minsk by car. However, a car is necessary, if one does want to move about fairly freely in Byelorussia.

Since Stalin's death, tourism has expanded to an extent which would not have been deemed possible earlier (Leitmüller, p. 81). But to what extent can a tourist travel freely in the USSR? What information does he get at all? One must consider the following principal obstacles, which apply to most tourists:

- the language: only few foreigners speak Russian
- failure of command of a foreign tongue on the part of the Soviet citizens; only a few intellectuals can speak a foreign western language (*ibid.*, p. 84).
- contacts prohibited: Soviet citizens are warned not to seek contact with foreigners. Talking to foreigners is often interrupted by a third party (*ibid.*, pp. 85f.).
- travel restrictions; only a few city centers and transits are allowed. Moscow and Leningrad are the most frequented; the rest of the country is closed (*ibid.*, p. 82).

As far as travel by air or by train is concerned, these trips are usually organized by the authorities. More interesting are trips by car, which is permitted in the USSR only to a limited extent. However, here restrictions are especially onerous (*Der große Polyglott*, p. 16):

“Before the start of a car trip by a foreign visitor to the Soviet Union, the journey must be paid and meticulously defined by a contractual partner of Intourist or another tourist agency with regard to duration, route, sight-seeing program, locations of overnight stays, provisioning and all motor fuel (gasoline vouchers!). The trip may pass only such places where branches of the Intourist agencies exist. [...]

No deviation from the roads is permitted for tourists, because fuel and repair outside the set routes cannot be guaranteed. For the few drivers who want to stay with their friends or relatives and want to travel without booking with Intourist, visas are issued only with difficulties.”

Which automobile routes are permitted? For this, see the map of permitted Intourist car routes through Russia during the 1980s, Document 12, p. 163 (*Grieben...*, p. 83). The route Brest – Minsk – Smolensk – Moscow, which runs through Byelorussia, is very salient. The means by which the Soviet Union controls this highly interesting road will now be illustrated.

The frontier crossing point at Brest is only open from 7:00 until 21:00 (*Der große Polyglott*, p. 22). It takes pretty much exactly an hour to pass through that checkpoint. And this has been “ordered” evidently from high-

er up (Nagel, p. 61). Accordingly, travel through this frontier is extremely limited. Only 15 cars a day can be cleared on the one-lane road at the border. Because Soviet cars are part of the traffic, fewer than 15 foreign cars can pass daily. Foreign cars on the transit road from Brest to Smolensk were controlled to an extent that is unbelievable by western standards. A West-German journalist who took this road with his family recalls (*ibid.*, p. 21):

“A bit later on, we reach the city exit, laid out like an interstate exit, toward Minsk. We stop and photograph the first highway sign signaling Minsk. We discover that it is quite simple to decipher such road signs in Cyrillic; we quickly become accustomed to the characters. After taking the photo, we are stopped at a sentry about two kilometers further on. My passport is taken, and one of the officers disappears in his tiny bureau. Initially, we are baffled. I follow. I watch the officer telephoning; my opened passport is the subject of discussion. My interposed questions are not understood and are disregarded. After a five-minute phone call, they give me back my passport and say ‘good bye,’ and I am ushered to the door. I am not satisfied and go on the offensive. I produce Maria’s address from my pocket, point to her phone number and energetically demand that the number be dialed. The police officer obeyed. I explain to Maria what happened and ask for an explanation. She talks with the officer who returns the receiver to me. Maria explains that I did a prohibited act. Unsuspectingly, I tell her about the subject of my photo, the road sign. She mentions that a bridge is crossing the road behind the road sign – and that it is forbidden to photograph such things; thus the delay.”

In Minsk they become acquainted with some locals and decide to take a trip together (*ibid.*, pp. 35f.):

“The next day we are at least an hour late. As we drive up, our new friends are already standing at the curb: husband Yarislav and his wife Luda with their child Dimitri; a friend and college acquaintance, Pjotr, is also among them. With the exception of Yarislav, all enter our RV. Yarislav tells me that he will follow in his own car within five minutes – a precautionary measure – but that his friend Pjotr knows the exact route. We are puzzled. After about seven kilometers, at the city boundary, we perk up. ‘We are being watched’ says our driver’s mate Pjotr. And sure enough: after another eight kilometers at a junction in view of a summer ski-jump, we are stopped by the military police. ‘Passport’ he barks at me. I hand him our three passports. He continues talking to me

in Russian. 'Do you speak German or English?' I ask in a harsh tone, 'I don't understand you' – but he doesn't understand me either. All other passengers in the van remain silent. Our controller then moved decisively to the rear door of the RV, opens it rather roughly and asks – we expected it – 'who is Russian here?'"

Another example (*ibid.*, p. 37):

"About 40 kilometers beyond Minsk – we're still discussing the abrupt separation from our new friends – a lake with a man-made beach lies on the right side of the road. As we leave the paved road to reach that beach on a side road of about 200 meters, another military policeman stands in front of us quite suddenly. He stops the car. Pointing to the lake accompanied with swimming motions, I signal our intentions. 'Nyet' is his brusque remark."

These episodes can be explained only if the Soviet Union had created an omnipresent surveillance web to monitor western motor tourists. This tourist surveillance lies in the hands of the Sixth Section of the Seventh Department of the Second Main Bureau of the KGB (Barron, pp. 109f.). Quote (*ibid.*, p. 111):

"Members of the Sixth Section station sentries in motels, on camping grounds, at gas and service stations along the routes preferred by the tourists. They also monitor all foreigners traveling by plane or by train within the Soviet Union. This sector also operates a communication system covering the entire country, with which the Seventh Department can transmit photos and personal information on tourists very quickly."

Finally a word on the intricate surveillance system at the border of the Soviet Union, which was set up to prevent people from illegally leaving the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has more than 200,000 border-patrol officers (Hollander, p. 741). Only especially reliable Russians are deployed, who moreover must meet certain political requirements (*ibid.*, p. 742). The border is layered into three surveillance zones:

1. Limited Entry Zone. It is about 30 kilometers wide and subject to special security provisions. Whoever does not live here, may enter it only with a special permit of the security police (*ibid.*, p. 743).
2. Prohibited Zone. This zone runs along the actual border. Its width depends on local circumstance. Its construction (*ibid.*, p. 744):

"Using underground telephone lines along the border, the sentry can telephone headquarters at any time. Radio communication is reduced

to a minimum, at least as far as the border patrols are concerned. Stationary frontier precautions include sentries, hide-outs, traps, larger and smaller patrols, observation points, passport controls and maneuver groups."

3. Actual border fortifications. These consist of numerous 30-meter-wide track-detector belts, on which any refugee leaves conspicuous tracks (*ibid.*).

Such fortifications also exist at the borders of the countries allied to the Soviet Union, for example at the border to Poland (*ibid.*, p. 745). The border patrols are moreover supported by a third party (*ibid.*, p. 743):

"Furthermore, these areas are saturated with KGB agents and professional or occasional informers; the latter are mostly local inhabitants who are told to report not only border violations but also any suspicious foreigners. In addition, there are various voluntary commandos, mostly young people, schoolchildren and pioneers who are recruited by local party- and Komsomol [youth] organizations and who very openly cooperate with the authorities. If they are successful, then these volunteers are rewarded with money, presents or certificates. The population near the border is constantly urged to be extremely vigilant."

D. Byelorussia

For the time after 1945, little information about the development of White Russia or Byelorussia, as it is also called. The scant information shows, however, that the country's development has differed from that of the other Soviet republics.

1. Exceptional Role of Byelorussia

According to observations of western experts on Russia, Byelorussia is an unusual Soviet republic. In 1964, a detailed report of the delegates to the XXII Party Convention in Moscow appeared. This convention interested Western observers because the convention report mentioned the function of each and every delegate for the first time (Slusser, p. 852). Some results from the report (*ibid.*):

"If one compares the delegates of the fifteen different republics of the [Soviet] Union, then an interesting fact emerges, namely a substantial

variation of the personnel. The highest number of leading state and party functionaries came particularly from the delegates of Byelorussia. This already-impressive number gains even more significance if one relates it to the population percentage of Byelorussia and to the number of members of its Communist Party as compared to the Communist Party of the entire Soviet Union [CPSU]. Of the entire population of the Soviet Union in 1962 (219.7 million), Byelorussia had 8.3 million or 3.8%; of the 8,872,516 CPSU members, 202,068 were Byelorussians, or 2.3% (candidates for membership composed 2.8%), while the Byelorussian delegates included 24 high state functionaries (out of 119; i.e. 20 %), and eight high party functionaries (out of altogether 62; i.e. 13%).

Aside from the representatives of the Byelorussian Republic and the Communist Party of Byelorussia, this delegation also included prominent members with high party and government positions who had no apparent connection to Byelorussia. In this respect, the Byelorussian delegation was unique as compared to the rest of the Socialist Republics, even though this difference cannot be clearly determined with statistical methods.”

With regard to the relevance of the composition of such party delegations, we read there in general (*ibid.*, p. 759):

“The composition of party convention delegates is the result of minute screening – rather than of a spontaneous vote of the delegates – a screening carried out using criteria for the representation of important state and party organizations (all members of the Central Committee Bureau, of the Central Committee Secretariat, all important government departments, all provinces, on party and agency level, the important cities, etc.). There was very little latitude for any personal qualifications as delegate.”

From the composition of the delegations, the West-German author draws the following conclusion (*ibid.*, p. 863):

“At any rate, from this staffing emerges Byelorussia’s increasing importance for the Soviet economy. It may be surmised that Minsk is being developed into a center of specialized and high-tech industries with military importance. In this context, the observations already made – that discipline and rigorous implementation of penalizations is greatly emphasized in Byelorussia – have a special overtone.”

Another observation fits in as well (*ibid.*, p. 867):

“Together with the other remarks by Aksyonov and with similar words by Petrov and Masurov, this can be interpreted in such a way that police monitoring – both open and covert – is extremely severe in Byelorussia. Byelorussia was the only republic of the union, by the way, that sent both its minister of the interior as well as its chief of the Secret Police as delegates to the XXII Party Convention, while Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Bashkiria, the Tartarian ASSR, the Ukraine and the Russian SSR had sent only representatives of either one or the other authority. The other republics didn’t send any representatives from any of the departments at all.”

To wrap this up, two last quotations from this German article that seem highly interesting (*ibid.*, pp. 859, 854):

“41 voting delegates and twelve with advisory status belonged to them. A few individual observations seem appropriate, since a comprehensive analysis is frustrated by the lack of minute detail. Thirteen of them were listed as ‘Military Personnel’ (vojennoslushtshije). Of interest for the political sociology of Soviet Communism is the fact that women make up exactly half of the delegates without political influence, while there is only one woman among the delegates with political importance.”

“When looking at the careers of the leading men of the central CPB [Communist Party of Byelorussia], then the noteworthy fact emerges that no abrupt changes in personnel policies or nominations took place after Stalin’s death. In fact, it seems that, during the first few years after the war, a continuous rearing of personnel from the core of the partisans and the Komsomol and party functionaries of the wartime had taken place.”

A multitude of questions arise in conjunction with the above citations. As far as economic matters are concerned, this question will be dealt with later on. In detail: Why did Byelorussia have such sway within the CPSU? What made this country so particular? Isn’t it rather unremarkable? Why was the party delegation selected in such a way as to send both the secretary of the interior and the chief of the Secret Police as party delegates? What is the significance of the undefined “military personnel” within Byelorussia that they are represented in such great numbers? What is their field of activity? Why can this activity be done equally by both men and women? Why do they not exist in the other republics? Is there any connection between the special status of Byelorussia and their field of activity? The ongoing per-

sonnel policies are also odd. All the men from the central CPB are former members of the partisan movement!

Note: If one assumes that the military personnel used to be camp personnel, then the proportion between the men and women becomes plausible.

2. New Localities

In this context, the reader is reminded of the peculiar increase in the population density of Byelorussia that was mentioned at the beginning of this essay. It is an increase that is incommensurate with the official results of the censuses. This observation is supported by another fact. Byelorussia did have a substantial reduction in its population between 1939 and 1959. Here, the peculiarity of the two different results for 1939 arises, which is in itself odd enough. In detail:

1939 (1st edition)	10.500 million
1939 (2nd edition)	8.910 million
1959	8.055 million

In view of such a massive population decline, the following excerpt from a Soviet schoolbook for the eighth grade sounds peculiar (Baranski, p. 324):

“For Byelorussia as for the Ukraine as well, the main problem after the war was the reconstruction of the destroyed power stations, factories, enterprises and towns. Aside from the reconstruction, new building sites also flourish. Thousands of new towns and villages have emerged.”

Why did thousands of new towns and villages emerge? With such a population reduction? One is reminded of the remarks of the previous chapter stating:

“Naturally there are other aspects to be considered during war. Thus, the necessary enclosure of the land and the relief of the overpopulated towns by the creation of new settlements can only be achieved in the war’s aftermath.”

Both systems, the national-socialist and the communist system, found it imperative to create new settlements! Odd! Considering that an acute increase in the populations of already existing cities had taken place, this affair is all the more imponderable:

CITY	1941 ³⁰	1959 ³¹	1970 ³²
Minsk	239,000	509,000	916,000
Gomel	166,000	272,000	
Vitebsk	167,000	148,000	213,000
Mogilev	99,400	121,000	202,000
Bobruisk	84,100	97,000	138,000
Brest	73,000	122,000	
Baranovitshi	26,000	102,000	
Orsha	31,300	64,000	101,000

The above development portrays a continuous increase in the city population.

3. Economic Development Since 1941

Of course, detailed data on industrial development in the Soviet Union are hard to come by. A list of the years 1929/30 gives a relative picture of the structure of Byelorussian industry before the Second World War:

Gross production according to estimate for the year 1929/30				
Industry	Value in thousands of rubles		Unit	Amount
	1926/27	Product		
Construction	3,392.4	Bricks	1,000 pieces	57,500
				682
				2,816
Glass	9,944.2	Windows	tons	5,600
		Lamps	tons	4,565
		Bottles	tons	4,831
Metal	25,847.9	Chaff Cutters	pieces	1,560
		Threshers	pieces	14,875
		Lathes	pieces	400
		Engraving machines	pieces	200
		Stone Cutting machines	pieces	425
		Scales	pieces	23,430
		Nails	tons	7,010
		Glasses, normal	dozen	736,000
		Glasses, optical	dozen	324,000
		Cotton	1,000 m	7,650
Textiles	22,659.0	Yarn	1,000 m	141
		Nylons	dozen	683,000
		Children's Socks	dozen	324,000

³⁰ Reichsminister..., pp. 9ff.

³¹ Fickenscher *et al.*, p. 850.

³² Steinberger/Göschel, p. 691

Industry	Value in thou-	Product	Unit	Amount
	sands of rubles 1926/27			
Leather	37,591.7	Men's Socks	dozen	230,000
		Large Skins	pieces	304,495
		Small Skins	pieces	1,225,000
Chemicals	4,109.9	Shoes, Boots	pair	2,367,040
		Chem. Chalk	tons	4,160
		Paint	tons	800
		Combs	100 pieces	3,624
		Buttons	1,000 pieces	37,082
Food	22,239.9	Yeast	tons	5,500
		Confectionaries	tons	2,960
		Vegetable fats	tons	5,171
		Tobacco	tons	2,800
Wood	66,508.6	Lumber	cbm	730,231
		Veneer	cbm	129,343
		Matches	boxes	2,450,305
Paper	33,008.0	Paper	tons	43,140
		Cardboard	tons	5,775
		Wallpaper	1,000 pieces	10,900

von Engelhardt, S. 320; the table was slightly modified for layout reasons.

Prior to World War II, Byelorussia had little industry; modern industrial plants were non-existent. After WW II, Byelorussia was heavily industrialized. Quote (Baranski, p. 324):

"Between 1946 and 1950, the state invested more heavily in the economy of Byelorussia than in all the five-year-plans before the war."

"Hundreds of new enterprises were established; new industrial branches arose. The gross industrial product was 81 times higher in 1968 than in 1913. Particularly, the automobile, tractor and machine sectors developed strongly, along with mechanical engineering, metal processing and chemical industry." (Steinberger/Göschel, p. 694)

Mechanical engineering was the field where the most changes took place:

"Serious problems concerning improvements in specialization, distribution and development must be solved in mechanical engineering, the leading economic field of the Byelorussian SSR. Within 20 years, from 1941 to 1961, the most profound changes took place in its structure and specialization. New branches emerged: automobile and tractor manufacture, the production of bridges, cranes, machine tools and production lines, motorcycles, corn harvesting machines, irrigation and road construction machines, pumps for mining and chemical industries, ball bearings, electrical measuring instruments, radios, televisions, watches, etc. The output of mechanical engineering increased twenty-fold." (Poksisevskij, p. 164)

What made this impressive development possible?

“Prerequisites for the development of such an economic structure of the Byelorussian SSR are natural conditions, which support agricultural development, the presence of raw materials for the production of mineral fertilizers, the presence of a large number of workers and qualified personnel, the favorable geographical position relative to the industrially developed districts in the European part of the USSR and to the socialist countries in Europe.” (ibid., p. 162)

In my opinion, the term “large number of [...] qualified personnel” is important here. Were they not present before 1945? The fact of the large number of workers is repeated again later (*ibid.*, pp. 163f.):

“Because the majority of the most important industrial branches of the republic depend on the supply of raw materials, the local resources of workers being nevertheless substantial, it is advantageous to develop such production methods as employ a large number of workers while needing less raw materials.”

The center of production lies in the eastern part of Byelorussia. That’s why there is the problem “of resettlement to other districts of the country, especially to the eastern zone, where lack of workers is severe” (*ibid.*, p. 163). The center of economic development seems to be in the eastern part of Byelorussia, the former militarily administered zone, (Fickenscher *et al.*, p. 851):

“The most important centers for mechanical engineering and metal processing (according to productivity) are Minsk, Gomel, Vitebsk, Mogilev, Orsha, Bobruisk and Borissov.”

Here, a few examples of the multitude of questions that arise:

- Why did the industrial development of Byelorussia begin in 1941?
- Why did the first five-year plan after the war commit itself to the enforced development of industry?
- Where did the qualified personnel come from with whom one could build a modern industry in mechanical engineering?

4. The Police Organization

Because of the characteristically secretive behavior of the Soviet Union, it is highly improbable to acquire any direct information concerning the police organization of Byelorussia. In one of the foregoing chapters, a few

indications were made, namely that at the XXII Party Convention, the minister of the interior and the chief of the Secret Police were participating delegates; apparently a most-unusual situation. Furthermore, it was mentioned that police monitoring was extremely severe in Byelorussia. In 1984 and 1985, two very unusual publications appeared in the West about police organization in Byelorussia, giving an interesting insight into the system. The first secretary of the local Party Committee of Brest, Sokolov, published an essay complaining about adverse influences from abroad (Schmid, pp. A363ff.). There, the special situation of the “frontier fortress of Brest” is mentioned. Why the term “frontier fortress of Brest” is used, is explained as follows (*ibid.*, p. A366):

“Many inhabitants of Brest have family ties to citizens in the People’s Republic of Poland. One should also consider that a large number of inhabitants of the area has the ability to watch Polish television. Before martial law was declared in Poland, some programs had anti-communistic tendencies. These sapped the will of the Poles in their fight for the ideals of the Workers Class; no appropriate criticism was made concerning the agitation of the right-wing leaders of the workers union ‘Solidarity’ or their advisors from KOS-KOR. Quite often, historical facts were distorted; unfriendly remarks against our country were tolerated.”

This quotation is astounding, because a few years have passed since martial law was imposed (in Poland). The measures that were taken likewise seemed nonsensical (*ibid.*, p. A368):

“The arsenal of preliminary measures to hinder breaches of the law has been greatly expanded. The movement for collectives and towns to gain the title ‘exceptional’ is gaining momentum. Centers for a legal system and counsel to hinder infringements have been established. Over 65,000 persons are involved in the work of the auxiliary police.”

Unusual is another excerpt (*ibid.*, p. A365):

“The commanders and political functionaries of the security forces are teaching the inhabitants to detect malicious hostile intentions, and they are helping them to develop skills enabling them to apprehend any violators of the law.”

What are the problems that seem to be present? What did Polish television broadcast before martial law was imposed? Why does this impact linger for so many years, making such unusual measures necessary? What’s the func-

tion of these deputies, and what kind of violators of the law are these which keep the law enforcement forces busy?

Note: If one supposes that the anti-communist programs that went on the air dealt with Auschwitz, and that the resettled inhabitants of Byelorussia learned that the relocated Jews were believed to be dead, wouldn't it be feasible that these people, said to be dead, try to establish contact with the West via Poland?

A year later, an interview appeared dealing with the same theme. The minister of the interior of the Byelorussian SSR, V. Piskarev, reported on practical measures taken since 1983 by his department ("Bessere...", pp. A669-472, here p. A472):

"Today, more than 500,000 auxiliary police men (druzinniki) are helping us, and the majority is willing to courageously confront a criminal, as did the chief foreman of a Byelorussian automobile factory, S. Sarkazkij, who was decorated posthumously. When it became known that his death was the work of a criminal, the ranks of the deputies swelled by more than one thousand men. All in all, I must say the cooperation amongst the collectives, the party organizations, and the public has taken a favorable turn lately. Maintaining civil order has become the general concern."

Another quote (*ibid.*):

"[Question:] Victor Aleksejevitsh, you said that more than a thousand new recruits have come to you. But amongst them, there are surely many... laymen. Surely, a smart, strong professional policeman must intervene against a criminal, especially against an armed criminal."

[Answer:] You mentioned 'laymen'. I would say, up to a certain period of time. We are instructing these people. Rest assured: we would not deploy any non-professionals."

The crimes which Piskarev lists and for which he needs this tremendous police apparatus seems childish:

- children playing with bombs/fire (*ibid.*, p. A470)
- Hooligans/disputes between couples, etc. (*ibid.*, p. A471)
- the only concrete example: death of a chief foreman (*ibid.*, p. A472)
- fuel theft (*ibid.*).

Why are 500,000 auxiliary policemen necessary? Why does Byelorussia have armed criminals apparently in a greater number? Are these not exceptions? Or is something else entirely hiding behind this?

Note that Byelorussia had 9 million inhabitants in 1970. To illustrate this, a small excursion in arithmetic is made: 500,000 deputies for 9 million inhabitants means that one deputy is responsible for every 18 persons, including children, women and the aged. If one further considers that such an auxiliary would have to be in good physical shape, then only men within a certain age range, 20- to 40-year-olds, would qualify. Of the 9 million inhabitants, roughly 1.5 million men would be eligible. Thus, every third such individual would have to be an auxiliary. Surely a grotesque situation. Furthermore, 500,000 auxiliaries would also need an extensive adequate police apparatus with many professional policemen! Byelorussia was indeed the prime example of a police state. All this, just for mostly trivial crimes?

5. Marjina Gorka (Marina Gorka)

The detailed discussion of Byelorussia commenced in Part II with Marjina Gorka, and they will end with this town as well. In a rather recent publication by the Soviet Union concerning Marjina Gorka, the interested reader will find the following text in the entry “Marina Gorka”³³ (*Beloruskaya SSR*, p. 392):

“Marina Gorka, town, [...] railway station Puchavitshi. Founded in the 16th century by the Radsivil family. 1876 first school established (technical school since 1921). Population in 1867: 2,000 people. Since 1924 center of Puchavizk County. Since Sept. 27, 1939 town with 6,500 inhabitants.”

The reference section of that publication contains a historical map of Byelorussia dated from 1772-1755 (*ibid.*, before p. 169). Marina Gorka can be seen on it. So, was the military map of 1943 referred to earlier wrong or incomplete? Definitely not! It will be demonstrated that the Soviets tried to obfuscate the facts by means of a subterfuge.

An investigation verifies that a railway station named Marina Gorka as well as a town called Puchovitshi existed. During the German occupation, the railway station was expanded to form another town next to Puchovitshi. Considering all indications given, the Soviets named the railway station Puchovitshi. Puchovitshi and Marina Gorka were merged under the name Marina Gorka.

³³ The various ways of spelling Marjina Gorka are due to the various transliterations.

A map of the Minsk area dated from 1896 shows Puchovitshi, but not Marina Gorka (*Entsiklopedicheskiy...*, after p. 388). I found the earliest entry of it under the name Marinagorka in *Ritter's Geo-Statistical Lexicon* of 1906, together with the following short notice: "located in Russia, Minsk District. P.EdL.Libau-Rommy" (*Ritters...*, p. 104). The editor evidently had little information to go on, because the railway line between Libau and Rommy is 1,000 km long. Substantial information can be derived from a map dated from WWI (Peucher). It shows the railway stations of Marina Gorka and the town Puchoviczi seven kilometers away. The first census in the Soviet Union took place in 1926. All localities where the population exceeded 594 people were listed (*Vsesoyusnaya...*, p. 214). Puchovitshi with its 2,161 inhabitants, lying in Minsk District, is mentioned, but not Marina Gorka, which at that time supposedly had a technical school already.

In a list of the German General Staff, Marjina-Gorka is named with the annotation "see Puchovitshi" (*Generalstab...*, p. 139). Under that entry one finds: "Puchovitshi (Marjina-Gorka)" and the note: "Puchovitshi's railway station lies 7-8 kilometers away" (*ibid.*, p. 148). In a structural analysis of the *Ostland*, all places having more than 2,000 inhabitants are mentioned (*Reichskommissar...* 1942, p. 154). The authors used Polish and Soviet sources from 1926, 1931 and 1933 respectively. Puchovitshi is named, but Marina Gorka isn't mentioned. The aforementioned army map of the German General Staff, update II.1943, Puchovitshi appears clearly and distinctly,¹⁰ whereas Marjina Gorka first appears in the update VIII.1943,¹¹ clearly separate from Puchovitshi, as an independent town evidently larger than Puchovitshi.

Marjina Gorka must have been of specific interest to the German Army Command, because a report about the 1944 annihilation of Army Group Center, published in 1955, contains a map with a few towns, among them Marjina Gorka, without any visible connection to the military situation (Gackenholtz, p. 325). These are all the facts I have.

The details given in the encyclopedia quoted earlier contain great contradictions to the historical documentation. According to this, Marjina Gorka must already have had a population of 2,000 inhabitants in 1897, which grew to 6,500 people in 1938. The place, having a technical school and being the center of Puchavizk County, possesses regional importance. It remains a mystery why this significant town cannot be found on various maps dating before 1942, while the insignificant neighboring town of Puchavizk shows up there. Just as inexplicable is the fact that Marjina

Gorka is not mentioned in the 1926 census, but Puchovitshi is. In naming the railway station Puchavitshi (Puchovitshi) rather than Marjina Gorka, the Soviets were practicing their deception tactics, because Puchavitshi is located 7 to 8 kilometers away from the railway line, whereas Marina Gorka lies directly beside it.

E. A Poem

The Russo-Jewish poet Alexander Galich dedicated the following poem to Solomon Mikhoels:³⁴

“The Jews brought to Russia a dialect (Yiddish) from the land of their expulsion, then they switched over to Russian, yet they remained Jews entangled in all the turmoil wrought onto their clan. They were burned in gas ovens and were denounced as murder physicians. Some distant barracks in some distant morass are still waiting for them, which they, due to kind providence, needed not enter so far. It is still too early to abandon these barracks. They may be rotting, but their own willing hands can still restore them.”

Solomon Mikhoels is the man Stalin had liquidated in 1948, apparently because he was the leader of the Jews living in the Soviet Union!

³⁴ Ingold, p. 866. The spelling of Mikhoels is not always consistent.

V. Questions

In the beginning, the reader was confronted with two questions, to which the answers will be given here. Information was produced so that certain aspects will surely be clearer now.

To begin with: Why did the Jews not speak up? Two reasons. First: how should they know that the “West” does not know where they are? The German authorities always declared that Jews would go to the east. They were forcibly transported quite openly to the east. What they could not know was the fact that Hitler systematically concealed what he meant when he said “to the east.” Furthermore, they certainly cannot know either what measures Stalin took to eliminate the small circle of German insiders who knew where this “east” lay. Many of the Jews who wanted to emigrate simply could not reach Western countries for financial reasons. The impression that prevailed was also that “our people don’t want us.”³⁵ The Soviets did their utmost to nourish this assumption, calling Israel “the worst of all states.” I believe I have amply proven that the Soviet Union systematically blocked all contacts. Should a young Jew actually reach the West, how could he prove his identity, how could he legitimize himself? Would he not be dismissed as a provocative lunatic, even if he appeared credible, and would one not say that he cannot handle “Auschwitz” and seeks mental refuge in delusional ideas?

Furthermore: Why did none of the Germans involved in and accused of mass murder defend themselves, if everything was so straightforward? The inner circle of people who knew what actually happened, who knew more

³⁵ Demant, p. 32. One even notices Simon Wiesenthal’s bewilderment concerning the discovery that neither the Jewish Press in Palestine nor in the USA reported anything. Wiesenthal: “Where was the outcry, the daily protest, at least in the Jewish press?” (Wiesenthal, p. 285).

than that “the Jews are going to the east”, was surely quite small. Aside from the men at the top (Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich) only a few knew about it, and most of them were “in the field.” One should consider that for the implementation, only a few really had to know what happened. Why should someone like Eichmann know where the Jews were transported? No doubt, far fewer were probably involved than the reader might assume. Those who were in the field on the German side were surely all captured by the Soviet Union as Byelorussia was retaken. I would suppose that, furthermore, certain top-secret statements existed which fell into the hands of the Soviets in Berlin, naming all the involved. Here, we have the problem of credibility. Had a person like Stangl – as commandant of Treblinka, he might have known something – declared that the Jews were transported to the east, to Minsk, who would have believed him, and – what else could he have produced?

In the meantime, the reader might pose an entirely different question. What about the breath-taking developments in the Soviet Union? Don’t these make it entirely unbelievable that such enormities as I here claim could remain hidden? Is there not today a Supreme Soviet that proclaims laws heretofore deemed impossible for the Soviet Union which make it impossible that Byelorussia could remain ‘under wraps’? Yes, but only if these laws were enforced there! The dilemma was solved through a devious plan: exploiting Chernobyl. The following report dated July 13, 1990 states (“Weißrußland...”):

“The Supreme Soviet in Minsk has declared the Soviet Republic of Byelorussia an ecological disaster area. [...] The representative of Byelorussia at the United Nations has been authorized to announce this to the general world public. According to ADN [East-German News Agency], this decision was made following a hearing on the consequences of the reactor catastrophe in Chernobyl (April 1986), which also affected Byelorussia very badly. For Byelorussia, all directives from the Soviet Ministry and State Committees that would hinder the ‘realization of government programs to overcome the catastrophe’ have been suspended.”

Again, concerning Byelorussia, something extraordinary happens which hints at its special role. Chernobyl lies in the Ukraine, but the Ukraine has not yet enacted any such program! The consequences that the above measures imply for Byelorussia are apparent. To top it off, the following enactment was proclaimed on August 3, 1990 (“Sowjetunion...”):

“The Soviet Union has closed down all roads and railway lines at the border with Poland for Soviet citizens. Moscow television explained that the government ordered this measure to bring smuggling and usury to an end.”

Now to the questions. In the foregoing chapters, the accumulated facts have raised many questions. Some of them were raised in the appropriate chapter. Below is a succinct list of possible questions, but it is by no means complete. These questions must all receive substantive answers, if my theory is to be rejected.

1. Why (or how) did the population of Byelorussia increase so dramatically?
2. Why do these peculiar population clusters exist?
3. What are the new settlements showing up in 1943 on German army maps?
4. What does “Hitler sends the Jews into the morass” mean?
5. Why does Hitler continuously compare the fate of the Jews with the German emigrants. Why does he justify himself with this so often?
6. Why did Hitler trouble himself about the fate of the Jews after the (successful) end of the war?
7. What happened to Rosenberg’s plans to relocate the Jews to Byelorussia?
8. Why were Rosenberg’s plans suddenly dismissed, closely followed by the division of Byelorussia into a military and a civilian-administered zone?
9. What does the term “coming Final Solution” imply in the protocols of the Wannsee Conference? Do the actions described at the conference have only a preliminary character?
10. What is the special role of Byelorussia?
11. What is the obligation of Byelorussia towards a coming new Europe?
12. What does Byelorussia “must be totally reorganized” mean? Why?
13. Why were the farmers relocated from the eastern to the western part of Byelorussia?
14. Why was this process so greatly emphasized on the regional level?
15. Why should new communities have been founded in Byelorussia after the war?
16. Why were the towns in Byelorussia overpopulated? Was there no flight from war or its effects?
17. Why is Byelorussia handled so perfunctorily in the eastern files?
18. Why were there no post offices in the eastern part of Byelorussia?

19. Why was there no mail delivery for civilians in Byelorussia, while the Ukrainian counterpart functioned?
20. Why was the news media in Byelorussia so weakly organized, contrary to the other occupied areas?
21. Why were transit roads suddenly missing in Bobruisk?
22. Is it coincidental that all extermination camps were in the vicinity of railway administration centers?
23. Which transportation commandos could Höss have given to the Gypsies?
24. What does “ST (special treatment) after six months” mean?
25. Why were there so many transports to Minsk and vicinity in 1942? Why were these people not liquidated in the extermination camps?
26. Why were the passengers of the train from Warsaw that reached Minsk on July 31, 1942 not all killed at Treblinka?
27. What did “west-east displacement” mean? What kind of auxiliary measures were needed for this?
28. Which settlers according to Globocnik were to receive financial support in Brazil or in the Far East?
29. Why was the deportation of Romanian Jews said to endanger the evacuation of the German Jews?
30. Why was it relevant that German Jews are far more intelligent than the Byelorussian Jews?
31. In the report on Operation Hornung, why are there the categories
 - dead
 - specially treated
 - Jews
 - prisoners?
32. Why did sensitive documents of the NSDAP (National Socialist German Worker’s Party) talk about “Preparatory measures for the Final Solution”? This, at the end of 1942?
33. Why, on the occasion of an assumed victory, would there have been the “time for the Final Solution of the Jewish question”?
34. What made Bormann prohibit any discussion concerning the future total solution in 1943?
35. Why was the main concentration of the partisan movement in Byelorussia?
36. Why didn’t partisan activity begin immediately after the Soviet retreat, instead of one year later?
37. Why were so many Czechs, Slovaks, Greeks, Spaniards, and French involved in the partisan activity, and how did they get there?

38. Why did Horthy suddenly stop the transport of Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz?
39. Is it coincidence that Byelorussia was re-occupied by the Soviet troops at the same time?
40. Why were the transports suddenly reversed?
41. Why were there no further exterminations in Auschwitz up until 1945?
42. Why did the Soviet Union lower an “Iron Curtain” around its sphere of control? Why so, at the very moment she liberated these areas?
43. Why did anti-Semitism arise in those areas only at the moment of occupation by the German troops, whereby all Jews were liquidated?
44. Why was Raoul Wallenberg apprehended?
45. Why is Byelorussia a founding member of the UN?
46. Why did Stalin have Mikhoels murdered?
47. Why were suddenly so many Jewish institutions broken up?
48. Why were there so many prohibited areas after the war? Why were these so large?
49. Why were German POWs from certain units suddenly exempted from being released? Why didn't this happen immediately after the war? Why had so many of these troops fought in Byelorussia?
50. Why did these measures all commence in 1948?
51. Why was Slánský accused of organizing a Zionist conspiracy?
52. Was it coincidental that in this process, Jews were removed from party and state posts in the Soviet-controlled countries?
53. Why did Stalin wish to deport the rest of the Soviet Jews to the eastern regions of the Soviet Union?
54. Why was Judaism systematically destroyed in the USSR?
55. Why was Israel said to be the “worst of all states”?
56. What did the Jewish Department of the Fifth Main Branch of the KGB do?
57. What lies behind the conflicting census results of the population of Byelorussia?
58. Even today (1990), why can't a Soviet citizen move about freely?
59. Why are foreign visitors in the Soviet Union monitored so intensely, especially in the vicinity of Minsk?
60. Why is the border checkpoint of Brest open, when apparently only 15 cars can pass it daily?
61. Why did Byelorussia play such a major role in the CPSU? (Communist Party of the Soviet Union)
62. Why did the police institutions have such a central position in Byelorussia?

63. Why were thousands of new settlements created in Byelorussia? Does this not contradict the reported population decrease?
64. Why did Byelorussia need 500,000 deputy police?
65. Why did the Soviet Union invest so heavily in Byelorussia after the war? Where did all the qualified cadres come from?
66. What covert action lies behind Marina Gorka?
67. What is the poem in honor of Mikhoels all about?

Many, many questions! Many more can be posed, and surely the alert reader can find more. How can they all be answered consistently? Solely through one assumption: The plan of the Final Solution was the relocation of the Jews to the eastern part of Byelorussia.

VI. The Final Solution

What lies behind the term “Final Solution”? What actually happened? I will try to illustrate the entire development. Surely a few details will be wrong, occasionally even some important points, but the basic statements will be correct. I am aware of the problem arising from deductive reasoning. I suffered a lot of ambivalence as to whether I should write down these remarks, and I still feel misgivings. Misgivings because they could be misused as a basis for malicious rhetoric, but I did it nevertheless, because it might help the one or other reader find a more complete affirmation of his own thoughts. I want to stress that the assertions that are the central theme of my work can be found in the chapters “The Discovery”, “Facts I” and “Facts II.”

A. The German Perspective

Let me start with the situation presented at the time of the convention of the “Institute for the Investigation of the Jewish Question” on March 27, 1941. The powers of the Third Reich were searching for a place in their sphere of influence where they could resettle the Jews. First, the area of Lublin was considered, later dismissed because the population density was already too great, and the Jews would have been unable to support themselves. The search continued in areas outside the realm of German influence.

The invasion of the Soviet Union changed the entire situation. A victorious campaign would have opened entirely new opportunities in the vast reaches of the Soviet Union. That’s why Heydrich received orders from Göring to prepare the basis for the Final Solution of the Jewish Question in

the German area of influence in terms of organizational, factual and material aspects.

1. The Resolution

The German Embassy in Paris, which wanted to evacuate Jews from France, had proposals for Himmler. Rosenberg, who was looking for retaliatory measures to the Kalinin Plan – evacuating the Russo-Germans – also considered the possibilities of evacuating the Jews to the East. On his behalf, Bräutigam prepared a plan for Hitler, who was highly interested but requested an opinion from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Slowly the plan began to take shape. Byelorussia, which Rosenberg wanted as collection area for all the “asocial elements” of the Baltic States, seemed suitable in principle. The chosen area was the eastern part of Byelorussia. On October 25, 1941, Hitler talked with Himmler and Heydrich in order to inform them of his decision and to discuss further plans. Following his experience with his euthanasia program, Hitler feared the reactions of the German public – the area reserved for the Jews was very forbidding – and made it top secret. At the Wannsee Conference, Heydrich illustrated the blueprints before members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since they had to cooperate in this Europe-wide resettlement program.

2. The Blueprints

The newly reorganized structure of Byelorussia was immediately dissolved. Its southern parts went to the *Reichskommissariat* of the Ukraine, a new, substantially condensed western General District of Byelorussia was created, and the rest went under military administration. The offices of the district commissaries were also dissolved. It remained uncertain right up until the war's end whether the Jews were to stay in the eastern part of Byelorussia or be relocated to another area. Rosenberg, who wanted “his” *Ostland* to be freed of Jews, was in favor of the relocation. Hitler wanted to wait until the war's end and his rhetoric was that the “actual Final Solution” was to happen after “final victory.”

First of all, with the help from the Jewish working force, city ghettos and camps in the countryside were built in Byelorussia, where the Jews would be put. Following these preparatory measures for the so-called “west-east displacement,” the Jews, save a few important skilled individu-

als, would be relocated to the militarily administered zone, in order to have enough room for the Jews from Germany and the General Government (of Poland), who would remain in transitional camps in the civilian zone until the camps in the military zone were ready. Thus, step by step, the Jews would be concentrated in the eastern part of Byelorussia. In the General Government (of Poland), Globocnik was made responsible for the organization of the resettlement of the Jews. He erected three camps at the eastern frontier: Belżec, Sobibor and Treblinka. The Jews were regionally gathered, then brought by rail to the nearest transit camp, and relocated from there to Byelorussia.

Jews from other parts of Europe went to the transit camp of Auschwitz, since Auschwitz was the hub of many railway lines and therefore most suitable as an assembly point for Jews from the rest of Europe. Höss built the actual transit camp Birkenau, from where transports left for the east, unnoticed by the other Auschwitz inmates. The Jewish transports from western and southern European countries were organized by the local authorities, aided by the local police and, if necessary, by the German troops. Eichmann organized the Jewish transports to Auschwitz and handed them over to Höss. Höss selected capable individuals for the industrial branches connected to the concentration camp of Auschwitz, and sent the rest to the Transit Camp Birkenau, from where “*Sonderzüge*” – special trains – took them to Byelorussia.

In Byelorussia, the local populace was prepared for the incoming Jewish settlers by propaganda. The basic arguments were: The western part of Byelorussia is the actual homeland of the Byelorussians, the home of their forefathers; there lie their ethnographical roots. Generally, Byelorussia must be restructured and, as member of the new National-Socialist Europe, must give over land for the resettlement of the Jews.

To hinder any news of the Jewish resettlement program from reaching Germany, Byelorussia had only a few newspapers, civilian transport was reduced to a minimum, and public postal services were prohibited.

Step by step, the Byelorussians were resettled from the eastern to the western part of the country. At first, they are resettled in existing towns. There were only limited possibilities to create new towns during the war. This was announced to happen after the war. A few farmers received new farms in the western part, in order to give hope to the rest (of the eastern population). At the frontier of the military zone, towns were built as fortifications, having to guard the border between the eastern and western parts and to ensure that no Jews leave their territory.

Within their area, the Jews received a mild form of autonomy under the auspices of Germany. Jurisdiction for complicated cases remained in Germany.

3. Complications

The implementation of the resettlement program according to the plan was encumbered due to various circumstances. Rumania began to expel Rumanian Jews to the Soviet Union, whereby the expulsion of German Jews was impaired. Even Frank wanted to resettle as many Jews as possible from his General Government (of Poland), faster than could be managed in the General District of Byelorussia. Here, many unexpected difficulties arose: many German Jews who came to Byelorussia were experienced war veterans. They began to organize a partisan movement, upon which indigenous Jews could rely who had, for fear of the German military, hidden themselves in the neighboring forests. This not only disturbed supplying the front, but also the resettlement of the arriving Jews. The partisan movement was further strengthened through communist veterans from the Spanish civil war, who were deported from camps in France to the Soviet Union. Many young Jews from all parts of Europe joined the partisan movement. In the course of the resettlement of Byelorussians to the western part of their country, the partisan movement gained further support.

Poland had other difficulties to deal with. By transporting Jews from at times remote rural areas of the countryside of Poland, epidemics were brought to Auschwitz and to the east, against which the carriers were immune, but not the other Jews or members of the SS. In order to stop the epidemic, potential carriers were remitted into quarantine in Birkenau for half a year. The relentless transport of the Warsaw Jews and reports of their traceless disappearance led to the assumption that rumors of mass-murder of Jews headed for resettlement were true, thus igniting the rebellion at the Warsaw Ghetto.

4. The Final Solution Is Aborted

Following the defeat of the Germans in Stalingrad, the front slowly began to roll back to the West. Soviet troops drew steadily closer to the eastern border of Byelorussia. Horthy gave his assent reluctantly to the evacuation of the Hungarian Jews after contacting Hitler directly and learning of the

situation of the Jews in the East. At the height of the resettlement program, Soviet troops overran the eastern sector of Byelorussia with tremendous force and in an extremely short time. Horthy stopped all transports of the Hungarian Jews, since the trains had no further destinations. Himmler, who kept hoping for a favorable end of the war, agreed only reluctantly. Those Jews in Auschwitz who were found capable of work were then transferred to Germany.

B. The Soviet Perspective

1. The Period to July 1944

News of Jewish settlements in Byelorussia established under the auspices of Germany and causing a consequent resettlement of Byelorussians seeped through to Byelorussian soldiers and ended in a wave of anti-Semitism. Probably this was encouraged by Stalin, who, as a ruthless leader, was quick to see uses to which this could be put. The Soviet leaders tried to control the Jewish partisan movement that began to establish itself in Byelorussia. This was accomplished in part by delivering weapons and ammunition.

The real problem was what to do with all these individuals after the war. Hitler's anti-Semitism reinforced the Jewish wish for their own country, and it seems that many of the Jews settled in Byelorussia, where old Jewish traditions still existed, saw their future there, but not, of course, under German control. A Jewish Republic as a member of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics seemed feasible, only: this republic would not as easily accept Soviet domination as the other Soviet Republics did, because it could rely on considerable international support. Stalin decided on total control of the Jews, above all because the western Jews were highly skilled and presented an enormous economic potential. Furthermore, Germany could be discredited for years to come.

The 1944 attack on Byelorussia was planned and prepared in such a manner that the area could be occupied within a few days, thereby insuring that nobody could escape. Prominent witnesses, such as the Swede Wallenberg, were apprehended under dubious pretenses and disappeared forever. Since the Red Army reached Berlin first, making sure that it controlled the city for eight weeks all by itself, it was easy to secure relevant files as well as a list of potential witnesses outside Byelorussia. Their former activ-

ities concerned the Soviet Union, thus there was no problem with getting an extradition from the Western Allies. If these witnesses had been active in Poland, the Poles became active, as was the case with Höss.

2. The Period between July 1944 and 1947

At first the liberated Jews were appeased. Of course, the war had to be won first, but subsequently Stalin began to employ the Jewish potential. Enormous funds, more than ever before, were invested in Byelorussia immediately. Hundreds of new enterprises were established, towns were rebuilt or newly created, where this had not already happened under German occupation.

Primarily those Jews who came from the West wanted to leave this uninhabitable area. They were represented by Mikhoels, who asked Stalin for the desolated Crimea as a new homeland. Stalin delayed the decision.

3. The Year 1948

At the end of 1947, Stalin comes to a final decision: the Jews and their fate are to be passed over in silence. For openers, he has Mikhoels murdered in Minsk. After that, Stalin awaits the founding of the state of Israel, and then uses this as a reason to suggest to the Jews in Byelorussia that the rest of the world is not interested in them. Then the process gets underway:

Many Jewish institutions are dissolved, prominent Jews in the Soviet Union lose their posts, and Jewish newspapers are forbidden. Stalin prepares to eliminate Jews from important positions in the Communist parties of Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic. All means of the Jews to make contact with the West through prominent communist Jews are to be prevented.

The ability of foreign diplomats to gather information is drastically cut down: numerous restricted areas emerge where access is prohibited.

The borders are rebuilt into a perfect seal, preventing all means of escape.

Initially, the German POWs are categorized as to whether they had served in units who, due to their area of deployment, might have knowledge of the Jews in Byelorussia; the so-called “detained units” arise. Members of these former units are subjected to detail interrogations; those

who might know something disappear into Siberia. All trace of hundreds of thousands is wiped out.

4. The Period between 1949 to 1953

Stalin redoubles his efforts; all described methods are continued and perfected. Planned show trials are carried out, anti-Zionism and especially the assimilation of Jews living outside Byelorussia is encouraged. His main goal is, however, to have all such Jews disappear into Siberia. That's why he instigates the so-called Doctors' Trials timed to set the appropriate scene for deporting the Jews. Stalin's death ends this project.

5. The Period after 1953

After Stalin's exit, the initiated process continues. Byelorussia's economy continues to be expanded; the resultant shortage of workers leads to resettlement from the western back to the eastern part. The towns are further expanded. The Byelorussian CP gains influence because of the productivity of the local industry. Also enhanced, however, are surveillance and the police force. In 1983, the minister of the interior has 500,000 auxiliary police men at his disposal to conduct monitoring and controlling functions.

The USSR must slowly open itself to the West; tourism cannot be fully denied. To allow this, the secret police receives appropriate powers. Special departments arise allowing the total monitoring of tourists. Restricted-access areas are enlarged.

Jews are, as far as they are Soviet Jews, increasingly coaxed to assimilate. Jewish culture is systematically wiped out; the state of Israel is branded as "the worst of all states."

VII. What Can Be Done?

The reflective reader may ask, what can be done? Because my thesis is based on circumstantial evidence, it can be supported by more circumstantial evidence. Of course, it would be best if the pertinent files were found and one had access to the appropriate archives!

“And Gorbachev?”, some may ask who cannot believe that he – and this must be assumed – backs these enormities, seeing how his name embodies so much hope for so many. There are two easy steps Gorbachev could undertake to refute my arguments. These measures ought to be self-evident, and a credible Gorbachev would have ordered one of them already a long time ago, because it represent the core of *Glasnost*: The permission of freedom of movement within the Soviet Union.

Specifically:

Dissolution of the restricted-access areas for tourists and above all for journalists; one should consider that reports of civil unrest in the Soviet Union originate only from Soviet sources. Why can’t Western journalists report on these directly? Why can’t visitors to the Soviet Union move about as freely as in the other socialist countries? Wouldn’t this be applied *Glasnost*?

It would be very helpful and convincing if the Soviet Union would return all German documents and files on Byelorussia to Germany, or at least make them accessible to the international public. Why shouldn’t this be done, 45 years after the war?

As far as the government of the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned: Would it not be proper for them to make such demands? After all, Gorbachev deserves so much confidence! Will the German government do it? Maybe they are afraid that Gorbachev might not deserve that “confi-

dence,” and so they will do exactly what’s always done in these cases: nothing!

More reasonable, because it is more realistic, would be if the governments of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany would create an independent commission in order to investigate the claims made here!

But I suspect that none of these proposed steps will be taken. What can the reader do? It would be most interesting to find more facts on this conundrum, and there are a lot of areas where they could be found:

A. Information from the Era 1941 – 1944


- Maps, especially military maps, not only on a 1:300,000 scale, but more-precise originals – German and Russian as well.
- Which German military units were in Byelorussia, especially stationed in the eastern sector? What was their fate; who could report on this today?
- Important are diaries, letters, and information from individuals who frequented this area.
- Newspapers, magazines from the area in general, regardless whether they are in German or other languages. For example, I don’t have all the copies of the *Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland* (German Eastern Newspaper) or of the *Minsker Zeitung*; I have no copies of the *Baranowitscher Zeitung*.
- Information concerning the railway system, the reasons for transport restrictions, such as those of 1942/43, are also informative.

B. Information from the Soviet Union

- From where did the German publishing houses get the data on the population distribution of the Soviet Union as published in their atlases?
- Accessible literature on Byelorussia exists that was published in the Soviet Union after 1945. Who commands the language and could peruse them? Who has access to the press archives in Byelorussia?
- Who possesses maps of Byelorussia today? Who has visited and experienced that country?
- What were the questions that helped Soviet interrogators pick out witnesses from the ranks of the “detained units”?


Appendix

Documents




Document 1: Population densities of Europe before 1969

Source: Dierke 1969, p. 83. The excerpt is enlarged and relabeled.



Document 2: Population densities in Europe before 1950


Source: Dierke 1950, p. 74. The excerpt is enlarged and relabeled.



Document 3: Excerpt around Marjina Gorka from German Army Map 1:300,000, Special Edition 1942, Revised II.1943. Source: Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart M640-T55/U53





Document 4: Excerpt around Marjina Gorka from German Army Map 1:300.000, Special Edition 1942, VIII.1943, sheet U54 Minsk.




Document 5: Disruption of 8 railway routes by partisan attacks in one week of July 1943 (Std. = hours). Source: Pottgiesser, p. 91.

Document 6: Positions of partisan attacks in the region of GDV Osten May 1942 and June 1943. Source: Philipp/Heim, Map 23.







Document 7: Situation of Army Group Center on 22 June 1944. Source: Gackenholtz, p. 323.



Document 8: Situation of Army Group Center on 3 July 1944. Source: Gackenholtz, p. 331.




Document 9: Deportations, Massacres and Revolts, October 1943.
Source: Gilbert 1982b, Map 222.




Document 10: Deportations, Death Marches and Revolts, August 1944.

Source: Gilbert 1982b, Map 271.



Document 11: Evacuations and Death Marches, November 1944.

Source: Gilbert 1982b, Map 276.



*Document 12: Routes permitted to Western tourists through Russia in the 1980s.
 Source: Grieben..., p. 83.*

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
HOLOCAUST HANDBOOKS

This ambitious, growing series addresses various aspects of the “Holocaust” of the WWII era. Most of them are based on decades of research from archives all over the world. They are heavily referenced. In contrast to most other works on this issue, the tomes of this series approach its topic with profound academic scrutiny and a critical attitude. Any Holocaust researcher ignoring this series will remain oblivious to some of the most important research in the field. These books are designed to both convince the common reader as well as academics. The following books have appeared so far, or are about to be released.

SECTION ONE:

General Overviews of the Holocaust


The First Holocaust. The Surprising Origin of the Six-Million Figure. By Don Heddesheimer. This compact but substantive study documents



propaganda spread prior to, during and after the FIRST World War that claimed East European Jewry was on the brink of annihilation. The magic number of suffering and dying Jews was 6 million back then as well. The book details how these Jewish fundraising operations in America raised vast sums in the name of feeding suffering Polish and Russian Jews but actually fun-

neled much of the money to Zionist and Communist groups. 5th ed., 200 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#6)

Lectures on the Holocaust. Controversial Issues Cross Examined. By Germar Rudolf. This book first explains why “the Holocaust” is an important topic, and that it is essential to keep an open mind about it. It then tells how



many mainstream scholars expressed doubts and subsequently fell from grace. Next, the physical traces and documents about the various claimed crime scenes and murder weapons are discussed. After that, the reliability of witness testimony is examined. Finally, the author argues for a free

exchange of ideas on this topic. This book gives the most-comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the critical research into the Holocaust. With its dialogue style, it is easy to read, and it can even be used as an encyclopedic compendium. 4th ed., 597 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#15)


Breaking the Spell. The Holocaust, Myth & Reality. By Nicholas Kollerstrom. In 1941, British Intelligence analysts cracked the German “Enigma” code. Hence, in 1942 and 1943, encrypted radio communications between German concentration camps and the Berlin headquarters were decrypted. The intercepted data



Pictured above are the first 50 volumes of scientific studies that comprise the series *Holocaust Handbooks*. More volumes and new editions are constantly in the works. Check www.HolocaustHandbooks.com for updates.


refutes the orthodox “Holocaust” narrative. It reveals that the Germans were desperate to reduce the death rate in their labor camps, which was caused by catastrophic typhus epidemics.







Dr. Kollerstrom, a science historian, has taken these intercepts and a wide array of mostly unchallenged corroborating evidence to show that “witness statements” supporting the human gas chamber narrative clearly clash with the available scientific data. Kollerstrom concludes that the history of the Nazi “Holocaust” has been written by the victors with ulterior motives. It is distorted, exaggerated and largely wrong. With a foreword by Prof. Dr. James Fetzner. 6th ed., 285 pages, b&w ill., bibl., index. (#31)



Debating the Holocaust. A New Look at Both Sides. By Thomas Dalton. Mainstream historians insist that there cannot be, any debate about the Holocaust. But ignoring it

does not make this controversy go away. Traditional scholars admit that there was neither a budget, a plan, nor an order for the Holocaust; that the key camps have all but vanished, and so have any human remains; that material and unequivocal documentary evidence is absent; and that there are serious problems with survivor testimonies. Dalton juxtaposes the traditional Holocaust narrative with revisionist challenges and then analyzes the mainstream’s responses to them. He reveals the weaknesses of both sides, while declaring revisionism the winner of the current state of the debate.





4th ed., 342 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#32)

The Hoax of the Twentieth Century. The Case against the Presumed Extermination of European Jewry. By Arthur R. Butz. The first writer to analyze the entire Holocaust complex in a precise scientific manner. This book exhibits the overwhelming force of arguments accumulated by the mid-1970s. Butz's two main arguments are: 1. All major entities hostile to Germany must have known what was happening to the Jews under German authority. They acted during the war as if no mass slaughter was occurring. 2. All the evidence adduced to prove any mass slaughter has a dual interpretation, while only the innocuous one can be proven to be correct. This book continues to be a major historical reference work, frequently cited by prominent personalities. This edition has numerous supplements with new information gathered over the last 35 years. 4th ed., 524 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#7)

Dissecting the Holocaust. The Growing Critique of 'Truth' and 'Memory.' Edited by Germar Rudolf. *Dissecting the Holocaust* applies state-of-the-art scientific techniques and classic methods of detection to investigate the alleged murder of millions of Jews by Germans during World War II. In 22 contributions—each of some 30 pages—the 17 authors dissect generally accepted paradigms of the “Holocaust.” It reads as excitingly as a crime novel: so many lies, forgeries and deceptions by politicians, historians and scientists are proven. This is the intellectual adventure of the 21st Century. Be part of it! 3rd ed., 635 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#1)

The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry. By Walter N. Sanning. Six Million Jews died in the Holocaust. Sanning did not take that number at face value, but thoroughly explored European population developments and shifts mainly caused by emigration as well as deportations and evacuations conducted by both Nazis and the Soviets, among other things. The book is based mainly on Jewish, Zionist and mainstream sources. It concludes that a sizeable share of the Jews found missing during local censuses after the Second World War, which were so far counted as “Holocaust victims,” had either emigrated (mainly to Israel or the U.S.) or had been deported by Stalin to Siberian labor camps. 3rd ed., foreword by A.R. Butz, epilogue by Germar Rudolf, and an update by the author containing new insights; 264

pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography (#29).

Air-Photo Evidence: World-War-Two Photos of Alleged Mass-Murder Sites Analyzed. By Germar Rudolf (editor). During World War Two both German and Allied reconnaissance aircraft took countless air photos of places of tactical and strategic interest in Europe. These photos are prime evidence for the investigation of the Holocaust. Air photos of locations like Auschwitz, Majdanek, Treblinka, Babi Yar etc. permit an insight into what did or did not happen there. The author has unearthed many pertinent photos and has thoroughly analyzed them. This book is full of air-photo reproductions and schematic drawings explaining them. According to the author, these images refute many of the atrocity claims made by witnesses in connection with events in the German sphere of influence. 6th edition; with a contribution by Carlo Mattogno. 167 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index (#27).

The Leuchter Reports: Critical Edition. By Fred Leuchter, Robert Faurisson and Germar Rudolf. Between 1988 and 1991, U.S. expert on execution technologies Fred Leuchter wrote four reports on whether the Third Reich operated homicidal gas chambers. The first on Auschwitz and Majdanek became world-famous. Based on various arguments, Leuchter concluded that the locations investigated could never have been “utilized or seriously considered to function as execution gas chambers.” The second report deals with gas-chamber claims for the camps Dachau, Mauthausen and Hartheim, while the third reviews design criteria and operation procedures of execution gas chambers in the U.S. The fourth report reviews Pressac's 1989 tome about Auschwitz. 4th ed., 252 pages, b&w illustrations. (#16)

Bungled: “The Destruction of the European Jews”. Raul Hilberg's Failure to Prove National-Socialist “Killing Centers.” By Carlo Mattogno. Raul Hilberg's magnum opus *The Destruction of the European Jews* is an orthodox standard work on the Holocaust. But how does Hilberg support his thesis that Jews were murdered *en masse*? He rips documents out of their context, distorts their content, misinterprets their meaning, and ignores entire archives. He only refers to “useful” witnesses, quotes fragments out of context, and conceals the fact that his witnesses are lying through their teeth. Lies and deceptions permeate Hil-

berg's book, 302 pages, bibliography, index. (#3)

Jewish Emigration from the Third Reich. By Ingrid Weckert. Current historical writings about the Third Reich claim state it was difficult for Jews to flee from Nazi persecution. The truth is that Jewish emigration was welcomed by the German authorities. Emigration was not some kind of wild flight, but rather a lawfully determined and regulated matter. Weckert's booklet elucidates the emigration process in law and policy. She shows that German and Jewish authorities worked closely together. Jews interested in emigrating received detailed advice and offers of help from both sides. 2nd ed., 130 pages, index. (#12)

Inside the Gas Chambers: The Extermination of Mainstream Holocaust Historiography. By Carlo Mattogno. Neither increased media propaganda or political pressure nor judicial persecution can stifle revisionism. Hence, in early 2011, the Holocaust Orthodoxy published a 400-page book (in German) claiming to refute "revisionist propaganda," trying again to prove "once and for all" that there were homicidal gas chambers at the camps of Dachau, Natzweiler, Sachsenhausen, Mauthausen, Ravensbrück, Neuengamme, Stutthof... you name them. Mattogno shows with his detailed analysis of this work of propaganda that mainstream Holocaust hagiography is beating around the bush rather than addressing revisionist research results. He exposes their myths, distortions and lies. 2nd ed., 280 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#25)





SECTION TWO: Specific non-Auschwitz Studies


The Dachau Gas Chamber. By Carlo Mattogno. This study investigates whether the alleged homicidal gas chamber at the infamous Dachau Camp could have been operational. Could these gas chambers have fulfilled their alleged function to kill people as assumed by mainstream historians? Or does the evidence point to an entirely different purpose? This study reviews witness reports and finds that many claims are nonsense or technically impossible. As many layers of confounding misunderstandings and misrepresentations are peeled away, we discover the core of what the truth was concerning the existence of these gas chambers. 154 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#49)

Treblinka: Extermination Camp or Transit Camp? By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. It is alleged that at Treblinka in East Poland between 700,000 and 3,000,000 persons were murdered in 1942 and 1943. The weapons used were said to have been stationary and/or mobile gas chambers, fast-acting or slow-acting poison gas, unslaked lime, superheated steam, electricity, Diesel-exhaust fumes etc. Holocaust historians alleged that bodies were piled as high as multi-storied buildings and burned without a trace, using little or no fuel at all. Graf and Mattogno have now analyzed the origins, logic and technical feasibility of the official version of Treblinka. On the basis of numerous documents they reveal Treblinka's true identity as a mere transit camp. 3rd ed., 384 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#8)


Belzec: Propaganda, Testimonies, Archeological Research and History. By Carlo Mattogno. Witnesses report that between 600,000 and 3 million Jews were murdered in the Belzec Camp, located in Poland. Various murder weapons are claimed to have been used: Diesel-exhaust gas; unslaked lime in trains; high voltage; vacuum chambers; etc. The corpses were incinerated on huge pyres without leaving a trace. For those who know the stories about Treblinka this sounds familiar. Thus, the author has restricted this study to the aspects which are new compared to Treblinka. In contrast to Treblinka, forensic drillings and excavations were performed at Belzec, the results of which are critically reviewed. 142 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#9)

Sobibor: Holocaust Propaganda and Reality. By Jürgen Graf, Thomas Kues and Carlo Mattogno. Between 25,000 and 2 million Jews are said to have been killed in gas chambers in the Sobibór camp in Poland. The corpses were allegedly buried in mass graves and later incinerated on pyres. This book investigates these claims and shows that they are based on the selective use of contradictory eyewitness testimony. Archeological surveys of the camp are analyzed that started in 2000-2001 and carried on until 2018. The book also documents the general National-Socialist policy toward Jews, which never included a genocidal "final solution." In conclusion, Sobibór emerges not as a "pure extermination camp", but as a transit camp from where Jews were deported to the occupied eastern territories. 2nd ed., 456 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#19)







The "Operation Reinhardt" Camps Treblinka, Sobibór, Belzec. By Carlo Mattogno. This study has its first focus on witness testimonies recorded during World War II and the immediate post-war era, many of them discussed here for the first time, thus demonstrating how the myth of the "extermination camps" was created. The second part of this book brings us up to speed with the various archaeological efforts made by mainstream scholars in their attempt to prove that the myth is true. The third part compares the findings of the second part with what we ought to expect, and reveals the chasm between facts and myth. 402 pages, illustrations, bibliography, index. (#28)



Chelmno: A Camp in History & Propaganda. By Carlo Mattogno. At Chelmno, huge masses of Jewish prisoners are said to have been gassed in "gas vans" or shot (claims vary from 10,000 to 1.3 million victims). This study covers the subject from every angle, undermining the orthodox claims about the camp with an overwhelmingly effective body of evidence. Eyewitness statements, gas wagons as extermination weapons, forensics reports and excavations, German documents – all come under Mattogno's scrutiny. Here are the uncensored facts about Chelmno, not the propaganda. This is a complementary volume to the book on *The Gas Vans* (#26). 2nd ed., 188 pages, indexed, illustrated, bibliography. (#23)




The Gas Vans: A Critical Investigation. By Santiago Alvarez and Pierre Marais. Did the Nazis use mobile gas chambers to exterminate 700,000 people? Are witness statements believable? Are documents genuine? Where are the murder weapons? Could they have operated as claimed? Where are the corpses? In order to get to the truth of the matter, Alvarez has scrutinized all known wartime documents and photos about this topic; he has analyzed a huge amount of witness statements as published in the literature and as presented in more than 30 trials held over the decades in Germany, Poland and Israel; and he has examined the claims made in the pertinent mainstream literature. The result of his research is mind-boggling. Note: This book and Mattogno's book on Chelmno were edited in parallel to make sure they are consistent and not repetitive. 2nd ed., 412 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#26)




The Einsatzgruppen in the Occupied Eastern Territories: Genesis, Missions and Actions. By C. Mattogno. Before invading the Soviet Union, the German authorities set up special units meant to secure the area behind the German front. Orthodox historians claim that these units called *Einsatzgruppen* primarily engaged in rounding up and mass-murdering Jews. This study sheds a critical light onto this topic by reviewing all the pertinent sources as well as material traces. It reveals on the one hand that original war-time documents do not fully support the orthodox genocidal narrative, and on the other that most post-"liberation" sources such as testimonies and forensic reports are steeped in Soviet atrocity propaganda and are thus utterly unreliable. In addition, material traces of the claimed massacres are rare due to an attitude of collusion by governments and Jewish lobby groups. 2nd ed., 2 vols., 864 pp., b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#39)

Concentration Camp Majdanek. A Historical and Technical Study. By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. At war's end, the Soviets claimed that up to two million Jews were murdered at the Majdanek Camp in seven gas chambers. Over the decades, however, the Majdanek Museum reduced the death toll three times to currently 78,000, and admitted that there were "only" two gas chambers. By exhaustively researching primary sources, the authors expertly dissect and repudiate the myth of homicidal gas chambers at that camp. They also critically investigated the legend of mass executions of Jews in tank trenches and prove it groundless. Again they have produced a standard work of methodical investigation which authentic historiography cannot ignore. 3rd ed., 358 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#5)



The Neuengamme and Sachsenhausen Gas Chambers. By Carlo Mattogno. The Neuengamme Camp near Hamburg, and the Sachsenhausen Camp north of Berlin allegedly had homicidal gas chambers for the mass gassing of inmates. The evaluation of many postwar interrogation protocols on this topic exposes inconsistencies, discrepancies and contradictions. British interrogating techniques are revealed as manipulative, threatening and mendacious. Finally, technical absurdities of gas-chambers and mass-gassing claims unmask these tales as a mere regurgitation of hearsay stories from other camps, among



them foremost Auschwitz. 178 pages, b&w ill., bibliography, index. (#50)

Concentration Camp Stutthof and Its Function in National Socialist Jewish Policy. By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. Orthodox historians claim that the Stutthof Camp near Danzig, East Prussia, served as a “makeshift” extermination camp in 1944, where inmates were killed in a gas chamber. Based mainly on archival resources, this study thoroughly debunks this view and shows that Stutthof was in fact a center for the organization of German forced labor toward the end of World War II. The claimed gas chamber was a mere delousing facility. 4th ed., 170 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#4)

SECTION THREE: Auschwitz Studies

The Making of the Auschwitz Myth: Auschwitz in British Intercepts, Polish Underground Reports and Post-war Testimonies (1941-1947). By Carlo Mattogno. Using messages sent by the Polish underground to London, SS radio messages sent to and from Auschwitz that were intercepted and decrypted by the British, and a plethora of witness statements made during the war and in the immediate postwar period, the author shows how exactly the myth of mass murder in Auschwitz gas chambers was created, and how it was turned subsequently into “history” by intellectually corrupt scholars who cherry-picked claims that fit into their agenda and ignored or actively covered up literally thousands of lies of “witnesses” to make their narrative look credible. 2nd edition, 514 pp., b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#41)






The Real Case of Auschwitz: Robert van Pelt's Evidence from the Irving Trial Critically Reviewed. By Carlo Mattogno. Prof. Robert van Pelt, a mainstream expert on Auschwitz, became famous when appearing as an expert during the London libel trial of David Irving against Deborah Lipstadt. From it resulted a book titled *The Case for Auschwitz*, in which van Pelt laid out his case for the existence of homicidal gas chambers at that camp. This book is a scholarly response to Prof. van Pelt—and Jean-Claude Pressac, upon whose books van Pelt's study is largely based. Mattogno lists all the evidence van Pelt adduces, and shows one by one that van Pelt misrepresented and misinterpreted every single one of them. This is a book of prime political and







scholarly importance to those looking for the truth about Auschwitz. 3rd ed., 692 pages, b&w illustrations, glossary, bibliography, index. (#22)

Auschwitz: Plain Facts: A Response to Jean-Claude Pressac. Edited by Germar Rudolf, with contributions by Serge Thion, Robert Faurisson and Carlo Mattogno. French pharmacist Jean-Claude Pressac tried to refute revisionist findings with the “technical” method. For this he was praised by the mainstream, and they proclaimed victory over the “revisionists.” In his book, Pressac's works and claims are shown to be unscientific in nature, as he never substantiates what he claims, and historically false, because he systematically misrepresents, misinterprets and misunderstands German wartime documents. 2nd ed., 226 pages, b&w illustrations, glossary bibliography, index. (#14)

Auschwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers: An Introduction and Update. By Germar Rudolf. Pressac's 1989 oversize book of the same title was a trail blazer. Its many document reprints are valuable, but Pressac's annotations are now outdated. This book summarizes the most pertinent research results on Auschwitz gained during the past 30 years. With many references to Pressac's epic tome, it serves as an update and correction to it, whether you own an original hard copy of it, read it online, borrow it from a library, purchase a reprint, or are just interested in such a summary in general. 144 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography. (#42)

The Chemistry of Auschwitz: The Technology and Toxicology of Zyklon B and the Gas Chambers – A Crime-Scene Investigation. By Germar Rudolf. This study documents forensic research on Auschwitz, where material traces reign supreme. Most of the claimed crime scenes – the claimed homicidal gas chambers – are still accessible to forensic examination to some degree. This book addresses questions such as: How were these gas chambers configured? How did they operate? In addition, the infamous Zyklon B is examined in detail. What exactly was it? How did it kill? Did it leave traces in masonry that can be found still today? Indeed, it should have, the author concludes, but several sets of analyses show no trace of it. The author also discusses in depth similar forensic research conducted by other scholars. 4th ed., 454 pages, more than 120 color and over 100 b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#2)





Auschwitz Lies: Legends, Lies and Prejudices on the Holocaust. By Carlo Mattogno and Germar Rudolf. The fallacious research and alleged “refutation” of revisionist scholars by French biochemist G. Wellers (attacking Leuchter’s famous report, #16), Polish chemist Dr. J. Markiewicz and U.S. chemist Dr. Richard Green (taking on Rudolf’s chemical research), Dr. John Zimmerman (tackling Mattogno on cremation issues), Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman (trying to prove it all), as well as researchers Keren, McCarthy and Mazal (who turned cracks into architectural features), are exposed for what they are: blatant and easily exposed political lies created to ostracize dissident historians. 4th ed., 420 pages, b&w illustrations, index. (#18)

Auschwitz: The Central Construction Office. By Carlo Mattogno. When Russian authorities granted access to their archives in the early 1990s, the files of the Auschwitz Central Construction Office, stored in Moscow, attracted the attention of scholars researching the history of this camp. This important office was responsible for the planning and construction of the Auschwitz camp complex, including the crematories which are said to have contained the “gas chambers.” This study sheds light into this hitherto hidden aspect of this camp’s history, but also provides a deep understanding of the organization, tasks, and procedures of this office. 2nd ed., 188 pages, b&w illustrations, glossary, index. (#13)

Garrison and Headquarters Orders of the Auschwitz Camp. By Germar Rudolf and Ernst Böhm. A large number of the orders issued by the various commanders of the Auschwitz Camp have been preserved. They reveal the true nature of the camp with all its daily events. There is not a trace in them pointing at anything sinister going on. Quite to the contrary, many orders are in insurmountable contradiction to claims that prisoners were mass murdered, such as the children of SS men playing with inmates, SS men taking friends for a sight-seeing tour through the camp, or having a romantic stroll with their lovers around the camp grounds. This is a selection of the most pertinent of these orders together with comments putting them into their proper historical context. 185 pages, b&w ill., bibl., index (#34)

Special Treatment in Auschwitz: Origin and Meaning of a Term. By Carlo Mattogno. When appearing in German wartime documents, terms like

“special treatment,” “special action,” and others have been interpreted as code words for mass murder. But that is not always true. This study focuses on documents about Auschwitz, showing that, while “special” had many different meanings, not a single one meant “execution.” Hence the practice of deciphering an alleged “code language” by assigning homicidal meaning to harmless documents – a key component of mainstream historiography – is untenable. 2nd ed., 166 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#10)

Healthcare at Auschwitz. By Carlo Mattogno. In extension of the above study on *Special Treatment in Auschwitz*, this study proves the extent to which the German authorities at Auschwitz tried to provide health care for the inmates. Part 1 of this book analyzes the inmates’ living conditions and the various sanitary and medical measures implemented. It documents the vast construction efforts to build a huge inmate hospital inside the Auschwitz-Birkenau Camp. Part 2 explores what happened to registered inmates who were “selected” or subject to “special treatment” while disabled or sick. This study shows that a lot was tried to cure these inmates, especially under the aegis of Garrison Physician Dr. Wirths. Part 3 is dedicated to this very Dr. Wirths. The reality of this caring philanthropist refutes the current stereotype of SS officers. 398 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#33)

Debunking the Bunkers of Auschwitz: Black Propaganda vs. History. By Carlo Mattogno. The “bunkers” at Auschwitz-Birkenau, two former farmhouses just outside the camp’s perimeter, are claimed to have been the first homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz specifically equipped for this purpose. They supposedly went into operation during the first half of 1942, with thousands of Jews sent straight from deportation trains to these “gas chambers.” However, documents clearly show that all inmates sent to Auschwitz during that time were properly admitted to the camp. No mass murder on arrival can have happened. With the help of other wartime files as well as air photos taken by Allied reconnaissance aircraft in 1944, this study shows that these homicidal “bunkers” never existed, how the rumors about them evolved as black propaganda created by resistance groups in the camp, and how this propaganda was transformed into a false reality by “historians.” 2nd ed.,

292 pages, b&w ill., bibliography, index. (#11)

Auschwitz: The First Gassing. Rumor and Reality. By Carlo Mattogno. The first gassing in Auschwitz is claimed to have occurred on Sept. 3, 1941 in a basement. The accounts reporting it are the archetypes for all later gassing accounts. This study analyzes all available sources about this alleged event. It shows that these sources contradict each other about the event's location, date, the kind of victims and their number, and many more aspects, which makes it impossible to extract a consistent story. Original wartime documents inflict a final blow to this legend and prove without a shadow of a doubt that this legendary event never happened. 4th ed., 262 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#20)

Auschwitz: Crematorium I and the Alleged Homicidal Gasings. By Carlo Mattogno. The morgue of Crematorium I in Auschwitz is said to be the first homicidal gas chamber there. This study analyzes witness statements and hundreds of wartime documents to accurately write a history of that building. Where witnesses speak of gasings, they are either very vague or, if specific, contradict one another and are refuted by documented and material facts. The author also exposes the fraudulent attempts of mainstream historians to convert the witnesses' black propaganda into "truth" by means of selective quotes, omissions, and distortions. Mattogno proves that this building's morgue was never a homicidal gas chamber, nor could it have worked as such. 2nd ed., 152 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#21)




Auschwitz: Open-Air Incinerations. By Carlo Mattogno. In 1944, 400,000 Hungarian Jews were deported to Auschwitz and allegedly murdered in gas chambers. The camp crematoria were unable to cope with so many corpses. Therefore, every single day thousands of corpses are claimed to have been incinerated on huge pyres lit in trenches. The sky was filled with thick smoke, if we believe witnesses. This book examines many testimonies regarding these incinerations and establishes whether these claims were even possible. Using air photos, physical evidence and wartime documents, the author shows that these claims are fiction. A new Appendix contains 3 papers on groundwater levels and cattle mass burnings. 2nd ed., 202 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#17)




The Cremation Furnaces of Auschwitz. By Carlo Mattogno & Franco Deana. An exhaustive study of the early history and technology of cremation in general and of the cremation furnaces of Auschwitz in particular. On a vast base of technical literature, extant wartime documents and material traces, the authors establish the nature and capacity of these cremation furnaces, showing that these devices were inferior makeshift versions, and that their capacity was lower than normal. The Auschwitz crematoria were not facilities of mass destruction, but installations barely managing to handle the victims among the inmates who died of various epidemics. 2nd ed., 3 vols., 1201 pages, b&w and color illustrations (vols 2 & 3), bibliography, index, glossary. (#24)

Curated Lies: The Auschwitz Museum's Misrepresentations, Distortions and Deceptions. By Carlo Mattogno. Revisionist research results have put the Polish Auschwitz Museum under enormous pressure to answer this challenge. They've answered. This book analyzes their answer. It first exposes the many tricks and lies used by the museum to bamboozle millions of visitors every year regarding its most valued asset, the "gas chamber" in the Main Camp. Next, it reveals how the museum's historians mislead and lie through their teeth about documents in their archives. A long string of completely innocuous documents is mistranslated and misrepresented to make it look like they prove the existence of homicidal gas chambers. 2nd ed., 259 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#38)

Deliveries of Coke, Wood and Zyklon B to Auschwitz: Neither Proof Nor Trace for the Holocaust. By Carlo Mattogno. Researchers from the Auschwitz Museum tried to prove the reality of mass extermination by pointing to documents about deliveries of wood and coke as well as Zyklon B to the Auschwitz Camp. If put into the actual historical and technical context, however, as is done by this study, these documents prove the exact opposite of what those orthodox researchers claim. This study exposes the mendacious tricks with which these museum officials once more deceive the trusting public. 184 pages, b&w illust., bibl., index. (#40)

Mis-Chronicling Auschwitz. Danuta Czech's Flawed Methods, Lies and Deceptions in Her "Auschwitz Chronicle". By Carlo Mattogno. The *Auschwitz Chronicle* is a reference book for the history of the Auschwitz





Camp. It was published in 1990 by Danuta Czech, one of the Auschwitz Museum's most prolific and impactful historians. Analyzing this almost 1,000-page long tome one entry at a time, Mattogno has compiled a long list of misrepresentations, outright lies and deceptions contained in it. They all aim at creating the otherwise unsubstantiated claim that homicidal gas chambers and lethal injections were used at Auschwitz for mass-murdering inmates. This literary mega-fraud needs to be retired from the ranks of Auschwitz sources. 324 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#47)

The Real Auschwitz Chronicle. By Carlo Mattogno. Nagging is easy. We actually did a better job! That which is missing in Czech's *Chronicle* is included here: day after day of the camp's history, documents are presented showing that it could not have been an extermination camp: tens of thousands of sick and injured inmates were cared for medically with huge efforts, and the camp authorities tried hard to improve the initially catastrophic hygienic conditions. Part Two contains data on transports, camp occupancy and mortality figures. For the first time, we find out what this camp's real death toll was. 2 vols., 906 pp., b&w illustrations (Vol. 2), bibliography, index. (#48)

Politics of Slave Labor: The Fate of the Jews Deported from Hungary and the Lodz Ghetto in 1944. By Carlo Mattogno. The deportation of the Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz in May-July 1944 is said to have been the pinnacle of this camp's extermination frenzy, topped off in August of that year by the extermination of Jews deported from the Lodz Ghetto. This book gathers and explains all the evidence available on both events. In painstaking research, the author proves almost on a person-by-person level what the fate was of many of the Jews deported from Hungary or the Lodz Ghetto. He demonstrates that these Jews were deported to serve as slave laborers in the Third Reich's collapsing war economy. There is no trace of any extermination of any of these Jews. 338 pp., b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#51)

SECTION FOUR: Witness Critique

Elie Wiesel, Saint of the Holocaust: A Critical Biography. By Warren B. Rudolph. This book analyzes several of Wiesel's texts, foremost his

camp autobiography *Night*. The author proves that much of what Wiesel claims can never have happened. It shows how Zionist control has allowed Wiesel and his fellow extremists to force leaders of many nations, the U.N. and even popes to genuflect before Wiesel as symbolic acts of subordination to World Jewry, while at the same time forcing school children to submit to Holocaust brainwashing. This study also shows how parallel to this abuse of power, critical reactions to it also increased: Holocaust revisionism. While Catholics jumped on the Holocaust band wagon, the number of Jews rejecting certain aspect of the Holocaust narrative and its abuse grew as well. This first unauthorized biography of Wiesel exposes both his personal deceits and the whole myth of "the six million." 3rd ed., 458 pages, b&w illustration, bibliography, index. (#30)

Auschwitz: Eyewitness Reports and Perpetrator Confessions. By Jürgen Graf. The traditional narrative of what transpired at the infamous Auschwitz camp during WWII rests almost exclusively on witness testimony from former inmates as well as erstwhile camp officials. This study critically scrutinizes the 30 most important of these witness statements by checking them for internal coherence, and by comparing them with one another as well as with other evidence such as wartime documents, air photos, forensic research results, and material traces. The result is devastating for the traditional narrative. 372 pages, b&w illust., bibl., index. (#36)

Commandant of Auschwitz: Rudolf Höss, His Torture and His Forced Confessions. By Carlo Mattogno & Rudolf Höss. From 1940 to 1943, Rudolf Höss was the commandant of the infamous Auschwitz Camp. After the war, he was captured by the British. In the following 13 months until his execution, he made 85 depositions of various kinds in which he confessed his involvement in the "Holocaust." This study first reveals how the British tortured him to extract various "confessions." Next, all of Höss's depositions are analyzed by checking his claims for internal consistency and comparing them with established historical facts. The results are eye-opening... 2nd ed., 411 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#35)

An Auschwitz Doctor's Eyewitness Account: The Tall Tales of Dr. Mengele's Assistant Analyzed. By Miklos Nyiszli & Carlo Mattogno.

Nyiszli, a Hungarian physician, ended up at Auschwitz in 1944 as Dr. Mengele's assistant. After the war he wrote a book and several other writings describing what he claimed to have experienced. To this day some traditional historians take his accounts seriously, while others reject them as grotesque lies and exaggerations. This study presents and analyzes Nyiszli's writings and skillfully separates truth from fabulous fabrication. 2nd ed., 484 pages, b&w illustrations, bibliography, index. (#37)



Rudolf Reder versus Kurt Gerstein: Two False Testimonies on the Belzec Camp Analyzed. By Carlo Mattogno. Only two witnesses have ever testified substantially about the alleged Belzec Extermination Camp: The survivor Rudolf Reder and the SS officer Kurt Gerstein. Gerstein's testimonies have been a hotspot of revisionist critique for decades. It is now discredited even among orthodox historians. They use Reder's testimony to fill the void, yet his testimonies are just as absurd. This study thoroughly scrutinizes Reder's various statements, critically revisits Gerstein's various depositions, and then compares these two testimonies which are at once similar in some respects, but incompatible in others. 216 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#43)

Sonderkommando Auschwitz I: Nine Eyewitness Testimonies Analyzed. By Carlo Mattogno. The 1979 book *Auschwitz Inferno* by alleged former Auschwitz "Sonderkommando" member Filip Müller has a great influence on the perception of Auschwitz by the public and by historians. This book critically analyzes Müller's various post-war statements, which are full of exaggerations, falsehoods and plagiarized text passages. Also scrutinized are the testimonies of eight other claimed former *Sonderkommando* members: D. Paisikovic, S. Jankowski, H. Mandelbaum, L. Nagraba, J. Rosenblum, A. Pilo, D. Fliamenbaum and S. Karolinskij. 304 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#44)

Sonderkommando Auschwitz II: The False Testimonies by Henryk Tauber and Szlama Dragon. By Carlo Mattogno. Auschwitz survivor and former member of the so-called "Sonderkommando" Henryk Tauber is one of the most important witnesses about the alleged gas chambers inside the crematoria at Auschwitz, because right at the war's end, he made several extremely detailed depositions about it. The same is true for Szlama Dragon, only he claims to have worked at the so-called "bunkers" of Birkenau, two makeshift gas chambers just outside the camp perimeter. This study thoroughly scrutinizes these two key testimonies. 254 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#45)

Sonderkommando Auschwitz III: They Wept Crocodile Tears. A Critical Analysis of Late Witness Testimonies. By Carlo Mattogno. This book focuses on the critical analysis of witness testimonies on the alleged Auschwitz gas chambers recorded or published in the 1990s and early 2000s, such as J. Sackar, A. Dragon, J. Gabai, S. Chasan, L. Cohen and S. Venezia, among others. 232 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#46)

Auschwitz Engineers in Moscow: The Soviet Postwar Interrogations of the Auschwitz Cremation-Furnace Engineers. By Carlo Mattogno and Jürgen Graf. After the war, the Soviets arrested four leading engineers of the Topf Company. Among other things, they had planned and supervised the construction of the Auschwitz cremation furnaces and the ventilation systems of the rooms said to have served as homicidal gas chambers. Between 1946 and 1948, Soviet officials conducted numerous interrogations with them. This work analyzes them by putting them into the context of the vast documentation on these and related facilities. The appendix contains all translated interrogation protocols. 254 pages, b&w illust., bibliography, index. (#52)




For current prices and availability, and to learn more, go to www.HolocaustHandbooks.com – for example by simply scanning the QR code on the right.



Three decades of unflagging archival and forensic research by the world's most knowledgeable, courageous and prodigious Holocaust scholars have finally coalesced into a reference book that makes all this knowledge readily accessible to everyone:

HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA **uncensored and unconstrained**

Available as paperback (b&w) or hardcover (color), 634 pages, 8.5"×11"; as eBook (ePub or PDF) and eBook + audio (ePub + mp3); more than 350 illustrations in 579 entries; introduction, bibliography, index. Online at www.NukeBook.org



We all know the basics of “The Holocaust.” But what about the details? Websites and printed encyclopedias can help us there. Take the 4-volume encyclopedia by Israel’s Yad Vashem Center: *The Encyclopedia of the Holocaust* (1990). For every significant crime scene, it presents a condensed narrative of Israel’s finest Holocaust scholars. However, it contains not one entry about witnesses and their stories, even though they are the foundation of our knowledge. When a murder is committed, the murder weapon and the crime’s traces are of crucial importance. Yet Yad Vashem’s encyclopedia has no entries explaining scientific findings on these matters – not one.

This is where the present encyclopedia steps in. It not only summarizes and explains the many pieces that make up the larger Holocaust picture. It also reveals the evidence that confirms or contradicts certain notions. Nearly 300 entries present the essence of important witness accounts, and they are subjected to source criticism. This enables us to decide which witness claims are credible.

For all major crime scenes, the sometimes-conflicting claims are presented. We learn how our knowledge has changed over time, and what evidence shores up the currently valid

narrative of places such as Auschwitz, Belzec, Sobibór, Treblinka, Dachau and Bergen-Belsen and many more.

Other entries discuss tools and mechanisms allegedly used for the mass murders, and how the crimes’ traces were erased, if at all. A few entries discuss toxicological issues surrounding the various lethal gases claimed to have been used.

This encyclopedia has multiple entries on some common claims about aspects of the Holocaust, including a list of “Who said it?” This way we can quickly find proof for these claims.

Finally, several entries address factors that have influenced the creation of the Holocaust narrative, and how we perceive it today. This includes entries on psychological warfare and wartime propaganda; on conditions prevailing during investigations and trials of alleged Holocaust perpetrators; on censorship against historical dissidents; on the religious dimension of the Holocaust narrative; and on motives of all sides involved in creating and spreading their diverse Holocaust narratives.

In this important volume, now with 579 entries, you will discover many astounding aspects of the Holocaust narrative that you did not even know exist.

BOOKS ON THE HOLOCAUST AND FREE SPEECH

On the next six pages, we list some of the books available from ARMREG that are not part of the series *Holocaust Handbooks*. For our current range of products, visit our web store at www.ARMREG.co.uk.

The Holocaust: An Introduction. By Thomas Dalton. The Holocaust was perhaps the greatest crime of the 20th Century. Six million Jews, we are told, died by gassing, shooting, and deprivation. But: Where did the six-million figure come from? How, exactly, did the gas chambers work? Why do we have so little physical evidence from major death camps? Why haven't we found even a fraction of the six million bodies, or their ashes? Why has there been so much media suppression and governmental censorship on this topic? In a sense, the Holocaust is the greatest murder mystery in history. It is a topic of greatest importance for the present day. Let's explore the evidence, and see where it leads. 128 pp. pb, 6"x9", ill., bibl., index.






Auschwitz: A Three-Quarter Century of Propaganda: Origins, Development and Decline of the "Gas Chamber" Propaganda Lie. By Carlo Mattogno. Wild rumors were circulating about Auschwitz during WWII: Germans testing war gases; mass murder in electrocution chambers, with gas showers or pneumatic hammers; living people sent on conveyor belts into furnaces; grease and soap made of the victims. Nothing of it was true. When the Soviets captured Auschwitz in early 1945, they reported that 4 million inmates were killed on electrocution conveyor belts discharging their load directly into furnaces. That wasn't true either. After the war, "witnesses" and "experts" added more claims: mass murder with gas bombs, gas chambers made of canvas; crematoria burning 400 million victims... Again, none of it was true. This book gives an overview of the many rumors and lies about Auschwitz today rejected as untrue, and exposes the ridiculous methods that turned some claims into "history," although they are just as untrue. 125 pp. pb, 6"x9", ill., bibl., index, b&w ill.

Auschwitz: A Judge Looks at the Evidence. By Wilhelm Stäglich. Auschwitz is the epicenter of the Holocaust, where more people are said to have been murdered than anywhere else.

The most important evidence for this claim was presented during two trials: the International Military Tribunal of 1945/46, and the German Auschwitz Trial of 1963-1965. In this book, Wilhelm Stäglich, a former German judge, reveals the incredibly scandalous way in which Allied victors and German courts bent and broke the law in order to come to politically foregone conclusions. Stäglich also exposes the superficial way in which historians are dealing with the many incongruities and discrepancies of the historical record. 3rd edition 2015, 422 pp. pb, 6"x9", b&w ill.

Hilberg's Giant with Feet of Clay. By Jürgen Graf. Raul Hilberg's major work *The Destruction of the European Jews* is generally considered the standard work on the Holocaust. The critical reader might ask: what evidence does Hilberg provide to back his thesis that there was a German plan to exterminate Jews, to be carried out in the legendary gas chambers? And what evidence supports his estimate of 5.1 million Jewish victims? Jürgen Graf applies the methods of critical analysis to Hilberg's evidence, and examines the results in the light of revisionist historiography. The results of Graf's critical analysis are devastating for Hilberg. Graf's analysis is the first comprehensive and systematic examination of the leading spokesperson for the orthodox version of the Jewish fate during the Third Reich. 3rd edition 2022, 182 pp. pb, 6"x9", b&w ill.

Exactitude: Festschrift for Prof. Dr. Robert Faurisson. By R.H. Countess, C. Lindtner, G. Rudolf (eds.) Faurisson probably deserves the title of the most-courageous intellectual of the 20th and the early 21st Century. With bravery and steadfastness, he challenged the dark forces of historical and political fraud with his unrelenting exposure of their lies and hoaxes surrounding the orthodox Holocaust narrative. This book describes and celebrates the man and his work dedicated to accuracy and marked by in-submission. 146 pp. pb, 6"x9", b&w ill.



Auschwitz – Forensically Examined.

By Cyrus Cox. Modern forensic crime-scene investigations can reveal a lot about the Holocaust. There are many big times about this. But if you want it all in a nutshell, read this booklet. It condenses the most-important findings of Auschwitz forensics into a quick and easy read. In the first section, the forensic investigations conducted so far are reviewed. In the second section, the most-important results of these studies are summarized. The main arguments focus on two topics. The first centers around the poison allegedly used at Auschwitz for mass murder: Zyklon B. Did it leave any traces in masonry where it was used? Can it be detected to this day? The second topic deals with mass cremations. Did the crematoria of Auschwitz have the claimed huge capacity? Do air photos taken during the war confirm witness statements on huge smoking pyres? This book gives the answers, together with many references to source material and further reading. The third section reports on how the establishment has reacted to these research results. 2nd ed., 128 pp. pb., b&w ill., bibl., index.






Ulysses's Lie. By Paul Rassinier. Holocaust revisionism began with this book: Frenchman Rassinier, a pacifist and socialist, was sent first to Buchenwald Camp in 1944, then to Dora-Mittelbau. Here he reports from his own experience how the prisoners turned each other's imprisonment into hell without being forced to do so. In the second part, Rassinier analyzes the books of former fellow prisoners, and shows how they lied and distorted in order to hide their complicity. First complete English edition, including Rassinier's prologue, Albert Paraz's preface, and press reviews. 270 pp. 6"x9" pb, bibl, index.

The Second Babylonian Captivity: The Fate of the Jews in Eastern Europe since 1941. By Steffen Werner. "But if they were not murdered, where did the six million deported Jews end up?" This objection demands a well-founded response. While researching an entirely different topic, Werner stumbled upon peculiar demographic data of Belorussia. Years of research subsequently revealed more evidence which eventually allowed him to

propose: The Third Reich did indeed deport many of the Jews of Europe to Eastern Europe in order to settle them there "in the swamp." This book shows what really happened to the Jews deported to the East by the National Socialists, how they have fared since. It provides context for hitherto-obscure historical events and obviates extreme claims such as genocide and gas chambers. With a preface by Germar Rudolf. 190 pp. pb, 6"x9", b&w ill., bibl., index

Holocaust Skepticism: 20 Questions and Answers about Holocaust Revisionism. By Germar Rudolf. This 15-page brochure introduces the novice to the concept of Holocaust revisionism, and answers 20 tough questions, among them: What does Holocaust revisionism claim? Why should I take Holocaust revisionism more seriously than the claim that the earth is flat? How about the testimonies by survivors and confessions by perpetrators? What about the pictures of corpse piles in the camps? Why does it matter how many Jews were killed by the Nazis, since even 1,000 would have been too many? ... Glossy full-color brochure. PDF file free of charge available at www.HolocaustHandbooks.com, Option "Promotion". This item is *not* copyright-protected. Hence, you can do with it whatever you want: download, post, email, print, multiply, hand out, sell... 20 pp., stapled, 8.5"x11", full-color throughout.

Bungled: "Denying the Holocaust" How Deborah Lipstadt Botched Her Attempt to Demonstrate the Growing Assault on Truth and Memory. By Germar Rudolf. With her book *Denying the Holocaust*, Deborah Lipstadt tried to show the flawed methods and extremist motives of "Holocaust deniers." This book demonstrates that Dr. Lipstadt clearly has neither understood the principles of science and scholarship, nor has she any clue about the historical topics she is writing about. She misquotes, mistranslates, misrepresents, misinterprets, and makes a plethora of wild claims without backing them up with anything. Rather than dealing thoroughly with factual arguments, Lipstadt's book is full of *ad hominem* attacks on her opponents. It is an exercise in anti-intellectual pseudo-scientific





arguments, an exhibition of ideological radicalism that rejects anything which contradicts its preset conclusions. **F for FAIL.** 2nd ed., 224 pp. pb, 6"×9", bibl., index, b&w ill.

Bungled: "Denying History". How Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman Botched Their Attempt to Refute Those Who Say the Holocaust Never Happened. By Carolus Magnus (C. Mattogno). *Skeptic Magazine* editor Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman from the Simon Wiesenthal Center wrote a book claiming to be "a thorough and thoughtful answer to all the claims of the Holocaust deniers." As this book shows, however, Shermer and Grobman completely ignored almost all the "claims" made in the more than 10,000 pages of more-recent cutting-edge revisionist archival and forensic research. Furthermore, they piled up a heap of falsifications, contortions, omissions and fallacious interpretations of the evidence. Finally, what the authors claim to have demolished is not revisionism but a ridiculous parody of it. They ignored the known unreliability of their cherry-picked selection of evidence, utilized unverified and incestuous sources, and obscured the massive body of research and all the evidence that dooms their project to failure. 162 pp. pb, 6"×9", bibl., index, b&w ill.

Bungled: "Debunking Holocaust Denial Theories". How James and Lance Morcan Botched Their Attempt to Affirm the Historicity of the Nazi Genocide. By Carolus Magnus. The novelists and movie-makers James and Lance Morcan have produced a book "to end [Holocaust] denial once and for all" by disproving "the various arguments Holocaust deniers use to try to discredit wartime records." It's a lie. First, the Morcans completely ignored the vast amount of recent scholarly studies published by revisionists; they don't even mention them. Instead, they engage in shadowboxing, creating some imaginary, bogus "revisionist" scarecrow which they then tear to pieces. In addition, their knowledge even of their own side's source material is dismal, and the way they back up their misleading or false claims is pitifully inadequate. 144 pp. pb, 6"×9", bibl., index, b&w ill.

Stalin's War of Extermination 1941-1945. By Joachim Hoffmann. A German government historian documents Stalin's murderous war against the German army and the German people. Based on the author's lifelong study of German and Russian military records, this book reveals the Red Army's grisly record of atrocities against soldiers and civilians, as ordered by Stalin. Since the 1920s, Stalin planned to invade Western Europe to initiate the "World Revolution." He prepared an attack which was unparalleled in history. The Germans noticed Stalin's aggressive intentions, but they underestimated the strength of the Red Army. What unfolded was the cruelest war in history. This book shows how Stalin and his Bolshevik henchman used unimaginable violence and atrocities to break any resistance in the Red Army and to force their unwilling soldiers to fight against the Germans. The book explains how Soviet propagandists incited their soldiers to unlimited hatred against everything German, and he gives the reader a short but extremely unpleasant glimpse into what happened when these Soviet soldiers finally reached German soil in 1945: A gigantic wave of looting, arson, rape, torture, and mass murder... **428 pp. pb, 6"×9", bibl., index, b&w ill.**

Who Started World War II: Truth for a War-Torn World. By Udo Walendy. For seven decades, mainstream historians have insisted that Germany was the main, if not the sole culprit for unleashing World War II in Europe. In the present book this myth is refuted. There is available to the public today a great number of documents on the foreign policies of the Great Powers before September 1939 as well as a wealth of literature in the form of memoirs of the persons directly involved in the decisions that led to the outbreak of World War II. Together, they made possible Walendy's present mosaic-like reconstruction of the events before the outbreak of the war in 1939. This book has been published only after an intensive study of sources, taking the greatest care to minimize speculation and inference. The present edition has been translated completely anew from the German original and has been slightly revised. 500 pp. pb, 6"×9", index, bibl., b&w ill.



The Day Amazon Murdered Free Speech. By Germar Rudolf. Amazon is the world's biggest book retailer. They dominate the U.S. and several foreign markets. Pursuant to the 1998 declaration of Amazon's founder Jeff Bezos to offer "the good, the bad and the ugly," customers once could buy every title that was in print and was legal to sell. However, in early 2017, a series of anonymous bomb threats against Jewish community centers occurred in the U.S., fueling a campaign by Jewish groups to coax Amazon into banning revisionist writings. On March 6, 2017, Amazon caved in and banned more than 100 books with dissenting viewpoints on the Holocaust. In April 2017, an Israeli Jew was arrested for having placed the fake bomb threats. But Amazon kept its new censorship policy: They next culled any literature critical of Jews or Judaism; then they enforced these bans at all its subsidiaries, such as AbeBooks and The Book Depository; then they banned books other pressure groups don't like; finally, they bullied Ingram, who has a book-distribution monopoly in the US, to enforce the same rules by banning from the entire world-wide book market all books Amazon doesn't like... 3rd ed., 158 pp. pb, 6"x9", bibl., color illustrations throughout.

The First Zündel Trial: The Transcript. In the early 1980s, Ernst Zündel, a German living in Toronto, was indicted for allegedly spreading "false news" by selling copies of Harwood's brochure *Did Six Million Really Die?*, which challenged the accuracy of the orthodox Holocaust narrative. When the case went to court in 1985, so-called Holocaust experts and "eyewitnesses" of the alleged homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz were cross-examined for the first time in history by a competent and skeptical legal team. The results were absolutely devastating for the Holocaust orthodoxy. For decades, these mind-boggling trial transcripts were hidden from public view. Now, for the first time, they have been published in print in this new book – unabridged and unedited. 820 pp. pb, 8.5"x11"





The Holocaust on Trial: The Second Trial against Ernst Zündel 1988. By Ernst Zündel. In 1988, the appeal trial of Ernst Zündel for "knowingly

spreading false news about the Holocaust" took place in Toronto. This book is introduced by a brief autobiographic summary of Zündel's early life, and an overview of the evidence introduced during the First Zündel Trial. This is followed by a detailed summary of the testimonies of all the witnesses who testified during the Second Zündel Trial. This was the most-comprehensive and -competent argument ever fought in a court of law over the Holocaust. The arguments presented have fueled revisionism like no other event before, in particular Fred Leuchter's expert report on the gas chambers of Auschwitz and Majdanek, and the testimony of British historian David Irving. Critically annotated edition with a foreword by Germar Rudolf. 410 pp. pb, 6"x9", index.

The Second Zündel Trial: Excerpts from the Transcript. By Barbara Kulaszka (ed.). In contrast to Ernst Zündel's book *The Holocaust on Trial* (see earlier description), this book focuses entirely on the Second Zündel Trial by exclusively quoting, paraphrasing and summarizing the entire trial transcript... 498 pp. pb, 8.5"x11", bibl., index, b&w ill.

Resistance Is Obligatory! By Germar Rudolf. In 2005, Rudolf, dissident publisher of revisionist literature, was kidnapped by the U.S. government and deported to Germany. There a show trial was staged. Rudolf was not permitted to defend his historical opinions. Yet he defended himself anyway: Rudolf gave a 7-day speech-proving that only the revisionists are scholarly in their approach, whereas the Holocaust orthodoxy is merely pseudo-scientific. He then explained why it is everyone's obligation to resist, without violence, a government which throws peaceful dissidents into dungeons. When Rudolf tried to publish his defence speech as a book, the public prosecutor initiated a new criminal investigation against him. After his probation time ended in 2011, he dared publish this speech anyway... 2nd ed. 2016, 378 pp. pb, 6"x9", b&w ill.

Hunting Germar Rudolf: Essays on a Modern-Day Witch Hunt. By Germar Rudolf. German-born revisionist activist, author and publisher Germar Rudolf describes which events made



him convert from a Holocaust believer to a Holocaust skeptic, quickly rising to a leading personality within the revisionist movement. This in turn unleashed a tsunami of persecution against him: lost his job, denied his PhD exam, destruction of his family, driven into exile, slandered by the mass media, literally hunted, caught, put on a show trial where filing motions to introduce evidence is illegal under the threat of further prosecution, and finally locked up in prison for years for nothing else than his peaceful yet controversial scholarly writings. In several essays, Rudolf takes the reader on a journey through an absurd world of government and societal persecution which most of us could never even fathom actually exists in a “Western democracy”... 304 pp. pb, 6”x9”, bibl., index, b&w ill.

Love: The Pursuit of Happiness. By Germar Rudolf. Rudolf’s autobiography on the sensual and emotional aspects of his life: love, affection, romance and erotica, as well as the lack of it. It tells about his human relationships with parents, siblings, friends and girlfriends, wives and children – and with a little puppy called Daisy; about his trials and tribulations as a lover and husband, and most importantly as a father of five children. This book might assist many readers to understand themselves and to help resolve or avoid relationship conflicts. It is an account filled with both humility and humor. Ca. 230 pp. pb, 6”x9” (to appear in late 2024)




The Book of the Shulchan Aruch. By Erich Bischoff. Most people have heard of the Talmud-that compendium of Jewish laws. The Talmud, however, is vast and largely inscrutable. Fortunately, back in the mid-1500s, a Jewish rabbi created a condensed version of it: the Shulchan Aruch. A fair number of passages in it discuss non-Jews. The laws of Judaism hold Gentiles in very low regard; they can be cheated, lied to, abused, even killed, if it serves Jewish interests. Bischoff, an expert in Jewish religious law, wrote a summary and analysis of this book. He shows us many dark corners of the Jewish religion. 152 pp. pb, 6”x9”.

Hitler’s Revolution: Ideology, Social Programs, Foreign Affairs. By Richard Tedor. Defying all boycotts, Adolf

Hitler transformed Germany from a bankrupt state to the powerhouse of Europe within just four years, thus becoming Germany’s most popular leader ever. How was this possible? This study tears apart the dense web of calumny surrounding this controversial figure. It draws on nearly 200 published German sources, many from the Nazi era, as well as documents from British, U.S., and Soviet archives that describe not only what Hitler did but, more importantly, why he did it. These sources also reveal the true war objectives of the democracies – a taboo subject for orthodox historians – and the resulting world war against Germany. This book is aimed at anyone who feels that something is missing from conventional accounts. 2nd ed., 309 pp. pb, 6”x9”, index, bibl.

Hitler on the Jews. By Thomas Dalton. That Adolf Hitler spoke out against the Jews is beyond obvious. But of the thousands of books and articles written on Hitler, virtually none quotes Hitler’s exact words on the Jews. The reason for this is clear: Those in positions of influence have incentives to present a simplistic picture of Hitler as a blood-thirsty tyrant. However, Hitler’s take on the Jews is far more complex and sophisticated. In this book, for the first time, you can make up your own mind by reading nearly every idea that Hitler put forth about the Jews, in considerable detail and in full context. This is the first book ever to compile his remarks on the Jews. As you will discover, Hitler’s analysis of the Jews, though hostile, is erudite, detailed, and – surprise, surprise – largely aligns with events of recent decades. There are many lessons here for the modern-day world to learn. 200 pp. pb, 6”x9”, index, bibl.

Goebbels on the Jews. By Thomas Dalton. From the age of 26 until his death in 1945, Joseph Goebbels kept a near-daily diary. It gives us a detailed look at the attitudes of one of the highest-ranking men in Nazi Germany. Goebbels shared Hitler’s dislike of the Jews, and likewise wanted them removed from the Reich. Ultimately, Goebbels and others sought to remove the Jews completely from Europe—perhaps to the island of Madagascar. This would be the “final solution” to the Jewish Question. Nowhere in the



diary does Goebbels discuss any Hitler order to kill the Jews, nor is there any reference to extermination camps, gas chambers, or any methods of systematic mass-murder. Goebbels acknowledges that Jews did indeed die by the thousands; but the range and scope of killings evidently fall far short of the claimed figure of 6 million. This book contains, for the first time, every significant diary entry relating to the Jews or Jewish policy. Also included are partial or full transcripts of 10 major essays by Goebbels on the Jews. 274 pp. pb, 6"x9", index, bibl.

The Jewish Hand in the World Wars.

By Thomas Dalton. For many centuries, Jews have had a negative reputation in many countries. The reasons given are plentiful, but less-well-known is their involvement in war. When we examine the causal factors for wars, and look at their primary beneficiaries, we repeatedly find a Jewish presence. Throughout history, Jews have played an exceptionally active role in promoting and inciting wars. With their long-notorious influence in government, we find recurrent instances of Jews promoting hard-line stances, being uncompromising, and actively inciting people to hatred. Jewish misanthropy, rooted in Old Testament mandates, and combined with a ruthless materialism, has led them, time and again, to instigate warfare if it served their larger interests. This fact explains much about the present-day world. In this book, Thomas Dalton examines in detail the Jewish hand in the two world wars. Along the way, he dissects Jewish motives and Jewish strategies for maximizing gain amidst warfare, reaching back centuries. 2nd ed., 231 pp. pb, 6"x9", index, bibl.



Eternal Strangers: Critical Views of Jews and Judaism through the Ages.

By Thomas Dalton. It is common

knowledge that Jews have been disliked for centuries. But why? Our best hope for understanding this recurrent 'anti-Semitism' is to study the history: to look at the actual words written by prominent critics of the Jews, in context, and with an eye to any common patterns that might emerge. Such a study reveals strikingly consistent observations: Jews are seen in very negative, yet always similar terms. The persistence of such comments is remarkable and strongly suggests that the cause for such animosity resides in the Jews themselves—in their attitudes, their values, their ethnic traits and their beliefs.. This book addresses the modern-day "Jewish problem" in all its depth—something which is arguably at the root of many of the world's social, political and economic problems. 186 pp. pb, 6"x9", index, bibl.

Streicher, Rosenberg, and the Jews: The Nuremberg Transcripts.

By Thomas Dalton. Who, apart from Hitler, contrived the Nazi view on the Jews? And what were these master ideologues thinking? During the post-war International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the most-interesting men on trial regarding this question were two with a special connection to the "Jewish Question": Alfred Rosenberg and Julius Streicher. The cases against them, and their personal testimonies, examined for the first time nearly all major aspects of the Holocaust story: the "extermination" thesis, the gas chambers, the gas vans, the shootings in the East, and the "6 million." The truth of the Holocaust has been badly distorted for decades by the powers that be. Here we have the rare opportunity to hear firsthand from two prominent figures in Nazi Germany. Their voices, and their verbatim transcripts from the IMT, lend some much-needed clarity to the situation. 330 pp. pb, 6"x9", index, bibl.



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